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PREFACE
The COmmittee on Population and Demography was estab-
lished in April 1977 by the National Research COuncil in
response to a request by the Agency for International
Development (AID) of the U.S. Department of State. It
was widely felt by those concerned that the time was ripe
for a detailed review of levels and trends of fertility
and mortality in the developing world. Although most
people in the demographic community agree that mortality
has declined in almost all developing countries during
the last 30 years, there is uncertainty about more recent
changes in mortality in some countries, about current
levels of fertility, about the existence and extent of
recent changes in fertility, and about the factors
determining reductions in fertility.
In 1963, a Panel on Population Problems of the
Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National
AcadelllY of Sciences published a report entitled~
Growth of World Population. The appointment of that
panel and the publication of its report were expressions
of the concern then felt by scientists, as well as by
other informed persons in many countries, about the
implications of population trends. At that time, the
most consequential trend was the pronounced and long-
continued acceleration in the rate of increase of the
population of the world, and especially of the population
of the poorer countries. It was estimated in 1963 that
the annual rate of increase of the global population had
reached 2 percent, a rate that~ if continued, would cause
the total to double every 35 years. The disproportionate
contribution of low-income areas to that acceleration was
caused by rapid declines in mortality combined with high
fertility that remained almost unchanged: the birth rate
was nearly fixed or declined more modestly than the death
rate.
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Since the earlier report, however, the peak rate of
growth in the world's population has apparently been
passed. A dramatic decline in the birth rate in almost
all the more developed countries has lowered their aggre-
gate annual rate of increase to well below 1 percent, and
the peak rate of increase has also apparently been passed
in the less-developed parts of the world as a whole. A
sharp decline in fertility in many low-income areas has
more than offset the generally continued reduction in the
death rate, although the rate of population increase
remains high in almost all less-developed countries.
The causes of the reductions in fertility---whether
they are the effect primarily of such general changes as
lowered infant mortality, increasing education, urban
rather than rural residence, and improving status of
women, or of such particular changes as spreading knowl-
edge of and access to efficient methods of contraception
or abortion--are strongly debated. There are also diver-
gent views of the appropriate national and international
policies on population in the face of these changing
trends. The differences in opinion extend to different
beliefs and assertions about what the population trends
really are in many of the less-developed countries.
Because births and deaths are recorded very incompletely
in much of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, levels and
trends of fertility and mortality must be estimated, and
disagreement has arisen in some instances about the most
reliable estimates of those levels and trends.
It was to examine these questions that the Committee
on Population and Demography was established within the
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and
Education of the National Research COuncil. It was
funded for a period of five and one-half years by AID
under COntract No. AID/pha-C-116l and Grant No.
AID/DSPE-G-006l. Chaired by Ansley J. COale, the
committee has undertaken three major tasksl
1. To evaluate available evidence and prepare
estimates of levels and trends of fertility and mortality
in selected developing nationsJ
2. To improve the technologies for estimating
fertility and mortality when only incomplete or
inadequate data exist (including techniques of data
collection)J
3. To evaluate the factors determining the changes in
birth rates in less-developed nations.
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Given the magnitude of these tasks, the committee
decided to concentrate its initial efforts on the first
two tasks, it initiated work on the third task in October
1979 when the Panel on Fertility Determinants was
established.
As of early 1982, 168 population specialists, including
94 from developing countries, have been involved in the
work of the committee as members of panels or working
groups. The committee, the commission, and the National
Research Council are grateful for the unpaid time and
effort these experts have been willing to give.
The committee approaches the first task through careful
assessment, by internal and external comparison, and
through analysis, by application of the most reliable
methods known, of all the data sources available. Each
of the country studies therefore consists of the applica-
tion of a range of methods to a number of data sets.
Estimates of levels and recent trends judged to be the
best that are feasible with available resources are then
developed on the grounds of their consistency and
plausibility and the robustness of the individual methods
from which they were derived.
The cODDDitteels second task, refinement of method-
ology, is seen as a by-product of achieving the first.
The application of particular methods to many different
data sets from different countries and referring to
different time periods will inevitably provide valuable
information about the practical functioning of the methods
themselves. Particular data sets might also require the
development of new methodology or the refinement of
existing techniques.
The third task of the committee, evaluation of factors
determining birth rates, is the most difficult. Research
on the determinants of fertility change has been carried
out by scholars from several disciplines, and there is no
comprehensive accepted theory of fertility change to guide
the evaluation. Because of this state of knowledge of
the causes of reductions in fertility and the difficulty
of the task, the committee and the Commission on
Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education established
the separately funded Panel on Fertility Determinants,
which includes scholars from anthropology, demography,
economics, epidemiology, psychology, sociology, and
statistics. Three committee members serve on the panel.
This report is one of the panells country studies. It
has been prepared by Lee-Jay Cho, director, East-West
Population Institute, East-West Centeu Fred Arnold,
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assistant director for Professional Education, East-West
Population Institute, and Tai Hwan Kwon, director,
Population and Development Studies Center, College of
Social Sciences, Seoul National University.
Much of the work on this study was carried out at the
East-West Population Institute. Tai Bwon Kwon visited
the Institute for two extended periods during 1981 to
work on the study. In addition, work on the study was
conducted at the Population and Development Studies
Center, Seoul National University. The panel and the
committee are grateful to these institutions for
logistical support provided to the authors.
The authors, panel, and committee would like to thank
Jae-Young Park, Soon Choi, Bee-Pyo Lee, and Nam-Il Kim
for their assistance and suggestions, Jane Menken and
John Knodel for comments on an earlier draft of this
report, Robert Hearn for editorial assistance, and Kathy
Martinez for typing the draft manuscript. The draft
report was discussed at a country studies workshop
organized by the panel in January, 1982, with financial
assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation. Authors of
the several panel country studies provided ideas and
commented on the Korea study at that workshop. Finally,
panel and committee reviewers provided advice and
suggestions.
Several members of the panel and committee staff
assisted in the preparation of this report. Appreciation
is expressed to Carole Turley and Irene Martinez, who
helped type the text and tables, and to Rona Briere, who
edited the report. Elaine McGarraugh handled the
production editing details with her usual precision and
alacrity.
W. PARKER MAULDIN, Chair
Panel on Fertility Determinants
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SUMMARY
Until the turn of the century, Korea was basically a
traditional agricultural society, maintaining political
and social stability with virtually no external contact,
and frequently referred to as a -hermit kingdom.- From
the perspective of the demographic transition, this
period (characterized by high mortality and fertility
levels resulting in almost negligible growth) was the
pre-transitional stage. Historical records show that
from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century the
population fluctuated between 5 and 7 million.
The beginning of the demographic transition in Korea
may be considered as covering the several decades prior
to the end of World War II. The level of mortality
slowly declined with the benefit of Western medical tech-
nology and the introduction of pUblic health measures
under Japanese colonial rule. This moderate reduction in
the death rate and the continued high birth rate contri-
buted to significant population growth. In 1944, toward
the end of the Japanese occupation, the size of the
population in the Korean peninsula was approximately 25
million.
The period from the partition in 1945, which divided
Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel, to 1955, when the
first simplified census was conducted, embraced post-
WOrld War II political and social unrest and confusion,
heavy return migration from abroad, the destruction and
disruption caused by the Korean War, and the consequent
dislocation and movement of the population. This period
may be regarded as a -dark age- in the availability of
population data. Although Korea's vital registration
statistics are still incomplete and deficient,
demographers have recently developed, refined and
generated other types of demographic statistics, based
1
2largely on census and survey data, that have permitted
adequate fertility and mortality measurements. A series
of censuses, taken almost regularly every five years from
1955, has provided a sufficient basis for refining
own-children fertility estimates, numerous KAP and
specialized demographic surveys conducted in the 1960s
and 1970s have served as a useful check on these census
estimates, and have also provided a rich source of
information on fertility determinants. The high quality
of age data from Korean censuses, combined with this
intense technical demographic analysis of census, survey,
and vital registration data, has permitted accurate
estimates of fertility and of its differentials over time.
The present examination of available fertility data
has shown that the TFR changed little from 1930 to 1960,
due to balancing trends in the proportions married among
women of childbearing ages and marital fertility. The
rather low level of marital fertility during the 1930s,
which was only 54 percent of Hutterite fertility,
increased by almost 25 percent by 1960, apparently
changing breastfeeding practices, in particular the
abandonment of very long nursing, contributed to reducing
long birth intervals and hence to increasing marital
fertility. During the same period, the proportion
married as measured by Coale's 1m index declined by 21
percent. The Korean War years (1950-1953) witnessed a
slightly lower birth rate, which continued until 1957.
Fertility then increased in the late 1950s, reaching its
highest level around 1960 with a TFR of about 6, which is
equivalent to the level observed for the pre-WOrld War
period of 1925-1945. After the Korean War the level of
mortality, especially infant and child mortality, declined
precipitously, and population growth peaked at an explo-
sive rate of 2.7 percent during the intercensal period of
1955-1960. By 1960, the population of the Republic of
Korea had increased to 25 million.
Between 1960 and 1980, a major demographic transition
took place in the midst of rapid social and economic
change. After 1960, fertility took a dramatic downturn,
despite this decline, however, by 1980 the population had
increased to 38 million, representing a growth of 52
percent in 20 years. The rapid fertility decline con-
tinued until 1967 and then slackened for the next five
years, there was another sharp decline in the period
1972-75, but for the most recent intercensal period of
1975-80, the decline has been less rapid. The resulting
1980 TFR of 2.9 and CBR of 22 were both about half their
respective levels in 1960.
3Roughly paralleling these fertility declines, ideal
family size has been cut in half in slightly more than
two decades. The ideal range of three to five children
common in the 1960s has now dropped to a norm of only two
to three, more than three fourths of women who already
have two children do not want any more. Moreover, women
now prefer to have their children in rather quick succes-
sion after marriage and to complete childbearing at a
relatively young age.
During the latter half of the 1960s, first, second,
and third birth intervals decreased sharply. Estimates
of fertility by duration since first marriage indicate
that birth rates rose sharply at shorter durations and
fell precipitously at higher durations during the 1960s
and the first half of the 1970s.
The decline of cohort fertility has been less dramatic
than that of either period fertility or ideal family
size. For real cohorts of women who reached aged 45-49
in 1975, the peak childbearing years below age 30
occurred before 1960, when marital fertility was still
very high and had not yet begun to decline. Therefore,
completed family size at ages 45-49 for real cohorts,
based on census data on children ever born, did not
decrease nearly as dramatically as the TPR based on
period fertility measures. The figures on children ever
born show considerable inertia since they embody, par-
ticularly for older women, a good deal of high-fertility
experience that occurred prior to the onset of the
marital fertility decline in the 1960s.
In examining areal differentials, the present study
found that although fertility declines occurred in all
localities, these were only slight in some places, par-
ticularly in the least modernized part of the country
along the east coast and in the rural areas of the
less-developed southwestern regions. In the 1960s, both
socioeconomic factors and IUD acceptance had a negative
impact on marital fertility in rural areas, however, the
effect of socioeconomic status is not discernible among
younger women, and IUD acceptance had a greater negative
impact on fertililty in communities with relatively low
1evels of socoeconomic development.
Applying a decomposition procedure, this study has
examined the two pr incipal components of change in the
TPR from 1960 to 19751 changes in population composition
by marital status and changes in marital fertility. The
results show that the decline in marital fertility after
age 30 accounts for most of the change in the TPR, for
4the period 1966-70, a rise in marital fertility at ages
below 30 acted to increase the TFR. Changes in the
proportions married were responsible for about one fourth
of the fertility decline over the period 1960-75. It is
interesting to note that decreases in the proportions
married at ages below 30 contributed to the TFR reduction,
while increases in the proportions married at ages 30 and
over acted in the opposite direction over the entire
period. The fact that most of the decline in the TFR
since 1960 is accounted for by the reduction of marital
fertility is consistent with the fact that age at marriage
was already quite late by 1960 and increased only moder-
ately after that time.
When the variables of education and residence were
added in the decomposition of the TFR change from 1960 to
1975, it was found that the reduction in marital fertility
contributed heavily to the TFR decline (73 percent), and
that most of the remaining decline was due to education.
Place of residence was less important than education, and
changes in marital status had a negligible contribution.
Much of the explanatory weight of changing marital status
shifted to education, this is plausible since the rise in
educational levels resulting from longer schooling tends
to delay age at first marriage.
Many factors have been suggested as influencing Korea's
fertility decline over the last two decades. These
include rapid urbanization, socioeconomic development,
declining infant and child mortality, the changing status
of women, increasing female labor force participation,
rising educational attainment (especially of women), high
educational aspirations for children, a rise in consumer
aspirations, improved transportation and commmunication,
increasing family nucleation, rising age at marriage, the
diffusion of modern contraceptives, the easy availability
of abortions, a decrease in the value of children as pro-
ductive agents and sources of old age security, and the
high cost of raising children. Since massive economic,
social, and demographic changes have been occurring
simultaneously in Korea, it is not easy to sort out
clearly which of these factors have been most influential
in the country's rapid decrease in fertility levels. In
the present study, it was found that among the proximate
determinants of fertility, family planning, abortion and,
to a lesser extent, rising age at marriage share substan-
tial responsibility for Korea's fertility decline,
although social and economic changes have also contributed
5to the fertility decline. These three primary factors
are discussed below.
FAMILY PLANNING
The national family planning program was first established
in 1962, and the government set a target of reducing the
annual rate of population growth from 2.8 to 2.0 percent
by 1970. The program initially concentrated on motivation
and a wmassive enlightenmentW campaign and subsequently
developed a national network of family planning field
workers to promote program acceptance. The predominant
method used at first was the IUD because it was the only
effective method known to the program administrators,
because it was relatively simple to administer, and
because its acceptance marked a serious decision by the
individual to control births, hence initiating an impor-
tant behavioral change. By 1967, over one million loops
had been inserted, and the annual number of IUD acceptors
had risen to 229,000. Distribution of oral contraceptives
began in 1968 when the IUD drop-out rate was rising and
there was an increasing need for alternative methods,
women who discontinued the IUD were eligible to receive
the pill after three months. pill acceptance increased,
and by the end of 1970, 276,000 women were using this
method. The upsurge in sterilization, which was particu-
larly marked in urban areas, occurred only after 1972. A
dramatic surge occurred in female sterilizations during
the period 1975-77, when the sterilization rate rose fom
11 to 53 tubal ligations per 1,000 ever-married women
aged 20-39, this increase can be atttributed to the intro-
duction of laparoscopy in the government program and a
tripling of government payments to physicians performing
the procedure.
From 1968 to 1978, the Planned Parenthood Federation
of Korea established and operated wMothers Clubsw in the
rural areas, basically to overcome traditional resistance
to smaller families and to encourage modern contraceptive
practice. Specifically, the Mothers Clubs facilitated
family planning communication, recruited acceptors, pro-
vided better access to contraceptives, created a favorable
community climate for the acceptance of contraception,
and assisted in the work of family planning field workers.
When actively functioning, these clubs played an important
role in the successful implementation of the national
family planning program, especially in rural areas.
6The contraceptive practice rate for currently married
women increased 2.7 times (from 20 percent to 54 percent)
from 1966 to 1979. During this same period, a rapid
urban-rural convergence in contraceptive practice was
taking place, currently, there is virtually no urban-rural
differentiation in contraceptive practice rates. The
dramatic increase in family planning practice in rural
areas is largely due to the fact that the national program
was oriented toward the traditionally high-fertility rural
areas. There has also been a gradual disappearance over
time of educational differentials in contraceptive
practice in both urban and rural areas.
By 1978, among currently married fecund women who
wanted no more births, 26 percent were sterilized,
another 29 percent were using other efficient methods
such as the pill and the IUD, and the remaining 45
percent were either using inefficient methods or not
using contraception at all. Many women in the last group
had an abortion to prevent the birth of an unwanted
child, as discussed below.
INDUCED ABORTION
Induced abortion has been a very important factor in
Korea's fertility transition, at least since 1960, before
the national family planning program in 1962, abortion
was the only effective method of fertility control, but
was rarely practiced. Induced abortion has contributed
to the fertility decline in two ways: it has been
practiced as a direct means of avoiding unwanted births,
and it has been used as the final resort when other
contraceptive methods failed. The success of the Korean
family planning program has been due significantly to
easy access and the absence of cultural and social
barriers to induced abortion. Abortion has been par-
ticularly effective in conjunction with contraceptive
practice. In fact, the increasing acceptance of induced
abortion in the face of rising contraceptive use suggests
that abortion is highly compatible with other means of
fertility control. This study found that the patterns of
abortion practice among various age and socioeconomic
groups are distinct from those of contraceptive use and
sterilization: abortion has occurred in a wider range of
ages, but has been more selective in terms of the couple's
socioeconomic status. Moreover, although contraception
and abortion are compatible, a considerable proportion of
7women rely entirely on abortion to limit their family
size.
The contribution of induced abortion to Korea's
fertility decline was most pronounced in the early 1960s,
since that time, family planning has had more of an
impact. One estimate indicates that impact of induced
abortion on fertility reduction was equivalent to 3
percent of the actual TFR in 1960, 14 percent in 1965,
and 18 percent in 1970, and that the impact was greater
in urban than in rural areas.
AGE AT MARRIAGE
With modernization and the mortality transition, the
marital composition of the Korean population has changed
substantially. The proportion of curently married women
(as well as men) has decreased rapidly in the early
reproductive ages (up to age 24) due exclusively to the
postponement of marriage, and has increased substantially
at later ages as a result of a continuous reduction in
the spouse's risk of dying. Both of these changes have
implications for fertility, although the impact of the
former is far more significant.
On the other hand, there is evidence that this post-
ponement of marriage has caused an increase in fecund-
ability in the early years of marriage. In addition, the
transition of early to late marriage has been accompanied
by a growing incidence of premarital pregnancy. These
two forces have tended to counteract the depressing
influence of a rising age at marriage on the level of
fertility in Korea.
Changes in basic marriage institutions, aside from the
timing of marriage have been very minor. In traditional
Korea, -familism,- derived mostly from the neo-Confucian
principles of Chu-shi, governed every aSPect of social
life. Universal marriage is still strongly endorsed and
the extent of divorce and remarriage has changed little
during the last twenty years of the fertility transition
in Korea. The Korean family is still characterized by a
patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal system, and
strong solidarity among family or kinship members. These
characteristics have in turn generated a strong son
preference and orientation toward large families. Among
sons, the first son is most valued since he alone can
fulfill most of the son's customary functions. The rapid
shift in family-size and fertility attitudes in Korea
8without concomitant changes in son preference may be
explained by the fact that only one or two sons are
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of these functions
and that daughters are often considered unessential.
OTHER DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY
Rapid urbanization has played an important role in
Korea's fertility decline, but will probably be less
important in the future. As in many other countries,
fertility declined more rapidly in urban areas in the
early stages of the fertility transition, more recently,
however, rural fertility has declined at a considerably
faster pace. As noted above, rural-urban fertility
differentials have been converging over time, and
contraceptive use rates for both areas are now nearly
identical. Although educational attainment exhibits the
usual strong inverse relationship with fertility, there
has been some convergence in these differentials as
well. Income does not seem to have much of an effect on
fertility once other factors are controlled.
Mortality appears to have had a substantial impact on
fertility in the past, although direct empirical evidence
is generally lacking. The rapid decline in infant and
child mortality has undoubtedly contributed to the fer-
tility decline, although further changes in mortality are
unlikely to have much effect, infant mortality has now
reached such a low level (less than 40 per 1,000) that
the fear of child mortality is no longer a major factor
in childbearing decisions.
Female labor force participation rates are rising, and
Korean women work longer hours on average than women in
any other country in the world. The effect of women's
work on fertility, however, is somewhat inconclusive.
The kind of work a woman engages in and the degree of
compatibility between her work and childrearing are more
important than whether she works or not. Although wo-en
have often been able to rely on their extended family or
hired domestic help to care for children while they work,
the increasing nucleation of Korean families and the high
cost of maids in urban areas are beginning to limit these
options.
The productive utility of children as workers for the
family farm or business or as family income producers is
declining in Korea. Although parents still expect a
moderate amount of economic and practical help from their
9children, this is generally viewed as a normal concomitant
of raising children rather than a reason for having them.
The security utility of children, particularly for support
in old age, is still strong but declining, children are
often expected to provide supplemental help rather than
total support.
On the cost side, parents are acutely aware of the high
costs of raising children (particularly the educational
costs) and these can be an important factor in fertility
decisions. The urban poor seem particularly vulnerable
in this resPect because of their low incomes and the high
cost of living in the cities. Although the opportunity
costs of raising children are not large, these will
probably increase over time. Parents often mention the
emotional and physical burdens that they would have to
cope with if they had more children, however, there is
evidence that these burdens are not entirely anticipated
before couples have begun childbearing.
In addition to the many factors discussed above, this
study has also explored some countervailing forces that
may have kept fertility from falling even more rapidly
and that may make future declines more difficult to
attain. During the last several decades, there have been
significant changes in breastfeeding practices. The
abandonment of very long breastfeeding apparently began
early in the fertility transition, presently, only a
small proportion of women continue very prolonged
nursing, although the majority continue to nurse for
moderately long periods of nine months or JIIOre.
Associated with this phenomenon is the fact that birth
intervals at early parities have become substantially
shorter as more educated and higher-income couples have
accepted bottle feeding. It is expected that declines in
either the incidence or length of breastfeeding in the
future would tend to increase fertility rates.
The likely effect of continued son preference is JIIOre
ambiguous. Pertility has declined precipitously in Korea
in the face of no JIIOre than a gradual decrease in this
traditional attitude. Some SPeculate that there is no
reason for son preference to provide a drag on further
fertility declines, others feel that the greatest effect
of boy preference will be at the second and third parities
(i.e., in decisions about whether to have a third or
fourth child), and that additional fertility declines are
therefore unlikely.
Bv idence on the influence of cOllllDunity and ecological
factors is aixed. Studies adding community-level
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variables to individual records on survey data files have
been unable to prove a link between these variables and
fertility, although flaws in the design of these studies
may be responsible for this result. Aggregate- level
analyses relating areal characteristics to areal
fertility levels have been more successful. The most
significant results have been derived from an anthro-
pological study that highlighted structural and
institutional factors in comparing different communities.
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE FERTILITY TRENDS
A rapid fertility transition has been observed in a number
of Asian countries in addition to Korea, including Japan,
Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Chinese
population in Malaysia. All of these populations share
the so-called Chinese cultural influence. Japan, an
industrial state, has completed its demographic transi-
tion, while the newly industrializing countries of Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have all experienced
rapidly falling levels of fertility along with rapid
economic and social development. It is basically a
matter of time before these countries also complete their
demographic transitions. Although it is extremely
difficult to isolate the cultural factors that have
contributed to this common pattern of fertility change,
such shared characteristics as the absence of barriers to
ready acceptance of abortion and sterilization and the
universality of marriage might be highlighted. Other
shared characteristics include cultural homogeneity in
ethnicity, language, and religious tradition, and geo-
graphic and political unity. These characteristics in
turn promote social integration in the form of efficient
communication and shared values, norms, and institutions.
In this way, Korea meets the conditions proposed by
Retherford (1981) as conducive to a sudden and rapid
fertility decline.
In general, economic and social development results in
lower mortality and in the reduced productive and security
utility of children. These changes are accompanied by a
smaller desired family size, creating the conditions for
fertility decline even in the absence of a national family
planning program, thus economic and social development
may be the fundamental cause of fertility transition.
However, although this developmental change has facili-
tated Korea's fertility decline, the family planning
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program has expedited the process. Korea's national
family planning program was initially very effective in
legitimizing family planning, and consequently in reducing
the -normative costs- of birth control in a short period
of time, family planning leaders subsequently worked
successfully to diffuse birth control throughout the
country.
Prospects for future fertility trends are uncertain.
All of the variables examined in this report indicate
favorable conditions for further fertility decline, except
for three factorsa (1) the universality of marriage, (2)
the reduction of the incidence and duration of breast-
feeding, and (3) the continued strength of son preference.
The impact of these three factors can be eXPected to be
significant, especially in the fertility transition from
a TPR of three to the replacement level, however, this
impact will probably be insufficient to entirely curtail
the fertility decline. The course of fertility in the
last two decades has not been uniforma there was a
sudden fall in the early 1960s, followed by a temporary
slackening in the late 1960s, another rapid decline in
the early 1970s and a moderate decline in the last few
years. Korean fertility will complete its transition to
the replacement level in the years to come, although,
because of the three factors mentioned above, further
declines are not likely to be achieved without some
temporary setbacks.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the last several decades, Korea has experienced great
political, economic, and social changes. It has also
witnessed one of the fastest fertility transitions in the
world. Research on Korea's rapidly changing fertility
has proliferated during the last two decades. This study
will review the relevant research and organize the data
in such a way as to (1) put this fertility transition
into a proper perspective, (2) shed light on some of the
important questions that remain unanswered, (3) examine,
at both the micro and macro levels, various determinants
of fertility and factors contributing to rapid fertility
change, and (4) make some generalizations about the past
and provide some speculation and perspective on Korea's
future fertility trends. The following are some of the
questions addressed in this report:
1. What was Korea's fertility level in the past, and
what is that level today?
2. How fast has the fertility change occurred?
3. What factors have determined or are associated
with past and current levels of fertility?
4. What are the explanations for the observed changes
in fertility?
5. What are the prospects for fertility change in the
future?
6. Bas the observed demographic change been
independent of economic and social changes?
7. Can fertility change be induced?
13
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"BACKGROUND
Korea, a small peninsula off Manchuria, China, in North-
east Asia, has a national history going back thousands of
years. Located among the major historical powers in
Asia, the country has on several occasions suffered fro.
foreign invasion and domination, nevertheless, it has
succeeded in maintaining and preserving its culture,
language, values, and traditions. Its people are
ethnically, culturally, and linguistically ba8ogeneous.
'!'he Yi dynasty began at the end of the fourteenth
century and ended when Japan succeeded in annexing the
Korean peninsula in 1909. Japan I s occupation lasted 36
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years and ended with the defeat of the imperial forces in
World War II. At that time, the Soviet Union occupied
the country north of the 38th parallel, and the
ideological struggle emerged that finally led to the
political division of the peninsula. In 1950, the Korean
War broke out and destroyed what was left of the colonial
industrial base developed by Japan.
The devastation of the war during the years 1950-53
left the nation on the edge of survival. By 1961,
recovery had still been modest and per capita income
stood at U.S. $82 (see Table 1). Demands of minimum
living standards left little room for investment out of
this small income, and fixed capital formation averaged a
mere 10 to 12 percent of the GNP, levels about as low as
those in the poorest nations of the world (Korea,
Economic Planning Board, 1980). In less than five years,
however, the economy began a spiral of rapid growth that
continued until 1979. By 1968, nearly a quarter of the
Korean GNP was being channeled into a massive program of
capital expansion and modernization. The result has been
growth in productivity averaging 6.1 percent per year.
This increase in productivity, combined with a labor
force increasing at 3.6 percent annually and the gradual
reduction of unemployment, has produced an annual growth
rate in real GNP of over 10 percent, a rate that rivals
even that of booming, prosperous Japan.
A number of indicators provide evidence of the profound
changes that took place during the last two decades (see
Table 1). The population increased by 50 percent between
1960 and 1980, with the average annual intercensal growth
rates declining SUbstantially from 2.7 percent during
1960-66 to 1.5 percent during the 1975-80 period. Despite
this substantial population growth, the country has
experienced rapid modernization and improvement in living
standards. Improvements in medical and public health
facilities contributed greatly to a dramatic reduction in
infant and chilhood mortality and a substantial increase
in life expectancy. Female life expectancy, already
quite high at 61 years in 1960, increased to 69 by
1978-79.
The urban population in Korea rose from 28 percent in
1960 to 57 percent in 1980. Rising urban demand for farm
products, coupled with modern farming methods and
government support for agricultural prices, has now
raised farm income to levels comparable to those in the
city. Still, the movement of people from rural to urban
areas continues at a rapid rate even today.
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TABLE 1 Selected Socioeconomic Indices: Republic of Korea
Index 1960 1966 1970 1975 1980
Population (millions) 25.0 29.2 31.4 34.7 37.4
Average annual population
growth rate since previous
census (percent) 2.7 1.8 2.0 1.5
Density (per km2)
Overall 256 299 327 357 385
Arable land 1,166 1,262 1,339 1,477 1,592
Female life
expectancy (years) 61 64 67 70 69a
Percent urban 28 34 41 48 57
Percent of women aged
15-49 who have more than
a primary education 12 21 30 42
Percent of children aged
6-11 who attend school
Urban 80 88 87 89
Rural 72 84 88 90
Per capita income (U.S. $)
Current prices 82b 125 243 574 1,597a
1975 prices 24lb 307 408 574 8l0a
Percent of employed popula-
tion working in secondary
and tertiary industry 37c 42 50 54 66
Electric power (KWH)
69bper person 132 284 562 946a
Radios per
121b 2l4d 857e1,000 households 525
TV sets per
5b1,000 households 9 65 259 850
Telephones per
1,000 households 28b 61 93 173 242
aValue is for 1979 instead of 1980.
bvalue is for 1961 instead of 1960.
cValue is for 1963 instead of 1960.
dValue is for 1965 instead of 1966.
evalue is for 1974 instead of 1975.
Source: Cho and Retherford (1981).
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Traditionally, Koreans have placed a high value on
education and literacy. They are also noted for their
work ethic. Since almost everybody has a basic education,
the vocational skills and professional training needed by
a growing economy are easily acquired. During the last
three decades, there has been great progress in the
education of the population. The proportion of women in
reproductive ages with more than a primary education (six
years) increased from 12 percent in 1960 to 42 percent in
1975. The proportion of children age 6-11 attending
school increased from 72 percent in rural areas and 80
percent in urban areas in 1960 to about 90 percent in
both areas in 1975. Girls had much lower attendance
rates than boys in 1960, but this sex difference had
virtually disappeared by 1975.
Despite the growing population during this transition
period, the increase in productivity has kept output per
person expanding at a phenomenal 8.3 percent per year.
Real per capita income more than tripled between 1960 and
1979. Tbday, per capita GNP stands at over U.S. $1500.
Rapid economic growth has contributed to rising real
incomes at all levels. The real monthly earnings of
manufacturing workers, for example, rose at a rate of 4.3
percent annually, and overall income has been more
equally distributed among families than in other nations
of equivalent income.
The proportion of employed persons working in
secondary and tertiary industries increased from 37
percent in 1963 to 66 percent in 1980. From 1961 to
1979, per capita electric power consumption increased
more than l3-fold, per capita radio ownership more than
7-fold, to almost one radio per household in 1974, per
capita television ownership more than l70-fold, to almost
one set per household in 1980, and per capita telephones
more than 8-fold, to almost one telephone for every four
households in 1980.
The female work force has also contributed to Korea's
development. The overall female labor force participation
rate rose from 38 to 42 percent in the ten years between
1968 and 1978, the rate for farm females rose from 45 to
51 percent, and for nonfarm females rose from 30 to 36
percent. The participation rate for males remained
constant at 76 percent (Korean Institute for Family
Planning, 1978:255-256).
Korea has one of the highest population densities in
the world. Population density on arable land increased
from 1,166 per square kilometer in 1960 to 1,592 in 1980
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(see Table 1). By way of comparison, density on arable
land was about 50 in the United States and 793 in
Bangladesh in 1974 (United Nations, Food and Agricultural
Organization, 1975). These figures indicate the strong
population pressure on Korea's agricultural resources.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
The remainder of this Introduction provides a brief
demographic history of the country, followed by a review
of available sources of population data. Chapter 2
focuses on estimates of fertility levels and trends
during the last two decades and the decomposition of
fertility change into its components. Chapter 3 brings
together the information contained in the first two
chapters to examine the relationship between changing
socioeconomic conditions and changes in fertility
attitudes and behavior. The importance of changes in
family structure and marriage patterns is explored in
Chapter 4, and the changing value of children and the
influence of son preference on fertility are discussed in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 outlines the development of Korea's
family planning program, highlighting changes in family
planning practices and the use of abortion services. The
summary at the beginning of this report discusses what is
known about the determinants of fertility and speculates
about the future course of fertility trends in Korea.
Korea's Demographic History
Korea's early historical records indicate that some form
of registration of households and population was carried
out for purposes of taxation and military conscription.
Evidence of more systematic, census-like registration is
available for the Yi dynasty, beginning in the fourteenth
century. It is obvious that early in this period, house-
hold registration covered only part of the country and
was subject to a great number of omissions and evasions,
largely due to efforts to avoid taxation and conscription.
Apparently, by 1672 registration had become country-
wide and considerably more complete. The census in that
year counted 1,205,000 households and a population of
4,720,000, or 3.9 persons per household (Eisuke, 1925).
As shown in Table 2, the population trend was consistent
over numerous census periods from 1672 up to the turn of
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TABLE 2 Households and Population, 1672-1920
Year Households Population
1672 1,205,866 4,720,815
1681 1,376,842 6,218,342
1690 1,514,000 6,952,907
1699 1,333,330 5,774,739
1708 1,406,610 6,206,554
1717 1,560,734 6,788,789
1726 1,614,598 6,995,400
1738 1,672,184 7,096,565
1747 1,759,692 7,340,318
1756 1,771,349 7,318,359
1765 1,675,267 6,974,642
1774 1,703,030 7,098,441
1783 1,733,757 7,316,924
1807 1,764,504 7,561,403
1864 1,703,450 6,828,521
1910 (end 2,804,103 13,313,017
of year)
1915 (end 3,117,692 16,278,389
of year)
1920 (end 3,297,126 17,264,119
of year)
Source: Eisuke (1925).
Male and Female
Population
males: 3,563,685
females: 3,753,239
males: 7,057,458
females: 6,255,559
males: 8,370,940
females: 7,907,449
males: 8,903,000
females: 8,361,119
this century, although the quality of the last few
censuses must have deteriorated considerably because of
the domestic and international political turmoil. Over
this roughly 200-year period the Korean population showed
a very low rate of growth--0.25 percent per annum. In
1777, the census counted males and females separately for
the first time, enumerating 3,537,786 males and 3,700,737
females (a sex ratio of 95.6), this low ratio may well be
attriQutable to census evasion on the part of younger men
who feared military conscription.
From the historical records, there is no way to
determine the levels of fertility and mortality prior to
the first modern census in 1925. It is known from the Yi
dynasty household registration that the average household
size fluctuated between 3.9 and 4.6, which is lower than
today's level. It is also known that marriage was nearly
universal, and that age at marriage for both males and
females was very young. As mentioned earlier, population
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growth was insignificant during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Based on these facts it may be
speculated that the fertility level was quite high, but
that the level of mortality was also high, resulting in
virtually no population growth. A large collection of Yi
dynasty household registration records is available,
showing household relationships, age, and sex. Historical
demographic analysis of the Korean data, such as that done
by Hanley (1979), has shed some light on the levels of
fertility, family size, and mortality during this period.
In 1909, SUbsequent to Japanese annexation, the
colonial authority made a year-end population count that
showed a population of 12.9 million, this is a substan-
tially higher figure than the last count of the Yi
dynasty, especially considering the fairly large exodus
of migrants out of Korea into China, Russia, and other
places. From 1910 to 1923, the year-end population
counts showed population growth in the range of 13.3
million to 17.9 million. The year-end count is not a
census, but an administrative count based on the
canvassing of households and also on police and civil
registration records (Chee, 1967:29-30). Although these
counts did not achieve complete coverage (in the period
1911-25, coverage varied from 92 to 97 percent), they
have provided a sufficient basis for estimating trends in
population size and growth.
By 1925, when the first modern census was conducted by
the Japanese colonial government, the population in the
Korean peninsula was 19 million. Even with substantial
migration out of Korea in the two decades following the
1925 census, the Koreans in the peninsula increased their
number, and by 1944, according to the last colonial
census conducted, the population was 25.1 million. Frea
1925 to 1944, the Korean population showed only moderate
growth (1.4 percent), as indicated in Table 3.
Estimates of fertility have been made for the colonial
period from the censuses of 1925 through 1940 by Chang
(1966) and also by Kwon (1977: Chapters 5 and 7). The
level of fertility was very high: the crude birth rate
was estimated to be 46 per thousand during 1926-30,
declining gradually over the next 15 years to 42 (see
Table 4). During the colonial period, there was
virtually no change in the total fertility rate (TFR),
only a slight decline from 6.2 to about 6.1. An
examination of estimated age-specific fertility rates
reveals that women in all age groups except the youngest
(15-19) maintained the same high fertility level during
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TABLE 3 Population and Intercensal Growth Rates:
All Korea, 1925-44 and Republic of Korea, 1949-80
19,020,030
1.44
20,438,108
1.66
22,208,102
1.17
23,547,465
1.41
25,120,174
20,166,756
1.20
21,502,386
2.70
24,954,290
2.49
29,159,640
2.16
31,438,768
1.96
34,678,000
1.54
37,500,000
Year
All Korea
1925 (October 1)
1930 (October 1)
1935 (October 1)
1940 (October 1)
1944 (May 1)
Republic of Korea
1949 (May 1)
1955 (September 1)
1960 (December 1)
1966 (October 1)
1970 (October 1)
1975 (October 1)
1980 (November 1)
Population
Intercensa1
Growth Rate
(percent)
Sources: Cho (1973); and calculations based on the 1975 and
1980 census reports from the National Bureau of Statistics,
Economic'P1anning Board, Seoul.
the four intercensa1 periods. T.hus the minor decline in
the birth rate can be attributed to the gradual rise in
the age at marriage during this period. In traditional
Korea, marriage took place at very young ageSJ between
1925 and 1940, mean age at first marriage for females
rose froa 16.6 to 17.8, while the proportion of females
single in the age group 15-19 increased from 27 percent
in 1925 to 37 percent in 1935.
TABLE 4 Estimated Completeness of Birth and Death Registration. 1910-65: Korea
Birth Rate Comp1ete- Death Rate Complete-
ness of ness of
Birth Death Natural
Recorded Estimated Regis- Recorded Estimated Regis- Increase
Period Rate Rate tration Rate Rate tration (per 1.000)
1910-15 24.6 45.3 54.3 15.7 33.7 46.6 11.6
1916-20 31.5 47.5 66.3 24.7 31.6 78.2 15.9
1921-25 36.3 48.0 75.6 20.8 29.5 70.5 18.5
1926-30 35.9 45.9 78.2 21.6 26.4 81.8 19.5
1931-35 30.9 45.5 69.9 20.3 23.3 87.1 22.2 NN1936-40 32.6 43.3 75.3 18.4 21.4 86.0 21.9
1941-45 35.3 42.1 83.9 19.2 19.5 98.5 22.6
1946-50 18.9 39.9 47.4 10.1 15.8 63.9 24.1
1951-55 23.9 41.0 58.3 7.3 14.3 51.0 26.7
1956-60 31.1 43.0 72.3 6.9 12.8 53.9 30.2
1961-65 30.9 39.5 78.2 7.5 10.5 71.4 29.0
Note: Data for 1910-45 are for all Korea; data for subsequent years are for South Korea
only.
Source: Choe (1967).
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The three colonial censuses of 1925, 1930, and 1935
for which data on marital status are available illustrate
a remarkable phenomenon of universal marriage. By age 20
almost all females were married--only between 1 and 3
percent remained single--and beyond age 30 the proportion
of women unmarried was insignificant. Koreans have
traditionally placed a high value on marriage and family
formation, both for men and women; remaining single
beyond the so-called marriageable age has been greatly
frowned upon and considered a great disservice to parents
and family.
World War II and the end of Japanese colonial rule in
1945 brought about a great deal of change, including a
substantial volume of migration across the new national
boundaries. The Korean War (1950-53) caused further
destruction, chaos, and social change. Because of the
paucity of useful demographic or other relevant quantita-
tive data, very little is known about social and
demographic change during the years 1945 to 1954. In
addition, since 1945, when Korea was divided along the
thirty-eighth parallel, it has not been possible to
follow population trends of the entire peninsula. FOr
South Korea, the population increased between the 1944
and 1949 censuses from 16.2 to 20.2 million, indicating
an annual growth rate of 4.4 percent. This unusually
high growth rate was largely due to the return of Koreans
from Japan and Manchuria folloWing WOrld War II and to
heavy migration from the North during the period. The
1955 census, however, indicated only a slight increase in
population size from 20.2 to 21.5 million, representing
an average growth rate of 1 percent per year from 1949 to
1955. This period overlaps the Korean War, during which
mortality was extremely high and there was a large volume
of migration from the North to the South; the lower growth
rate may also be due to lower fertility during the war.
The 1960 census enumerated 25.0 million persons; based
on figures from the 1955 and 1960 censuses that have been
adjusted for underenumeration, the estimated annual rate
of intercensal population growth was 2.7 percent. The
1966 census enumerated 29.2 million, based on adjusted
figures for both 1960 and 1966, the annual intercensal
growth rate for the six-year period was 2.5 percent. The
population grew to 31.4 million by 1970, with an inter-
censal growth rate, again using adjusted figures, of 2.2
percent. The 1975 census and the recent 1980 census
enumerated 34.7 million and 37.5 million, respectively,
implying intercensal growth rates of 1.96 and 1.54
percent for 1970-75 and 1975-80.
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Data Sources
In Korea, there are basically three types of data avail-
able for the measurement and analysis of fertility:
vital statistics derived from the registration system,
indirect measurements of fertility from census data, and
specialized fertility surveys and other surveys to which
questions on fertility have been added.
Vital Statistics
As briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter, Korea haa
had some form of population registration from the earliest
historical times; however, this was mostly confined to
simply canvassing households and counting population for
purposes of taxation and military conscription. The
modern civil registration system and the collection of
data on vital events date back only to 1910, and until
1937, vital statistics were compiled only as a by-product
of the civil registration system. This statistical
information covered only the number of vital events, the
detailed vital statistics on births, deaths, and
marriages that are available today were not collected.
Although a modern system of vital statistics was
established in 1938 by the Japanese colonial government,
it did not function as completely as the system in Taiwan
under the same colonial rule. As shown in Table 4, birth
registration was far from complete. During the ten years
prior to the end of World War II, birth registration was
relatively more complete: 75 percent in 1936-40, and 84
percent in 1941-45. Death registration was even better:
86 percent and 99 percent during the same periods.
After the liberation in 1945 and sUbsequent partition
of the country, political and social instability prevented
the new government from improving vital statistics. In
fact, during the years 1946-50, the system deteriorated
sUbstantially, it is estimated that less than 50 percent
of births and 64 percent of deaths were recorded in this
period. During the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953, the
system remained woefUlly inadequate and incomplete.
Death registration further deteriorated during the
postwar period. Although a number of factors contributed
to incomplete vital registration, three that deserve
mention are delayed registration of vital events,
problems associated with the general use of the lunar
calendar, and the inconvenience of obtaining certifi-
cation of cause of death from a medical doctor.
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The vital registration system gradually improved over
the two decades from 1960 to 1980. Delayed registration
of births and deaths became much less frequent, and the
general public became more cooperative. Nevertheless,
except for the last few years, birth and death statistics
are not sufficiently complete and reliable to permit
adequate fertility analysis. However, data for the 1980s
should be sufficiently complete to serve as a basis for
the measurement and analysis of Korean fertility and
mortality.
Censuses
The first modern Korean census was conducted in 1925
under Japanese rule. From 1925 to the end of World War
II in 1945, five censuses covering all of Korea were
taken at intervals of five years, except for the last
one, which was taken after four years. These censuses
were of high quality and were consistent over the regular
census intervals, and provide valuable data for demo-
graphic analysis. Two types of censuses were administered
by Japan: a simplified census conducted in quinquennial
years (those ending in a five), and a full census taken
in years ending in zero. The former was limited to
collection of basic demographic information such as age,
sex, marital status, and nationality, while the full
census covered additional socioeconomic characteristics
such as education, occupation, and industry.
The census data on age in the colonial period were
unusually accurate for a fascinating reason: Korea
followed the Chinese dating system, using the lunar
calendar--a l2-year cycle of 12 different animals--to
determine age, and traditionally placed great signifi-
cance on the date and time of birth. The Western solar
calendar was introduced with the Japanese colonial
occupation in the early part of this century, it has
gradually been replacing the lunar system, but still has
not done so completely because of cultural resistance.
The early assumption of Westerners that rural Koreans
would not know their exact ages is wrong. Korean parents
record their children's dates of birth (and in most cases
the hour as well) for the following purposes:
(1) Sajoo (literally translated as "the four pillars
of a person"), meaning that the time, day, month, and
year of birth determine a child's future. In the past,
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some mothers would try to postpone a birth until a
propitious hour of the day, although this practice is
rare today.
(2) Samchil (literally, ·three-seven·), meaning that
for 21 (three times seven) days after birth, visitors
other than close relatives are not allowed in the house.
This was probably meant to minimize the child's exposure
to disease. Although not strictly observed in the cities
at present, the practice is still generally observed in
the rural areas.
(3) Paegil (literally, ·the hundredth day·), meaning
that on the hundredth day after birth, close relatives
and friends are invited to share food and drinks to
celebrate the birth and survival of the child.
(4) Tbl (translated as ·first birthday·), meaning
that the child has survived a full year since birth, an
event that calls for celebration. The first and sixtieth
birthdays are the two most eventful birthdays celebrated.
(5) Gunghap, meaning that, for a happy marriage, the
sajoo of the bride and groom should be matched to see
whether the combination is favorable. This custoa is
still widely practiced.
(6) Bwangap, meaning that on one's sixtieth birthday
a man or woman has completed five twelve-animal-year
cycles. This occasion calls for a big celebration.
These customs require an accurate record of the age of
each member of the family. As in Japan, age heaping--a
kind of age misreporting in which certain ages (often
those ending in a specific digit), such as 5, 10, 15, 20,
25, are overreported, while others, such as 19, 23, 37,
are underreported--is probably less common in Korea than
in the United States.
There are, however, some complications involved in the
Korean age-recording system. First, according to both
the Koreans and the Chinese, a child is one year old at
the time of birth (implying that the nine-month gestation
period is one year of life). Furthermore, age in Korea
is not reckoned from the individual's last birthday, but
from the New Year (January 1). Thus, if a child is born
on January 1, 1970, he will be considered two years old
on January 1, 1971, exactly one year after birth. There-
fore, if one simply asks how old a person is, the
information obtained will be SUbstantially different frc.a
the age in completed years at last birthday. In the
extreme case, a child born on December 31, 1969, would ~
two years old on January 1, 1970 (the child is one day
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old in age in completed years). A further complication
in calculating age statistics with a lunar calendar is
that the length of the year varies depending on whether
it is a normal or a leap year. A normal lunar year has
12 months consisting of 354 days. The lunar calendar is
kept in phase with the evolution of solar years by the
insertion at irregular intervals of a leap year with an
additional lunar month. If vital events such as births
and deaths are evenly distributed over time, lunar leap
years contain 13/12 as many events as normal years, or
8.33 percent more events. One leap year is usually
followed by two normal years.
During the colonial period, census enumerators
canvassed households and collected dates of birth,
virtually all of which were expressed according to the
lunar calendar. Ages were then derived from these birth
dates. With proper conversion and adjustments,
sufficiently accurate age distributions from all five
colonial censuses can be obtained, and from these both
the birth and death rates can be estiJl8ted. Yun-Shik
Chang and Tai-Hwan Kwon have used these census data to
provide plausible estimates of fertility and mortality
for these periods (Chang, 1966J Kwon, 1977).
The situation became more complex after the war
because of the gradual shift to the Western calendar.
There are no data available on the changing proportion of
the population reporting their birth dates using the
Western calendar.
The Republic of Korea was established in the south in
1948, and from that time to the present the government
has conducted seven censuses (in 1949, 1955, 1960, 1966,
1970, 1975, and 1980). The returns of the 1949 census
were totally destroyed during the Korean War, leaving
only a limited set of data on population (unfortunately,
a detailed age-sex distribution is not available). The
1955 census was the first complete enumeration of the
population after the Korean War. The single-year age
distribution is available for geographic and adminis-
trative divisions of the countrYJ in addition, marital
status, employment and industry, occupation, and educa-
tion cross-classified by age and sex are available for
different areal subdivisions, as are data on refugee
status from the North.
A comparison of the data from the 1955 and 1960
censuses reveals that the former considerably under-
enumerated the population (Cho, 1971). The National
Bureau of Statistics at the time was not equipped with
28
the technical or financial resources to execute a high-
quality census. In 1960, a major effort was made to con-
duct a large-scale census. Foreign technical assistance
was enlisted. Many aspects of the census operation were
modernized: pretests, postenumeration surveys, and modern
data processing equipment were introduced, the quality of
the operation improved substantially over the previous
censuses, and the enumeration was more complete. The
1960 census for the first time incorporated items on age
at first marriage and children ever born, items which
sUbsequent censuses have continued to carry.
Unfortunately, however, foreign technical input in the
design of the 1960 census resulted in a major technical
blunder. Instead of following the well-established
practice of computing age from birth dates, the foreign
advisors introduced the U.s. census question simply
asking the age of each person. The result, revealed by
the postenumeration survey, was that over 75 percent of
the population indicated age according to the lunar
system. This left a negligible number in the age cate-
gory under one year, and redistributed the numbers in the
other categories. various efforts have been made to
convert the lunar age into age in completed years, but
none has so far produced satisfactory results for refined
demographic analysis.
Because of budgetary problems in 1965, no census was
conducted in that year, but a simplified censuS was
conducted in 1966. Proper caution was used in the
section dealing with age determination. For the first
time in the history of the Korean census, respondents
were given the choice of indicating their birth dates by
either the lunar or the Western calendar. In addition,
respondents could indicate their wanimalw of the 12-year
zodiac for their birth year. The coding staff at the
central office, using a conversion table, then computed
the exact age in completed years. In addition to asking
for children ever born, the 1966 census asked for the
first time the number of children surviving. According
to Cho (1971), the 1966 census was one of the better
censuses in recent decades.
Similar census procedures were repeated for the 1970,
1975, and, most recently, 1980 censuses. In Korea, the
data from these censuses serve as the principal basis for
measuring and analyzing fertility and mortality in the
absence of complete and reliable vital statistics. These
data are amenable to refined demographic procedures that
can help detect and measure changes in fertility and
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mortality levels and age distribution over time. The
existence of six census counts of the population in 25
years enhances the detection of errors, especially in age
distributions, through demographic analysis, experience
with other populations has shown that if the same
enumeration procedures are used, similar patterns of
overstatement and understatement of numbers at different
ages will occur over consecutive censuses (Coale, 1955,
Coale and Zelnick, 1963, Coale et al., 1979).
Surveys
Specialized population surveys were not conducted in
Korea until the 1960s. With the introduction of family
planning in 1960, and the beginning of the national
program in 1962, the need for statistical information on
attitudes toward and knowledge and use of family planning
greatly increased. The earliest family planning survey
was begun in 1961 in Koyang by the Pamily Planning and
Population Center of Yonsei University (see Yang et al.,
1965), in 1964, an interesting study of differential
fertility was conducted in the town of Ichon (see H.-Y.
Lee, 1965). Both of these surveys covered only small
areas of the country. The first National Survey on
Family Planning was conducted in 1965. Since then,
nationwide surveys have been conducted every year or two
(a partial listing appears in Table 5). These national
surveys have been characterized by large (generally 4,000
to 8,000) samples of currently or ever-married women in
their childbearing years. Their scope has included
questions on cumulative fertility, complete pregnancy
histories, family planning knowledge, attitudes, and
practices, and specific experience with IUDs, oral pills,
and abortion. Several contained questions that followed
up on earlier surveys.
As a part of the 1966 census evaluation program, a
postenumeration survey (PES) was planned by the Bureau of
Statistics. ~ meet the growing need for demographic
statistics, the scope of this survey was expanded to
include questions designed to estimate not only current
levels of fertility and mortality, attitudes on ideal
family size, and the practice of contraception, but also
population movement and migration. Por this reason, the
1966 PES is also called the 1966 Special Demographic
Survey. Extensive tabulations from this survey are
available in Choe and Park (1969). Beginning in 1972,
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TABLE 5 National Fertility Surveys. 1965-78: Republic
of Korea
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1971
1973
1974
1976
1978
Survey
National Survey on Family Planning
National Survey on Family Planning
National Family Planning KAP Survey
National Family Planning and
Fertility Survey
National Fertility-Abortion Survey
National Family Planning KAP and
Fertility Survey
Korean National Fertility Survey
(WFS)
Korean National Fertility and
Family Planning Evaluation Survey
National Family Planning KAP Survey
Sample
4,000 currently married
women aged 15-44
5,000 currently married
women aged 15-44
5,000 ever-married
women aged 15-49
7,477 ever-married wo.en
aged 15-49
6,000 ever-married
women aged 15-49
2,400 ever-married wo.en
aged 15-49
5,417 ever-married wo.en
aged 15-49
6,000 ever-married vo.en
aged 15-49
8,000 ever-married
women aged 15-49
Note: List is not exhaustive.
the Bureau of Statistics began conducting quarterly the
Current Demographic Survey (CDS) covering a sample of
about 22,000 households. The purpose of this survey is
to estimate the number of births, deaths, and cases of
migration, in its earlier years, it generally under-
estimated births and deaths. In 1974, the Bureau of
Statistics conducted a major employment survey covering
about 130,000 households. The principal objective was to
provide various statistics on employment and the
economically active population, using the labor
utilization approach. The survey also contained some
questions that can be used to derive basic demograpbic
measures. In 1978, another major project on evaluation
of vital statistics began in which the vital events
enumerated by the CDS were matched with the vital events
registered in the same survey areas. This project bas
been producing very useful results. Because of these
efforts at the Bureau of Statistics, the CDSs in recent
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years have improved substantially and have become an
important source of vital statistics.
In 1979, the Korean Institute for Family Planning
conducted a survey on contraceptive prevalence designed
to assess the impact of the national family planning
program (K.S. Koh et al., 1980b). ~e sample of 20,000
households was large enough to provide provincial-level
data on contraceptive prevalence, fertility, and
use-effectiveness. ~e Korean Institute for Research in
the Behavioral Sciences conducted two surveys of the
Value of Children (VOC), which also included information
on fertility and family planning (Lee and Kim, 1979). A
small pilot study with 378 respondents was completed in
1973, in 1976, a larger national sample of 2,050 married
women and men was conducted which covered the entire
country except for the province of Cheju Island. Cheju
Island is, however, the geographical focus for an
intensive study of fertility and family planning entitled
the Korean Population Policy and Program Evaluation StUdy
(C.B. Park et al., 1980). From 1975 to 1981, the study
was jointly conducted by the East-West Population
Institute, Korea's National Bureau of Statistics, and
Dong-A University. ~is project has completed two
large-scale benchmark surveys on Cheju's population of
about 400,000, conducted simultaneously with the 1975 and
1980 censuses. In addition, one prevalence survey using
only a small sample was conducted in 1978.
In conclusion, although Korea's registration of vital
statistics has been incomplete and deficient, the country
has in recent years develoPed other types of demographic
statistics, such as census and survey data, from which
both direct and indirect measurements of fertility can be
made. As a result, there are now more than enough data
to make analysis of fertility and family planning
behavior possible, in fact, in some ways there may be
more data than can be adequately analyzed.
CHAPTER 2
FERTILITY LEVELS AND TRENDS
This chapter presents estimates of fertility levels and
trends during the last two decades and examines fertility
changes, it also briefly discusses natural fertility and
some of the factors influencing it. As suggested in
Chapter 1, Korea's registration of vital events has been
incomplete and insufficiently reliable for most of the
period of interest, measurement of fertility must there-
fore be based on census or survey data. Recent population
censuses conducted at fairly regular five-year intervals
provide an extremely useful data base for indirect
fertility and mortality estimation.
Application Qf the own-children method to the censuses
of 1966, 1970, 1975, and 1980 has allowed the esttaation
of fertility for a period of nearly three decades, with
multiple estimates for the years 1956-75. This method,
when applied to a particular census, generates fertility
estimates for each of the 15 preceding years, thus, when
applied to censuses taken at five-year intervals, it
produces more than one set of estimates for the over-
lapping periods. This is extremely important because
these sets of fertility estimates for the same periods,
derived from different censuses and sUbject to different
biases, are largely independent and thus serve as a check
on one another. The basic elements of the estimation
method are outlined below.
The essence of the estimating procedure is reconstruc-
tion of the fertility experience of the women enumerated
in a surveyor census for the preceding period. Retro-
spective fertility estimates are usually made for the
single-year cohorts of women aged 15-59 at the time of
enumeration. By simply interpolating these estimates,
and by translating the woman's age at the time of the
census to that at the reference period, one can derive
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the conventional period measures of age-specific
fertility. The principal demographic adjustments needed
are allowances for (a) mortality of children and their
mothers, and (b) children not living with their mothers.
Applying this method, for most practical purposes,
does not require that special questions be added to
normal census schedules. All that is needed are simple
tabulations of young children by the single-year age of
the child and mother, these tabulations can be based on
census or survey data on age and relationship to head of
household. Because such information is usually coded as
a part of regular census data processing, the work
required to produce a basic tabulation of children simply
entails locating the mother of the own children and
transcribing the age of each child and mother. Other
characteristics of the mother and father may be included
for more detailed studies of differential fertility.
Since the own-children estimation of fertility
involves reverse projection, estimation of mortality is
an intrinsic part of the procedure. census data on
children ever born and children surviving, if sufficiently
accurate, can be used to provide internally consistent
adjustment factors for mortality of children. The own-
children procedures were developed to estimate current
fertility solely from census data without having to rely
on independent mortality esti~tes from noncensus sources.
The Brass procedure of estimating infant and childhood
mortality from the proportion dead among children ever
born recorded in censuses leads to an apparent under-
estimation, hence, for the present analysis, mortality
estimates derived from the Survey of Fertility and
Abortion were accepted and served as the basis for
adjustments for later periods.
When census data are used, an additional adjustment
must be made for the undercount of children and women,
detailed discussion of the methodology necessary to make
this adjustment is presented in other publications (Cho,
1973, Cho and Feeney, 1978, Cho and Retherford, 1978).
Own-children fertility estimates cannot be more accurate
than the census or survey data on which they are based.
The most important requirement is the accuracy of age
reporting for young children. Because of Korea's
accurate age reporting, the own-children technique is
particularly appropriate here. Although the resultant
estimates from data from different sources are not
perfectly consistent, they do provide an adequate basis
for measuring and analyzing fertility levels and trends.
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FERTILITY LEVELS AND TRENDS
Table 6 presents standard measures of fertility: the
crude birth rate (CBR), or births per 1,000 population,
the general fertility rate (GFR), or births per 1,000
women aged 15-49, and the total fertility rate (TPR), the
nUliber of children that would be born per wc.an reaching
age 50 if women were subject to the age-specific fertility
rates of the year in question.
Fertility estimates for the period 1955-75 presented
in this table are from the National Academy of Sciences,
ca..ittee on Population and Demography, report on Korea
(Coale et al., 1980), which was built upon auch prior
analysis of own-children data froa Korean censuses done
by Cho and others at the East-West Population Institute.
'lbe estimates for the 1976-80 period are from collabora-
tive research conducted by the Korean Bureau of Statistics
and the East-West Population Institute.
As discussed earlier in this report, the decade 1945-55
may be characterized as a demographic -dark age- in South
Korea: not only was vital registration inadequate, but
the 1949 census records were also destroyed in the course
of the Korean War. 'lbe birth rate probably declined
sOGewhat during the war, but the necessary data to support
this inference are as yet unavailable. Contrary to the
view of many demographers that a postwar baby booa began
to take place in the South immediately after the cease-
fire in 1953, it may be hypothesized that the lower birth
rate continued until 1957, when most of the soldiers
returned from the front. It should be remembered that,
after the cease-fire in 1953, the South Korean a~ .ent
more of its own troops to the front to comPensate for the
withdrawal of United Nations and American forces.
Officially, no members of the armed forces were discharged
until 1957, although there were brief periods of leave
for individuals after the cease-fire. 'lbis meant that
normal family life for a large number of men in their
twenties and thirties was disrupted froa 1950 to 1957.
Estimates of the fertility of this period are currently
being derived from 1960, 1966, and 1970 census data.
Table 6 shows that there was an increase in fertility
during the late 1950s, reaching the highest level around
1960 with a TFR of almost 6. '!'bis is equivalent to the
level observed during the colonial period 1925-45. After
1960, a dramatic decline took place that continued until
1967, followed by a slackening until 1972. Another .harp
decline is indicated for the period 1972-75. Between
3S
TABLE 6 SUlIDDary Indices of Fertility: Republic of Korea
Year CRRa GFRb TFRC SIIlFRd MACe
1955 39.5 164 5.46f
1956 38.2 160 5.33f
1957 38.4 162 5.40
1958 41.9 178 5.94
1959 41.8 179 5.93
1960 42.1 182 5.98 251 30.5
1961 39.6 172 5.62
1962 38.1 166 5.41
1963 37.6 165 5.35
1964 34.0 150 4.86
1965 32.2 142 4.61
1966 31.9 141 4.59 198 30.2
1967 30.3 134 4.34
1968 31.2 137 4.42
1969 30.8 134 4.39
1970 29.8 129 4.24 185 29.8
1971 29.8 128 4.26
1972 29.3 124 4.18
1973 27.3 114 3.86
1974 25.9 107 3.62
1975 22.8 92 3.14 154 28.7
1976 23.1 90 3.1
1977 22.6 87 3.0
1978 21.8 83 2.8
1979 23.1 87 2.9
1980 22.4 84 2.7 151 27.4
Note: Fertility estimates for the last five years are based on unpublished
own-children data from the 1980 census.
aThe crude birth rate is calculated as the general fertility rate times
the quantity (mid-year female population 15-49/mid-year total population)
taken from uncorrected census data.
bGFR • (2,075 x female births)/fema1e population 15-49.
cCa1culation of TFRs is based on reported own-children schedules (see
Coale et a!.. 1980).
dSIIlFR denotes the standardized marital general fertility rate (calculated
as Ipts x Fi where pfs is the proportion aged x to x + 5 of married
women aged 15-49 in a standard population. taken here as the 1975 census
populations, Ff is the observed age-specific marital birth rate in this
same age group. and the summation ranges over ages 15-49). Values of SIIlFR
are taken from Retherford and Cho (1981).
eMAC is the mean age at childbearing calculated from the age-specific birth
rates. Values of MAC are taken from Coale et a!. (.1980:3).
fTFRa for 1955 and 1956 estimated from trend in GFRs 1955-57.
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1975 and 1980, the fertility level continued to drop but
at a much slower pace, reaching a TPR of 2.7 and a CBR of
22 in 1980.
In Figure 1, the TFRs from 1960 to 1974 are cOBPared
with two sets of fertility estimates based on data from
the Korean National Fertility Survey (KNPS) of 19741
own-children estimates from the household data, and
estimates obtained from pregnancy histories collected in
the survey. On the whole, the agreement is quite good,
except for the somewhat higher levels of fertility from
1968 to 1972 indicated by the survey. Because of
problems associated with the limited sample size and
6.5
---- KNFS Pregnancy History
--- KN FS Own-ehildren from
Household Survey
- - Our Estimates
5.5
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u..
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4.5
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YEAR
FIGURE 1 Estimated TOtal Fertility Rates, 1960-741
Republic of Korea
Note: KNFS pregnancy history and own-children
tabulations are based on unpublished data from the Korean
National Fertility Survey. Our estimates are adjusted
census-based own-children estimates.
Source: Coale et ale (198016).
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possible bias in tbe survey, tbe census estimates seem to
be more robust. The most precise corroboration of tbe
own-cbildren fertility estimates is the validation of tbe
average level and the average age pattern of fertility
with estimates based on registered birtbs adjusted for
incomplete registration. As shown in Pigure 2, tbe
average age-specific fertility schedules for 1971-75 from
these two independent sources are virtually identical.
Because of the accurate age reporting in the Korean
50454035
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1971-75:
Age-Specific Pertility Rates (per 1,000 women),
Republic of Korea
Note: Calculated from corrected birth registration and
from own-children estimates.
Source: Coale et al. (1980:4)
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censuses, the indication of a peak total fertility rate
in 1960 and sUbsequent sharp decline CL~ be accepted as
genuine, these patterns are attested to by the differ-
ences in the number of children at the appropriate ages
found in the censuses of 1966, 1970, and 1975. The
summary of fertility rates presented in Table 6 and the
changing age patterns of fertility in Table 7 are
confirmed by estimates from independent sources.
From 1960, when fertility was at its highest, to 1980,
the CBR, the TFR, and the GFR each fell by about 50
percent. The standardized marital general fertility rate
(SMGFR), which effectively substracts out the effects of
rising age at marriage, fell somewhat less drastically,
by slightly less than 40 percent. The mean age at
childbearing fell by more than three years during the
TABLE 7 Age-Specific Birth Rates, 1960-80: Republic
of Korea
Year
All Women
1960
1966
1970
1975
1980
15-19
35
19
13
12
5
20-24
249
193
174
153
130
25-29
323
290
298
256
264
30-34
273
207
207
131
111
35-39
204
131
III
55
31
40-44
96
61
43
18
7
45-49
16
17
8
3
1
Currently Married Women
1960 460 378 347 298 232 117 22
1966 500 405 323 220 147 74 23
1970 460 411 337 219 121 51 10
1975 460 411 295 139 59 20 4
1980 a 350 304 118 33 8 1
Note: Age-specific birth rates for all women for 1960, 1966, 1970, and
1975 are taken from Coale et al. (1980:3) and are consistent, to within
rounding errors, with the TFRs in Table 2.1; birth rates for married
women for the same years were estimated by dividing age-specific birth
rates for all women by corresponding age-specific proportions currently
married. Rates for the age group 15-19 for currently married wa-en are
accurate only to two significant figures and are thus rounded to the
nearest multiple of ten. Rates for both all women and currently married
women for 1980 are preliminary own-children estimates calculated from
the 1980 census.
aThe estimate for currently married women aged 15-19 in 1980 is based
on too small a number of women to provide a reliable figure and, hence,
it is not shown in the table.
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s..e period, as cbildbearing became more concentrated at
younger reproductive ages. Table 7 provides further
detail by sbowing trends in age-specific birtb rates,
both for all women and for currently married women. 'lbe
rates for all women in the upper panel of the table show
substantial declines at all ages, with proportionate
declines that are especially large at the youngest and
oldest ages. The picture is somewhat different in tbe
second panel of the table, which shows rates for cur-
rently married women only. Except in tbe last intercensal
period, birtb rates for these women remained virtually
constant below age 25. The trend in fertility at ages
25-29 has been gradual and soaewhat erratic. Birth rates
for currently married women age 30 and over fell steadily
througbout the period, with declines of about 90 percent
in tbe tbree oldest age groups.
The reason birtb rates at ages 15-19 and 20-24 fell
for all woaen but remained relatively constant for
currently married women is that age-specific proportions
aarried fell at tbese ages. The proportions currently
married fell SUbstantially at ages 15-19 and 20-24, and
aoderately at ages 25-29 (see Chapter 4 for a more
detailed description of trends in proportions married) •
Proportions married rose at ages above 30, however,
mainly because of a reduction in widowhood associated
with mortality decline. The influence of mortality and
widowbood is also apparent in the age gradient of
proportions currently married, wbich declines with age
after age 30 as adult male mortality increases to
significant levels.
The decline of cobort fertility has been less dramatic
than that of period fertility. For the coborts of women
wbo reacbed ages 45-49 in 1975, the peak childbearing
years below age 30 occurred before 1960, wben marital
fertility was still very high and had not yet begun to
fall. Thus their completed family size at ages 45-49,
based on tbe census question on children ever born, does
not show nearly as dramatic a decline as the TFR based on
current age-specific birtb rates. 'lbe slower decline of
cbildren ever born is illustrated in Table 8, wbicb shows
tbe average number of cbildren ever born for all women
and for ever-married women. 'lbe number of cbildren ever
born actually rose at many ages, particularly in rural
areas, between 1960 and 1966, before falling in
subsequent years. 'lbe declines after 1966 are moderate
compared with those in current fertility measures sbown
earlier in Tables 6 and 7. One could say tbat tbe
TABLE 8 Mean Number of Children Ever Born, 1960-75: Republic of Korea
Whole Country Urban Rural
Age 1960 1966 1970 1975 1960 1966 1970 1975 1960 1966 1970
1975
--
All WOllen
15-19 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-24 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
25-29 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.1
30-34 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.6 ...3.8 0
35-39 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.1 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.6 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.6
40-44 5.4 5.5 5.3 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.2 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.2
45-49 5.5 6.1 5.6 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.0 4.7 5.6 6.3 6.0 5.6
Ever-Married WOllen
15-19 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6'" 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.6
20-24 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1
25-29 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3
30-34 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.6
35-39 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.6 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.6
40-44 5.4 5.5 5.3 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.2 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.3
45-49 5.5 6.1 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.5 5.0 4.7 5.6 6.3 6.0 5.6
Source: Cho and Retherford (1981:4).
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TABLE 9 Ever-Married Total Fertility Rates by Province,
1966-70 to 1976-80: Republic of Korea
Percent Decrease
Province 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1966-70 to 1976-80
Kyonggi Do 4,851 4,269 3,013 37.9
Kangwon Do 5,854 5,025 3,747 36.0
Chungchong Pukdo 5,838 5,006 3,643 37.6
Chungchong Namdo 5,753 5,224 3,731 35.1
ChoUa Pukdo 6,374 5,647 3,971 37.7
ChoUa Namdo 6,486 5,683 4,043 37.7
Kyongsang Pukdo 5,468 4,713 3,285 39.9
Kyongsang Namdo 5,638 4,891 3,473 38.4
Cheju Do 5,954 5,206 3,516 40.9
Source: Retherford et al. (1982).
children ever born figures show a great deal of inertia,
since they embody, for older women, a good deal of
high-fertility experience that occurred prior to the
onset of the marital fertility decline in the 1960s.
LOCAL AREA FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS
Table 9 shows recent estimates of ever married total
fertility rates (EMTPRs) for all KOrean provinces
(excluding the metropolitan areas of Seoul and Pusan).
In each of the three time periods shown, fertility
differentials are apparent, with the lowest fertility
province (Kyonggi Do) registering an EMTPR 25 percent
below the highest fertility province (Cholla Namdo).
These differentials appear to be related to the
percentage of the population in each province living in
rural areas (Retherford et al., 1982). The fertility
declines over the ten-year period have been of the same
magnitude in every province. It is possible to examine
areal fertility trends in more detail by looking at
county level data. Pigure 3 shows the Coale index of
aarital fertility (19) for all counties in 1960 and
Figure 4 shows the extent of the decline in 19 between
1960 and 1970. The lowest fertility in 1960 was found in
the urban centers, particularly in the metropolitan areas
of Seoul in the north and Pusan in the south. High
fertility was clustered in counties situated away from
the ..jor urban centers and in the mountainous interior
section of the country. Counties with an intermediate
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level of fertility were found along the coast and near
major transportation and communication lines (Retherford
et al., 1982).
A majority of counties had a substantial reduction in
fertility between 1960 and 1970, with the largest declines
taking place in the major metropolitan areas of Seoul,
Pusan, and Taegu. Nevertheless, every province had some
areas that experienced little or no fertility decline.
Counties with only slight fertility declines were largely
in the least modernized part of the country along the
east coast and in the rural areas of the less-developed
southwestern provinces (Cho and Perry, 1979).
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF FERTILITY DECLINE
The import of the detailed tabulations of total fertility
rates, age-specific birth rates, and age-specific
proportions married presented above can be analyzed more
concisely by decomposing the change in the TFR into its
components. The particular decomposition methodology
used here has been described earlier by Cho and
Retherford (1981), Retherford and Ogawa (1978), and
Retherford and Cho (1981).
Table 10 shows decompositions that break down the
change in the TFR into two principal components& changes
in population composition by marital status and changes
in marital fertility. Each of these two principal
components is in turn broken down by age. The total
change in the TFR, as computed from Table 6, is shown in
parentheses at the lower right of each of the four panels
in the table. The percent contribution to change is
given in the body of each panel, with 100 percent
corresponding to the total change in TFR shown in
parentheses.
It is evident from Table 10 that the decline in
marital fertility after age 30 accounts for most of the
change in the TFR. In fact, for 1966-70, a rise in
marital fertility at ages below 30 acted to increase the
TFR. The contribution of changes in proportions married
was also substantial in the 1960s, but relatively small
in 1970-75. Decreases in proportions married at ages
below 30 acted to reduce the TFR, while increases in
proportions married at ages above 30 acted in the
opposite direction during all three periods. The
preponderance of marital fertility contributions to the
decline in the TFR is consistent with the observation
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TABLE 10 Simple Percent Decomposition of the Change
in the Total Fertility Rate: Republic of Korea
Period Marital Marital
and Age Status Fertility Total
1960-66
15-29 36.1 1.6 37.8
30-49 -3.1 65.4 62.2
Total 33.0 67.0 100.0
(-1.39)
1966-70
15-29 49.2 -22.6 26.6
30-49 -10.7 84.1 73.4
Total 38.5 61.5 100.0
(-0.32)
1970-75
15-29 11.9 16.4 28.3
30-49 -0.9 72.6 71.7
Total 11.0 89.0 100.0
(-1.13)
1960-75
15-29 27.6 5.2 32.7
30-49 -3.2 70.5 67.3
Total 24.4 75.6 100.0
(-2.84)
Note: Because of rounding errors. rows and columns
do not always add precisely to marginal totals.
Numbers in parentheses in the lower right of each
panel indicate change per woman in the TFR over the
period indicated.
Source: Cho and Retherford (1981:43).
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made above that age at marriage was already quite late by
1960 and increased only moderately after that time.
As explained in Retherford and Ogawa (1978), the
decomposition method can be extended to more variables.
Because the results depend on the order in which variables
are introduced, some caution is necessary in interpreting
the results. For Table 11, the variables entered, in
order, were education, residence, marital status, and
marital fertility. Education consists of three categories
(none, some primary, more than primarY)J residence of two
(urban and rural)J and marital status of two (currently
married and not currently married). As before, it was
assumed that all births occur within marriage, an
acceptable assumption in view of Korea's low rate of
illegitimacy.
The education component represents the contribution to
changes in the TFR from changes in the educational
composition of the populationJ the residence component
represents the contribution from changes in residence
composition within education categoriesJ the marital
status component represents the contribution from changes
in marital status composition within education-residence
groupsJ and the fertility component represents the
contribution from changes in education-residence-marital
status-specific birth rates. Over the period 1960-66,
during which the TRF fell substantially (by about 1.4
children per woman), changes in educational composition
accounted for 28 percent of the change in the TFR, as
shown in the first panel of Table 11. With education
controlled, changes in residence composition did not
account for much additional change. With both education
and residence controlled, changes in marital status
composition acted to increase the TFR by 7 percent, thus
reversing the sign of the marital status contribution in
Table 10 and braking the overall TFR decline. Declines
in education-residence-marital status-specific fertility
accounted for more than three-fourths, or 79 percent, of
the TFR declineJ this contribution was concentrated at
ages above 30, where major declines in age-specific
fertility occurred.
The pattern for 1966-70, shown in the second panel of
Table 11, is somewhat similar to that for 1960-66, except
that compositional contributions were proportionately
more important relative to the fertility contributionJ
this is not surprising, since the TFR declined much less
during the last four years than during the first six
years of the decade. During 1966-70, changes in
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TABLE 11 Elaborated Percent Decomposition of the Change
in the Total Fertility Rate: Republic of Korea
Marital Marital
Period and Age Education Residence Status Fertility Total
1960-66
15-29 14.1 1.1 -5.4 15.6 25.3
30-49 14.1 -0.8 -1.8 63.2 74.7
Total 28.1 0.3
-7.2 78.8 100.0
(-1.38)
1966-70
15-29 31.1 10.1 -6.9 -21.5 12.8
30-49 39.5 -2.5 -13.9 64.1 87.1
Total 70.5 7.6 -20.8 42.7 100.0
(-0.34)
1970-75
15-29 6.1 0.6 18.9 1.7 27.3
30-49 7.5 0.5 -0.7 65.5 72.7
Total 13.6 1.1 18.1 67.2 100.0
(-1.05)
1960-75
15-29 11.2 2.3 4.5 6.7 24.5
30-49 12.9 -0.2 -3.3 65.9 75.5
Total 24.0 2.1 1.3 72.6 100.0
(-2.77)
Notes: Reaults are based on own-children fertility estimates derived from a
10-percent sample from the 1960 census, a I-percent sample from the 1966
census, a 10-percent sample from the 1970 census, and a 5-percent sample from
the 1975 census. Because of rounding errors, rows and columns do not always
add precisely to marginal totals. Numbers in parentheses in the lower right
of each panel indicate change per woman in the TFR over the period indicated.
Base data for 1960 were adjusted for errors arising from the way the 1960
census question on age was asked.
Results in Tables 10 and 11 must be interpreted cautiously. The two tables
are not strictly comparable, because they are based on slightly different
input data. Moreover, the reader should be aware that the percent
contributions in the decompositions are sensitive to data errors, especially
when the total change in the TFR is small, as during 1966-70. This
sensitivity is evident in the age marginals in the right-most column of Tables
10 and II, which show substantial disagreement between the two tables; the
disagreement stems from the above-mentioned differences in input data.
Source: Cho and Retherford (1981:44).
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educational composition accounted for 71 percent of the
change in the TFR. Again, with education controlled,
changes in residence composition contributed little.
Changes in marital status composition acted to increase
the TFR by 21 percent, reflecting a continued increase in
proportions married within education-residence groups.
Declines in education-residence-marital status-specific
fertility during this period accounted for less than
half, or 43 percent, of the TFR decline.
The third panel of Table 11 shows a rather different
picture for 1970-75. During this more recent period, the
education contribution was only 14 percent. The residence
contribution was again small. Changes in marital status
composition within education-residence subgroups contri-
buted to, rather than subtracted from, the overall TFR
decline, indeed, the marital status contribution of 18
percent (note its concentration at ages below 30) exceeded
the education contribution. The fertility contribution
was about two-thirds of the total. The fourth panel shows
a summary decomposition over the entire period 1960-75.
When residence is introduced before education, the
contribution of changes in education composition and
residence composition are about evenly split instead of
concentrated on the education side, the other contribu-
tions are virtually unchanged. This alternative
decomposition is discussed in more detail in Retherford
and Cho (1981). In interpreting the decompositions in
Tables 10 and 11, the reader should be aware that the
percent contributions are sensitive to errors in the
input data, especially when the total TFR change to be
analyzed is small, as between 1966 and 1970, therefore,
too much significance should not be attached to precise
numerical values.
Earlier, in Table 7, it was shown that age-specific
marital birth rates rose at younger ages and fell at
older ages between 1960 and 1975. This finding is
reflected in the decompositions in Tables 10 and 11.
Analysis of child spacing data indicates that the rise in
marital fertility at younger ages was associated with a
substantial decline in the interval between marriage and
first birth during the 1960s and the first half of the
1970s (Rindfuss et al., 1982). Consistent with these
changes, estimates of birth rates by duration since first
marriage indicate that birth rates rose dramatically at
short durations and fell sharply at long durations over
the same period (Cho and Retherford, 1978).
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The above-mentioned child spacing data, obtained from
several national fertility surveys in Korea, indicate
that first, second, and third birth intervals decreased
sharply during the latter half of the 1960s, and that
higher birth intervals, which increased in the early
1960s and the early 1970s, tended to plateau during the
late 1960s. These findings are consistent with the
census-based fertility estimates in Table 6, which also
indicate a slowdown in fertility decline during the late
1960s, and with the decompositions in Tables 10 and 11.
This consistency indicates that the slowdown of fertility
decline during the late 1960s was real and cannot be
attributed to estimation error.
Why did marital fertility increase at younger ages and
shorter marriage durations, and why did lower-order birth
intervals get shorter? Rindfuss et ale (1982) have
demonstrated that the answer is not improved fecundity
associated with better nutrition, nor is it improved
fecundity resulting from age at first marriage rising out
of the teen years when fecundity is lower. A major
reason appears to be, instead, that a rapidly increasing
proportion of first births within marriage were conceived
before marriage. This is evident from the upward trend
in the proportion of first births that occur within the
first six to nine months of marriage. The deteriorating
fit of Coale-Trussell model fertility schedules to the
Korean data at younger ages since 1965 (Coale et al.,
1979) supports this finding. Rindfuss et al.'s findings
suggest also that some of the explanation of shorter
birth intervals after the first birth lies in shorter
breastfeeding. They find, moreover, that birth intervals
of a given order are shorter when most of the previous
children have been girls rather than boys; thus boy
preference may result in consciously weaning girls
earlier in order to try to get a boy sooner, although it
is also possible that some birth control is used for
spacing purposes, and that less spacing control is used
when there is a shortage of boys. It is perhaps more
important that among the younger generation of couples in
general, a greater emphasis is placed on contracting
birth intervals to enable the couples, especially the
wives, to pursue career options beyond childbearing and
childrearing •
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NATURAL FERTILITY
Although fecundity is high in Korea, natural fertility
appears to be low relative to other countries. There are
indications, however, that natural fertility has been
increasing, possibly in response to a change in
breastfeeding practices, discussed below. Since most
demographic research in Korea deals with the post-1960
period, information on natural fertility is very rare.
Only two sets of fertility estimates are known to exist
for earlier time periods when it can be safely assumed
that reproductive behavior was not affected by any
deliberate attempt to control family size (Kwan, 1977, Y.
Kim, 1966). Since these two sets of estimates are in
close agreement, only Kwan's are shown in Table 12. The
relatively constant TFR between 1925 and 1960 is a
consequence of age-specific fertility rates that rapidly
decreased at ages 15-19 (because of a rising age at
marriage) and increased at ages 25-49 (see Figure 5).
Age-specific marital fertility rates, on the other hand,
increased steadily throughout this period, in spite of
extreme political upheavals, social unrest, and econoaic
deterioration, in the ten years following 1945-50, these
rates increased nearly 20 percent.
More recent fertility data are confounded by differing
degrees of contraceptive use, although some suggestive
information is available from the 1965 Ichon survey,
which is regarded as the only reliable data relevant to
the analysis of natural fertility in Korea. The mean
number of children ever born to currently married wa.en
in Ichon was 1.2 at ages 20-24, 2.7 at ages 25-29, 4.3 at
ages 30-34, 5.9 at ages 35-39, and 6.7 at ages 40-44.
These averages were somewhat higher than 1966 census data
for middle-sized towns because the census was subject to
a greater degree of underreporting. Although the propor-
tion of women who reported ever using contraception was
fairly high for women aged 25-39 in Ichon, most such use
was both ineffective and of short duration. The first
effective family planning method to be introduced into
the area, the IUD, was not available until early 1965,
when the survey was conducted, therefore, its use could
not have had any effect on cumulative fertility at that
time. It is reasonable to assume, then, that the level
of fertility for women aged 30 and over is a fair
reflection of natural fertility in that area. The
average completed family size of fewer than seven live
births is relatively low, especially considering the
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TABLE 12 Selected Measures of Fertility, 1925-60: Korea
Measure
Crude Birth Rate
Total Fertility Rate
Age-Specific Fertility
Rates
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
Age-Specific Marital
Fertility Ratesa
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
1925-30
45
6.2
189
324
269
214
153
74
14
276
340
283
230
171
90
18
1935-40
44
6.2
158
323
281
225
161
80
15
283
350
292
237
176
93
19
1945-50
42
6.0
96
305
292
234
167
83
15
300
369
308
250
185
98
20
1955-60
45
6.3
38
308
335
270
194
96
18
357
440
367
298
221
117
24
Note: Data for 1925-40 are for all Korea; data for subsequent years
are for South Korea only.
aThe changes in age-specific marital fertility rates over time are
assumed to be equal for all age groups.
Source: Kwon (1977:125-139 and 346-353).
customs of early and universal marriage and the stability
of Korean marriages. No fertility survey conducted in
Korea since the mid-1960s has found any woman reporting
.are than 14 pregnancies or 12 live births. Therefore,
even at its extreme, Korean natural fertility appears to
be relatively low.
PECUNDITY
Data on fecundity are often unreliable, however, accord-
ing to all available data on both reported fecundity
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impairments and the incidence of childlessness, the level
of infecundity in Korea is quite low and has been
decreasing over time in all age groups. Although early
national surveys (1965-68) of married couples in which
the wife was aged 15-44 found a nearly constant
proportion of 86 to 88 percent who reported that they
were fecund, this overall figure masks vast differences
by age (see Table 13). In re~ent years, infecundity bas
rarely been reported by younger married women (under age
35). In 1976, the proportion reporting themselves to be
fecund was still well above 90 percent in the 35-39 age
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TABLE 13 Percentage of Couples Reported as Definitely
Fecund, 1968-76: Republic of Korea
Year of Survey
_ed
Woman 1968 1971a 1971b 1974a 1974b 1976a 1976b
25-29 97 99.0 98.9 99.4 99.3
98.0 97.8
30-34 92 96.8 96.2 98.8 98.5
35-39 83 93.0 87.5 94.5 93.7
84.6 83.9
40-44 ~ 55.3 48.7 85.1 84.2
aThoae aterilized for contraceptive purposes are treated aa fecund.
bThose sterilized for contraceptive purposes are proportionately distributed
as fecund or sterile under the assumption that the proportion fecund among
those who were sterilized ia the same as among thoae who were not sterilized.
Sources: Koh and Smith (1970); Korean Institute for Family Planning (1973);
B.T. Park et al. (1979); Korea, NBOS and KIFP (1977).
group and remained high, at about 85 percent, at ages
40-44 (although these reported figures are not likely to
be a realistic appraisal of actual fecundity at these
ages). Since the latter half of the 1960s, fecundity has
increased in all age groups, but the gain has been most
dramatic in the later reproductive ages.
This rapid increase in fecundity in the later repro-
ductive ages has been attributed largely to a rising age
at menopause, although this trend is not well documented.
In the 1976 National Fertility and Family Planning
Evaluation Survey, the proportion of women who had
experienced menopause was reported to be 0.6 percent at
ages 35-39, 3.5 percent at ages 40-44, and 27.9 percent
at ages 45-49. At the other end of the spectrum,
fecundity in the very early reproductive ages increased
substantially between 1960 and 1980, as evidenced by. the
onset of menstruation at an earlier age in recent years.
The quality of the above data on fecundity impairments
aay be called into question for two reasonSI (1) the
self-reporting nature of the questions, and (2) the
variable quality of the surveys in general. The basic
results, however, can be corroborated with more reliable
data on the incidence of childlessness in Korea. In
less-developed countries, the incidence of childlessness
can be used as a rough estimate of the incidence of
54
sterility, since voluntary childlessness is rare (Nag,
1980). According to the 1974 KNFS, -Involuntary
childlessness, reflecting primary sterility, seems low in
Koreal less than 3 percent of women in any duration of
marriage category above 5 years have been without any
children to date- (Korea, NBOS and KIFP, 1977195).
Furthermore, only 11 percent of women with no children
reported any fecundity impairment. The 1974 survey
indicated that only 1.3 percent of currently married
women at the end of the childbearing years (ages 45-49)
had not had a live birth, compared with 2.5 percent
reported in the 1971 Fertility-Abortion Survey.
The proportion of couples with no live birth is even
lower in the 35-44 age group, while it is somewhat higher
at younger ages. In the earlier age groups, the
probability of having married more recently is greater,
so that many childless couples will eventually bear
children. The older age groups are likely to include a
larger proportion of remarried women with no children
from their previous marriages, sterility of the husbands
of remarried women is also likely to be high since the
husbands are usually much older than their wives. Of
course, it is possible that women without children are
more likely to get divorced and not remarry (thereby
artificially inflating the level of fecundity of
currently married women), but reliable data on such a
phenomenon are not available.
BREASTFEEDING
Breastfeeding is still nearly universal in Korea,
although differentials in both its incidence and length
are beginning to appear. Except when physiologically
incapable, nearly all women still breastfeed their babies
(B.T. Park et al., 1979). The 1974 KNFS found that 94
percent of women reported breastfeeding their babies in
the last closed birth interval (Korea, NBOS and KIFP,
19771127). These calculations were based on women with a
last closed birth interval of at least 33 months. The
mean length of breastfeeding was 19.2 months, with .cst
breastfeeding for 1 to 2 years, only 16 percent breastfed
for more than 2 years, and only 12 percent reported
weaning their babies in less than 1 year.
Bottle feeding has now become popular among educated
women in urban areas. The overall proportion breast-
feeding is somewhat lower among city residents and better
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educated women, especially younger women who have fewer
than four children. These women are also more likely to
breastfeed their children for shorter periods of time.
Shorter durations of breastfeeding have resulted in
shorter postpartum nonsusceptible periods, which,
together with general health improvements, have led to
substantially shorter interbirth intervals, at least for
early parities.
Figure 6 shows the proportion of women who nursed
their first child for various durations. Around 1950,
almost half of these women were breastfeeding for more
than 24 months. This proportion dropped to about one
third of women in the early 1960s and to less than 20
percent by 1970. The proportion breastfeeding more than
18 ~nths followed a similar pattern, falling by 43
percent between 1956 and 1970. Very little change can be
detected, however, in the proportion breastfeeding more
than 9 months, except for a slight decline since 1964.
In the case of breastfeeding more than 1 year, there is a
slightly greater decline in more recent years.
Apparently, the abandonment of very long breastfeeding
began quite some time ago, and recently, only a small
proportion of women have continued very prolonged
nursing, although the large majority of women continue to
nurse their children for moderately long periods of 9
mnths or so.
Before 1960, when the practice of family planning and
abortion was very limited, these changes in breastfeeding
apparently contributed to a reduction in the frequency of
long interbirth intervals, and consequently to the rise
in ..rital fertility from 62 percent to nearly 90 percent
of standard natural fertility, the average of ten
schedules listed by Henry (Coale et al., 1979). The
effect of breastfeeding on fertility in Korea is,
however, still open to question. Between 1960 and 1970,
Bongaarts (19781123) noted that the total natural
fertility rate increased as a result of a decline in
lactation. However, this small increase was more than
offset by substantial increases in the use of contra-
ception and induced abortion and a decline in the
proportions married. The KNFS data showed that women who
wanted no mre children breastfed significantly longer
than ~n who wanted more children (Nemeth, 1981). The
same survey found a strong positive association between
the length of breastfeeding and the length of the last
closed birth interval for women who did not use
contraception (Korea, NBOS and KIFP, 1977), however, the
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factors leading to that relationship are not entirely
clear. Although there would appear to be same causal
influence of breastfeeding on pregnancy, at least part of
this influence is in the opposite direction since many
women breastfeed their babies until they became
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pregnant. In an earlier study in Ichon, the small
differences between the average length of breastfeeding
and the length of the interval between a birth and
subsequent pregnancy for women in the older age groups
were found to be due primarily to greater foetal
wastage. Practically every woman in the Ichon survey
area breastfed her children until the start of the next
pregnancy, regardless of her age. In Korea today, if
widespread breastfeeding practices have been one factor
keeping fertility below its maximum level biologically,
any changes in these practices will tend to work against
further declines in fertility.
CHAPTER 3
SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND FERTILITY
The previous two chapters dealt separately with rapidly
changing economic and social conditions in Korea and the
fertility transition. The present chapter examines the
relationship between these changes. The methodology used
encompasses several related approaches, including macro-,
micro-, and community-level studies. The relatively
large number of micro- and macro-level studies conducted
in the last several years have shown clearly the impact
of modernization and socioeconomic development on
fertility levels in Korea: demand for children has been
reduced by a decrease in their net utility (Cho et al.,
1977), moreover, consumer aspirations have been raised by
the variety of goods and recreational activities that are
becoming available. This general rise in expectations,
combined with a growing feeling of relative deprivation
generated by rapid economic development and urbanization,
has put growing pressure on large families (Kwon et al.,
1975). While it is recognized that socioeconomic develop-
ment in general can be instrumental in producing a
fertility decline, it is more useful to examine the
individual facets of that development. These include
urbanization, declining infant and child mortality,
rising educational attainment (especially for women) and
educational aspirations for children, the changing status
of women, increasing female labor force participation, a
rise in consumer aspirations, and improved transportation
and communications.
These various factors are discussed in relation to
fertility in the subsections below. This is followed by
a review of the mixed evidence on the fertility impact of
community and ecological factors. Although Baae .-pirical
studies have been unable to demonstrate this i~ct, the
discussion below reviews a detailed anthropological study
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and an areal analysis that found these factors to be of
critical importance.
URBANIZATION AND MIGRATION
Since the Korean War, Korea has been transformed from a
heavily rural, agricultural society to one in which the
majority of the population lives in urban areas (see
Chapter 1). Although this rapid rate of urbanization has
proven to be an important factor in the country's
fertility decline (Moon, 1972J Kwon et al., 1975J C.B.
Park, 1978), it may prove to be less important in the
future. Rural women currently have considerably higher
fertility than urban womenJ however, rural fertility has
declined at a slightly faster rate than urban fertility
and remains higher only because it started at a much
higher level. In 1960, the TFR for rural women was 6.6
compared with a rate of 4.5 among urban women (see Table
14)J by 1975, urban total fertility had dropped by 39
percent to 2.8, while rural total fertility had declined
by 44 percent to 3.7. However, these declines were not
uniform over this period. From 1960 to 1966, total
fertility in urban areas declined by 30 percent, compared
with a decline of 17 percent in rural areas. During the
next decade, however, rural fertility fell almost three
times as rapidly as urban fertility (declining by 32.4
percent in rural areas and 11.8 percent in urban areas).
Although contraceptive use rates have been consistently
higher in urban than in rural areas throughout the history
of the Korean family planning program, the most recent
national survey shows virtually no difference in use rates
(Koh et al., 1980b). Differentials in ideal family size
between urban and rural areas have remained nearly con-
stant for at least the last fifteen years (Stoeckel, 1975J
Cheong et al., 1979). In recent surveys, rural women in
Korea say they want about one half child more on average
than women in large cities, although they actually expect
to have about one child more on the average (Cheong et
a1., 1979J B.T. Park et al., 1979).
Rapid urbanization affects both those born in cities
and those who move to cities from rural areas, but the
effect on the migrant can be particularly profound. In
describing urbanism as a way of life, Wirth (1957)
observed that it is characterized by secularization,
secondary-group relationships, voluntary association,
increased segmentation of roles, and poorly defined
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TABLE 14 Own-Children Estimates of Total Fertility Rates
per Woman, 1960, 1966, 1970, and 1975: Republic of Korea
Education
Residence More than
and Year None Primary Primary Total
Whole Country
1960 6.72 5.45 3.96 5.98
1966 5.79 4.56 2.92 4.60
1970 5.17 4.38 3.49 4.26
1975 3.80 3.51 2.77 3.21
Urban
1960 5.27 4.51 3.53 4.50
1966 3.72 3.38 2.58 3.13
1970 3.84 3.80 3.36 3.58
1975 3.08 3.05 2.59 2.76
Rural
1960 7.00 6.15 5.24 6.60
1966 6.23 5.30 3.99 5.50
1970 5.57 4.79 4.02 4.81
1975 4.10 3.85 3.35 3.72
Source: Retherford and Cho (1981).
social norms. For Korea, Moon (1972) noted that urban
life is accompanied by a decline in primary relationshiP8
and traditional kinship values because the migrant is
removed from the traditional milieu of the agricultural
population. While it is generally true that migrants
have a smaller number of children than nonmigrants,l it
is not clear to what extent this can be attributed to
urban adaptation. Ro and Abn (1977) feel that urban
exposure does tend to reduce fertility, but that migrant.
also possess certain attitudes and motivations that
predispose them to having fewer children. B.S. Lee et
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al. (1981) constructed an autoregressive fertility model
to control for selectivity of migrants and to test for
adaptation. They found that migrants from rural areas to
Seoul would have 2.9 fewer children than comparable rural
stayers, those moving to other large cities would have
1.9 fewer children, and those moving to small cities
would have 1.2 fewer children. Concluding that adaptation
to urban life is significant in explaining the reduced
fertility of rural-urban migrants, the authors estimated
that rural-urban migration was responsible for averting
2.6 million births during the decade 1965-75.
SOCIOECONC»UC STATUS
Although Cochrane (1979) has found that the traditional
negative relationship between education and fertility is
not as universal as previously thought, increases in
education in Korea are without doubt one of the major
causes of fertility decline (N.H. Cho et al., 1977J Moon,
1972). Fertility has been found to be negatively related
to education (particularly wifels education) in both
rural and urban areas and for all time periods for which
data are available (5. Hong, 1978J Kwon et al., 19751 Cho
and Retherford, 1981). This relationship generally holds
for a variety of fertility-related variables (number of
children ever born, TFR, ideal family size, and nonuse of
contraception and abortion), even after controls are
introduced for numerous other sociodemographic variables.
However, this inverse relationship between education and
fertility has shown some tendency to weaken over time,
and there has been considerable convergence in contra-
ceptive behavior between educational groups (Korea, NBOS
and KIFP, 19771 Cho and Retherford, 1981). OWn-children
fertility estimates for 1960-1975 (Table 14) show that
rapid fertility decline in both urban and rural areas
started in all educational groups simultaneously. These
estimates also confirm both the inverse relationship
between education and fertility throughout this period
and the convergence between educational groups over time.
This pattern is consistent with the transitional
hypothesis of differential fertility (Cho et al.,
19701282-285), which states that a population in the
early stage of its demographic transition begins to
exhibit a sharp inverse relationship between fertility
and educational attainment (as well as other components
of Bocial status). This relationship is the result of a
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transformation of the traditional value of children as
productive units to their new value as consumer goods.
Since individuals of higher socioeconomic status are the
first to adopt new life styles, their fertility begins to
decline earlier than that of lower socioeconomic groups.
The KNFS reported that the TFR dropped monotonically
from 4.8 for women with no schooling to 2.5 for women
with a college education (Korea, NBOS and KIFP, 1977191).
Much of the educational differential, however, was due to
differences in the proportion of women married at ages
under 25. This is evidenced by the fact that the total
marital fertility rate varied between only 5.3 and 4.4.
Mason and Phananiramai (1981) used an elaborate econoaic-
demographic model to examine marital fertility and found,
quite surprisingly, that more education leads to higher
marital fertility. Part of the explanation for this
puzzling relationship is that more highly educated women
of a given age have a shorter duration of marriage than
those with less education. However, a significant
positive relationship persisted even after controlling
for marital duration. The authors do caution that women
with higher education will not necessarily have higher
completed fertility since they tend to marry later.
Although some of the impact of education on fertility
is direct, there are also undoubtedly indirect effects
through such intervening variables as educational aspira-
tions for children, media exposure, female employment,
breastfeeding, infant mortality, occupation, and income.
Predictably, income does not appear to have much net
effect on fertility (Mason and Phananiramai, 1981).
Couples with higher income do express less dependence on
their children for old age support, but the overall
effect of income tends to wash out when other factors are
introduced.
Occupation appears to have some impact on fertility,
although its effect is also attenuated when controls are
introduced. The KNFS found that, within education
groups, women whose husbands worked in agriculture had
the highest level of fertility (Korea, NBOS and KIFP,
1977). The same study found that professionals and
managers were distinctive for their high level of contra-
ceptive use, while farmers and manual laborers were
distinctive for their low level of use. These findings
would suggest that as Korea's economy continues its
industrial transformation and Korean men and women shift
to jobs with higher occupational prestige, continuing
fertility decline will be favored.
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In the last two decades, there has been considerable
improvement in the status of women in Korea, accompanied
by an increasing propensity of women to join the labor
force. Korean women also have a longer average work week
(53.5 hours) than women in any other country in the world
(according to a recent report of the International Labor
Organization cited in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, January
22, 1982). In a 1976 national survey, B.T. Park et ale
(1979) found that the percentage of married women who had
been employed before marriage decreased monotonically
with age, from 44.5 percent for women under age 25 to 9.3
percent for women aged 45-49. Moreover, about 23 percent
of women were working at the time of the survey (30
percent in large cities and 18 percent in rural areas) •
Although female labor force participation has been
rising, it is not clear whether women's work per se has
been partly responsible for Korea's fertility decline.
The KNFS found no clear pattern of association between
women's work experience and either current contraceptive
use or cumulative fertility (Korea, NBOS and KIFP, 1977,
Koo,1979). Data from the 1970 census indicate that
.-ployed women had higher fertility than nonemployed
women in every age group (United Nations, BSCAP, 1975).
However, in a more restricted sample of women aged 26-30
in 1970, Ro (1979) found that women's economic activity
had the largest (negative) impact on the number of
children ever born of any variable included in a aulti-
var iate model. In fact, women who were regularly
employed had an average of .57 fewer children than those
who were econoaically inactive, after controlling for
education, literacy, migration status, occupation of
bousehold head, industry, and urban-rural residence.
As might be eXPeCted, the type of job seems to be more
iaportant in deteraining fertility than econoaic activity
alone. certain jobs are more compatible with raising
children than others. Although S. Hong (1978) did not
find auch of a fertility differential between working and
nonworking women, she found that women whose jobs were
incompatible with housekeeping had auch lower fertility
than those whose jobs were compatible. Low fertility has
also been found to be characteristic of women in
professional and technical occupations and women with
high opportunity costs of earnings (United Nations,
BSCAP, 1975, S. Hong, 1979).
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The mere act of working, therefore, SeeaB unlikely to
cause reduced fertility in a country where .any jobs are
entirely ca.patible with childrearing and alternatives to
caring for children during the workday are readily avail-
able. However, the increasing nucleation of the fuily,
the continuing evolution in the structure of job oppor-
tunities, and the changing status of women may all
coabine to facilitate a further reduction in fertility
rates in the future.
INFANT AND CHILD MORTALITY
One lleasure of socioeconosaic conditions in a country is
the state of health of the population in general, and the
level of mortality in particular. Since the Korean War,
.artality rates have declined precipitously in Korea:
the infant mortality rate declined fra. 100 to 122 in
1955-60 to 37 in 1978-79 (Korea, Bureau of Statistics,
Econa.ic Planning Board, 1980, Cho and Feeney, 1976). In
the past, infant .artality appears to have had a substan-
tial influence on fertility rates, although there are
a~t no .-pirical studies to support this link (8.
Hong, 1978), both changing attitudes toward fuily size
and the country's overall fertility decline have been
attributed to the decline in infant and child aortality
(Kwon and Lee, 1976, N.H. Cho et al., 1977).
However, mortality has now reached such a low level
that it is evidently no longer a major factor in child-
bearing decisions. In 1976, N.H. Cho et ale (1977)
reported that only 13.1 percent of married women men-
tioned worry about child mortality as a disadvantage of a
small family. In the same year, the Value of Children
study found that not a single respondent (out of aore
than 2,000) spontaneously mentioned .artality risks as a
reason why it is undesirable to have only one child
(Bulatao, 1979:87). C.B. Park et ale (1979:564) esttaate
that at this point in time, the cOlllPlete eliaination of
infant .artality would lead to only a one point reduction
in the crude birth rate. The authors conclude that -the
effect of infant mortality may be of aicro-level concern
but aay not have much impact on the macro-level.-
The above discussion indicates that changing socio-
econa.ic conditions in Korea can take auch of the credit
for precipitating the recent fertility decline. Rapid
urbanization, increasing educational attainaent (particu-
larly for women), the increasing availability to wa.en of
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jobs that are incompatible with childrearing, and the
drastic decline in infant and child mortality have all
contributed to the fertility transition. While the first
three factors may be expected to put continuing pressure
on the birth rate in the future, infant mortality is now
so low that further reductions are unlikely to have auch
impact on fertility.
COMMUNITY AND ECOLOGICAL FACTORS
There has been little research on the relationship
between community factors and fertility behavior in
Korea. Only four major studies are known to be available
so far. The results of these studies seem to depend on
the type of data and methodology used. Least successful
in demonstrating an effect of community factors on
fertility are studies that add community-level variables
to individual records on survey data files.
Aggregate-level analyses relating average areal fertility
levels to other areal characteristics have met with some
success. The type of research that has shown the
strongest results is an anthropological study primarily
based on field observation.
Cho and Perry (1979) conducted an areal analysis of
the determinants of fertility in 140 rural counties in
Korea. They found that both socioeconoaic factors and
IUD acceptance have a negative impact on marital fer-
tility among rural women aged 30-44, but the effect of
socioeconomic status is not discernible among younger
women. Their study also demonstrated that IUD acceptance
rates have a greater negative impact on fertility in
areas with relatively low socioeconomic levels.
Using 1974 KHFS data, S.B. Lee et ale (1978b) examined
the extent to which community differences in family
planning practices are explained by community character-
istics. They found that the differences were moderately
associated with the aggregate socioeconomic levels of
each village expressed as averages of the socioeconomic
standings of individuals. The most important aggregate
variables were almost identical to the variables that
explained differences among individual couples. The
relationship of community structure and environmental
factors to the level of family planning practices in a
cOJlllunity was found to be insignificant. S. Hong
(19761179), investigating the association between
cOJlllunity development and the desired family size of
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individuals in 53 villages in southeastern Korea, arrived
at a similar conclusion,2 but in her dismay at the
results she stated the followingl
From my own personal experience, I am certain that
the social environment affects individual behavior.
In the research ••• , however, few effects are
discernible. Perhaps the methodological and meas-
urement suggestions just made (in the dissertation)
will lead to improved studies of the community
effects on individual behavior.
Such an improvement could be made by the adoption of a
holistic approach based on intensive and prolonged field
observation. The anthropological research of Ran and
others on ·social, cultural, and ecological factors
affecting popUlation processes in Korea,· which was
carried out during a one-and-a-half-year period between
1975 and 1976 (Ran and Kwon, 1981), is typical of this
approach and provides many insights into the relation-
ships between community factors and reproductive behav-
ior. For comparative purposes, the research selected as
its observation sites four ecologically and sociocultur-
ally distinctive communities in different parts of the
country: a rice-farming village, a mountainous farming
village, a fishing village, and a middle-sized town. ~e
most important finding of this research is that ecological
factors such as the type of subsistence economy, the
pattern of labor participation, the seasonality of labor
demand, and community mortality and health conditions are
critical determinants of the marriage institution, the
family system, and family-building behavior and attitudes,
as described in more detail below. 3 The same kinds of
relationships between socioeconomic background and indi-
vidual fertility are confirmed as in other KAP (knowledge
of, attitudes toward, and practice of contraception) types
of surveys conducted in Korea, however, unlike other
studies, this research discloses many striking features
of community-level fertility differences and behavior.
When different types of communities are compared, no
significant negative relationship is observed between the
level of ~ertility and the average age at marriage. In
the fishing village, the level of fertility was relatively
low, while marriage took place at a comparatively young
age, the reverse was true in the rice-farming village.
Similar dissonance was seen between fertility behavior
and attitudes: women in the fishing village revealed
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very high faaily-size ideals, while their actual fer-
tility was relatively low.
The pattern of seasonal variations in the level of
births differed from one type of community to another.
The mode of mate selection and meaning of marriage were
distinctive in each type of community, even in the
traditional setting. It is well documented that in
traditional Korea, marriage was mostly arranged regard-
less of the opinion of those being .arried, though the
consent of children was assumed, arranged marriage was
both the preferred and dominant mode of .ate selection,
even in the early 1960s (J.S. Choi, 19661438, Lee and
Kwon, 1968). However, free .arriage was common in the
fishing village, which was most underdeveloped. Even in
the case of an arranged marriage, the process of mate
selection was entirely different in the farming and
fishing villagesl in the latter, there was hardly any
significant family or community involvement in mate
selection (unpublished research notes and Chun, 1977a).
Marriage patterns in the town community were si.ilar to
those in the farming areas.
Patterns of fertility-related behavior therefore vary
among the survey coamunities. The discussion that
follows examines how different ecological or environ-
mental factors have brought about these differentials.
Type of Subsistence Economy
As is obvious, fishing constitutes the major industry in
the fishing village. In addition, upland farming and
sea-plant cultivation form a substantial part of the
subsistence economy of the area. Fishing is exclusively
assigned to adult males, while women work in upland
farming, during the winter, the whole family, including
children, is engaged in sea-plant cultivation. The
farming and mountainous villages rely entirely on rice
cultivation and dry-field farming, economically, the two
villages are quite similar. The people in the town
cc.munity, who are no better off economically than
far_rs, are mostly employed in the service sector.
The relatively low level of fertility and large
family-size ideal in the fishing village can be explained
priaarily by the type of subsistence economy. Traditional
sea fishing on a small boat involves considerable risk.
The close relationship between high mortality and large
desired faaily size is already well established. More-
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over, high mortality among adult males frequently causes
the discontinuation of marriage for women. In addition,
because boat fishing itself results in separation of the
couple, abstinence is frequently observed during the
fishing season. These factors have contributed to the
comparatively low fertility in the community. Siailarly,
the high fertility in the farming villages can partly be
explained by the low risk of dying involved in agricul-
ture, the concurrent stability of marriage, and the
infrequent practice of voluntary abstinence.
The high mortality of adult men of reproductive age
appears to have profound implications for the .arriage
and family system of the fishing village. There is
little social resistance against the remarriage of women
in the area. The survey reveals that about 90 percent of
currently married women are in their second or third
marriageJ the equivalent proportions in the other com-
munities are less than 10 percent. In the fishing
village, family life is highly unstable: concubinage,
desertion of spouses by either side, and separation of
the couple are very common. In contrast, the rice-
farming village, which is also a kin (or clan) village,
manifests very strong family solidarity and stability.
The type of family system seems to be associated directly
with the degree of family involvement in mate selectionJ
so-called -free marriage- is found mostly in the fishing
village and least in the farming village.
The major meanings or functions of marriage also vary
in accordance with the ecological setting of an area.
The primary concerns of married people in the far.ing
village closely agree with the alleged traditional func-
tions postulated by the nec-Confucian ideology, which
emphasizes the succession of family name, family unity,
filial piety, and so forth. These are of only secondary
importance in the fishing village, where dependence in
old age and personal security are primary concerns. In
the fishing village, the right and duty of ancestor
worship can even be traded among those who have no
kinship relations at all (Chun, 1977a).
Thus it seems clear that the type of subsistence
economy is closely linked with the level of fertility,
the meaning and practice of marriage, and the family
system of an area. However, the differences in desired
family size cannot be properly explained in the same waYJ
for this purpose, labor demand and the importance of
child labor in the community economic syste••ust be
examined.
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Deaand for Labor
In the town community, the economic value of children is
minimal, while in the fishing village, it i. of much
greater importance. In general, the economic value of
children is partly determined by the extent of women's
labor force participation in the survey communities: the
value is greater when the need for women's labor force
participation increases. This observation is generally
valid where a traditional industry or economic system is
dominant, however, the reverse may be true in a modern
system where the major goal of women's econoaic activity
is self-realization or ability and career development.
The research discloses that the proportion of women in
any kind of economic activity is very minor in the town
community. In contrast, in the fishing village, farming
is almost exclusively assigned to women. Men rarely work
on the farm or help with household jobs, even if they
stay home idle, and children usually prepare supper for
the fuily and clean the house, in other words, WOIII8n' s
prescribed economic activity can only be properly per-
for..d if children are present. In the farming village,
wa-en's work outside the house is largely confined to
dry-field far.ing, and rice farming is the duty of men
under ordinary circumstances. 4 In these villages,
children have little econoaic value, but also do not
constitute much of an economic burden. Older sisters and
brothers usually take care of younger ones, and if not,
the community provides the necessary care.
Another important observation is that in the fishing
village, sea farming during the winter, which is then the
most i~rtant income source, is extremely labor-
intensive, the amount of far.ing is deter.ined, year by
year, by the number of household members available.
Children who have migrated to the city and are marginally
e.ployed there often return to the village to help their
fuily during this season. No evidence of circular
migration for work is seen in the other communities
(Chun, 1977a).
Such demand for both women's and children's labor in
the traditional setting may explain to a significant
extent community differences in desired family size. The
town community exhibits both the smallest family-size
ideal and the lowest demand for children's or women's
labor for the household economy, with the fishing village
at the other end of the spectrum. In fact, the range of
differences in desired family size among the villages is
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greater than that among age or .ajor socioecona-ic groups,
suggesting the importance of community or ecological
factors in attitudes toward family building.
The Work Cycle
In the traditional economic sector, labor intensity, the
work cycle, and the division of labor generally depend
upon the types and sizes of subsistence econa-ies. In
the farming villages mentioned above, intensive labor
input is needed from May to July and in September and
October, while the per iOO from November through February
is a slack season. In the fishing village, labor input
(particularly of women) is intense in May and June in
connection with upland farming, and during the winter
months from November to February because of off-shore
sea-plant cultivation (or sea farming). The latter is
most labor-intensive, and in this season all available
hands except the very young and the very old are put to
work from early in the morning until late at night.
Similar, though slightly less, labor intensity is observed
in far.ing during the bUSy seasons. On the other hand,
no such distinctive work cycle is apparent in the town
community.
The research reveals that the work cycle accounts for
the seasonality of births and marriages, and points to
problems in the family planning delivery system in the
survey communities. Chun's analysis (1977b) shows that
there are marked monthly differences in the frequency of
births in the farming and fishing villages, and that
these patterns coincide with the work cycle (that is,
pregnancy takes place most frequently in the slack
season, while the rate falls abruptly during the work
season).5 For example, the frequency of pregnancies
peaks in September and October in the fishing village,
and in December and January in the far.ing ca-aunity.
Similar, but more pronounced, patterns of seasonal
variation are observed for marriages. According to 1974
KNFS data, about 57 percent of marriages for woaaen aged
20-49 who grew up in rural areas are reported to have
occurred during the three ~nths from November to
JanuarYJ marriages during the four months from June
through September account for only 5.7 percent. '!'be
corresponding figures for women who had grown up in the
city are 39 percent and 14 percent, respectively.
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These patterns have significant iaplications for
family planning field services. Adequate delivery of
these services is extremely difficult during the busy
season. Field workers, who rotate regularly through each
village, often cannot see any eligible women when they
visit during the day because these women do not return
bC*e until late at night. Since the bUSy season extends
to about six JIlOnths a year, the rural work cycle should
not be overlooked when family planning strategies are
foraulated.
Other Ecological Factors
Ban and others include geographical location, housing,
and the perception of community health conditions among
the major ecological factors. The research found that,
although the national faaily planning program was
iaplemented allover the country, accessibility still
constitutes a uin factor in the availability of family
planning services and information. For example, it was
reported that field workers visited the fishing village
only once a year even though they were supposed to
insPect each village at least once a month. Furthermore,
because of a lack of convenient transportation, coapounded
by geographical location, the villagers rarely visited
any faaily planning clinic in the nearby town. A similar
problea, though much less acute, was found in the
aountainous village. Although a lack of contact with
faaily planning workers was also prevalent in the town
c~unity, women there could readily obtain information
and services through numerous drug stores and clinics.
Accessibility was also found to be closely related to the
co.-unity's general reaction to certain types of faaily
planning methods, including sterilizationl suspicion of
a method was greater when accessibility was limited.
Housing conditions were identified as one of the key
factors explaining the relatively low level of fertility
in the town coamunity. In that area, about one third of
the total households live in rented rooas, and the nUJlber
of children has many immediate implications for everyday
living I it is difficult for a large family to rent a
raa., and couples with many children are usually under
psychological stress because they are afraid their
children will disturb the landlord. This is more or less
a ~n feature of life for the urban lower classJ it is
manifested in slightly higher fertility than that of the
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urban middle and upper classes, but much lower fertility
than that of rural villager. Whereas concern about
children's education is a major force limiting family
size among the middle class, housing-related problems
appear to exert a major pressure for low fertility among
the urban lower class.
According to the anthropological type of study
discussed above, individuals' perceptions of health and
mortality conditions seem to mirror more the community or
collective experience than their own personal history.
For instance, the lower- and middle-class town community
members generally have very similar perceptions of sur-
rounding health and mortality conditions. perceptions of
the lower-class town residents are also far brighter than
those of the farming villagers, who are economically
better off. Undoubtedly, these perceptions are one of
the important determinants of desired family size, and
thus are related to motivation to regulate family size,
not only in the survey communities but also in Korea as a
whole.
Ecological Versus Sociocultural Factors
As discussed below in Chapter 5, various aspects of the
Korean family system are closely associated with
individual reproductive behavior, but the direction of
these impacts is neither unidimensional nor unilinear.
In the traditional family system, two mutually exclusive
forces co-exist, one supporting high and the other low
fertility. However, the significance of each force is
not constant, but dependent upon the particular social
milieu. A similar argument can be made about traditional
cultural factors, though most of these are embedded in
the family system. According to the findings of Ban and
others, observed differentials in both actual fertility
and desired family size among the four communities are
not substantially explained by sociocultural factors such
as traditionalism, familism, and community solidarity.
The ecological factors can have important implications
for the community's fertility level, actual or desired.
For example, the level of fertility in a community is
influenced by whether the community is urban or rural and
by the degree to which it is oriented toward industry,
farming, or fishing. At the same time, within each
community setting, sociocultural factors have behavioral
implications at the individual or couple level.
73
Apart from the anthropological type of cOllllllunity Btudy
done by Ban and otherB, moBt cOllllllunity-level analyBeB of
fertility-related behavior have failed, aB mentioned
earlier, to produce any diBtinctive fertility differenceB
by ecological or cultural factorB. However, the per-
BiBtent marked fertility differenceB between urban and
rural areaB and between large and Bmall citieB provide
other indirect evidence of the importance of community
and ecological factors. Confining analyBiB to agri-
cultural communitieB, aB iB the caBe with moBt community-
level BtudieB done BO far in Korea, Beems very unlikely
to lead to an accurate aBBeBBment of the ecological
factorB influencing fertility, Bince rural Korean farming
villageB diBplay conBiderable homogeneity in their
ecological and environmental characteriBticB, when
contraBted with citieB, fiBhing villageB, mining
ca.munitieB, or farming villageB undergoing rapid
tranBition due to geographic proximity to expanding
citieB with induBtrial orientationB. (Part of the lack
of finding diBtinctive fertility differenceB by
ecological or cultural factorB in Korean BtudieB, may be
due to the choice of communitieB with little ecological
distinctiveneBB.)
NO'l'BS
1 MigrantB moving from one rural area to another
(rural-rural migrantB) have fewer children than rural
reBidentB in general in all age groupB, and migrantB
to Seoul from other citieB have fewer children than
reBidentB of Seoul. Rural migrantB to Seoul have
even fewer children than Seoul reBidentB below age
30, but not at older ageB (Ra and Abn, 1977).
2 The lack of a BubBtantial effect of the community
level variableB in thiB Btudy may be partly due to
the limitationB of the Bampling deBign. The S3
villageB included in the Btudy are geographically
adjacent to one another and are all in the Baae
valley. Different reBultB may have been obtained
with a more diBperBed and leBB well-integrated Bample
of villageB.
3 PartB of the diBcuBBion below are extracted from Ban
and Evon (1981), otherB are derived from the
original, unpubliBhed data Bource, if not Btated
otherwiBe.
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4 wo.en's participation in rice farming has increased
rapidly in the 1970s, due mainly to a severe shortage
of male labor resulting from heavy rural-to-urban
migration among the young.
S Reliable reporting of the date of birth and the .anth
of marriage according to the lunar calendar can
easily be secured in Korea.
CHAPTER 4
MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY, AND FERTILITY
De.agraphic change in Korea cannot be fully understood
unless it is placed in the context of marital institu-
tions and the family system. 'D1e present chapter first
examines the fertility implications of changing patterns
of marital structure in Korea. 'D1e discussion then
proceeds to the social norms regulating Korean marital
behavior, and finally to the process of family building
and organization.
PROPORTIC»iS CURRBNTLY MARRIED
Marriage influences the reproductive behavior of indi-
viduals and determines a society's fertility level in
aany ways. It determines what proportion of women
ultimately engage in reproduction, when reproduction
starts, and how long on average a woman is exposed to
childbearing. Universality of marriage, age at marriage,
widowhood, divorce practices, and remarriage patterns are
the major direct determinants of the marital structure of
a societYJ however, all of these converge into the pro-
portion of currently married individuals.
The proportion of currently married women is signifi-
cant in understanding the level and structure of fertility
in Korea since JIOst births occur within wedlock. In
traditional Korea, illegitimate childrenl were rare due
to the custom of extremely early marriage and social
approval of concubinage (D.-a. Kim, 19801607-608). In
addition, profound social and legal sanctions are known
to have been exercised against illegitimate children.
Recently, fertility surveys have docuaented an increasing
proportion of premarital pregnancies, but JIOst of these
were reported as ending in live births within marriage.
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According to S.B. Lee et ale (1978a), pre-arital preg-
nancy accounted for 26 percent of the total first
pregnancies for 1974-76, while the pre-arital birth rate
a80ng first births was 6.2 percent, the corresponding
figures for 1960-61 are 10.1 percent and 2.1 percent,
respectively. If the prellarital birth rate is calculated
as a proportion of total births, it drops to about 2
percent during the years 1974-76. It should be noted
that these rates do not account for births to unwed
mothers, though this nuaber is thought to be negligible.
One JM)re Uiportant observation is that the date of
aarriage reported in the survey frequently disagrees with
the actual tiJle at which the couple entered into a stable
union I sa.etiJles the wedding cer880DY is perfo~ after
the marital union has begun. It has also been widely
observed recently in Korea that aany pre-arital
pregnancies take place after the engagellant. In other
cases, marriage is forced because of premarital pregnancy
to secure the legitimacy of the birth, if this is not
successful, an abortion tends to result. Based on these
observations, it ay be concluded that illegitimate or
premarital births are of very liaited d.-ograpbic
significance, and that even in conte-porary Korea,
aarriage primarily conditions reproductive patterns and
behavior.
Table 15 shows that the proportion of currently
married woaen of reproductive age has declined
substantially since 1960. As would be expected, the
changing pattern differs greatly according to agel the
proportion decreased in the age groups below 30 and
increased at ages 30 and above. The proportional
decrease at younger ages is mostly explained by the
rising age at marriage, and the increase at older ages by
the decreasing risk of JM)rtality. Given the relatively
high marital fertility in the younger age grou~ and the
rapidly declining marital fertility in older groups due
mainly to wider use of effective fertility control
methods, this changing proportion of currently arried
woaen has far greater meaning for community fertility
levels at younger ages than at later ages.
NOPTIALITY AND FERTILITY2
As discussed in Chapter 2, a sharp downturn in fertility
levels took place in the early 1960s. Prom 1925 to 1960,
there was little variation in the TFR except during WOrld
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TABLE 15 Mari tal Status Distribution of Women by Age
Group. 1935-75: Korea
Age 1935 1955 1960 1966 1970 1975
Proportions Single
15-19 37.4 85.2 92.8 96.1 97.1 97.4
20-24 3.2 20.8 33.6 51.6 57.2 62.5
25-29 0.4 3.0 2.9 7.7 9.7 11.8
30-34 0.2 0.7 0.4 1.0 1.4 2.1
35-39 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.7
40-44 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
45-49 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
15-49 8.1 23.2 25.7 29.3 31.5 36.0
Proportions Currently Married
15-19 61.6 14.3 7.0 3.8 2.8 2.6
20-24 94.7 75.1 65.0 47.7 42.3 37.2
25-29 96.6 89.7 93.3 89.8 88.4 86.8
30-34 95.1 89.8 91.9 93.9 94.6 94.4
35-39 91.9 87.0 88.4 89.2 92.0 93.2
40-44 86.3 81.4 82.4 82.7 84.8 88.2
45-49 78.6 73.6 76.3 75.2 76.8 79.1
15-49 85.6 67.8 67.4 64.2 62.9 59.5
Proportions Currently Divorced
15-19 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-24 1.0 2.1 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.1
25-29 0.8 2.5 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.7
30-34 0.7 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4
35-39 0.6 1.8 1.4 1.6 L8 1.5
40-44 0.6 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.4
45-49 0.6 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.1
15-49 0.7 1.6 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.7
Proportions Currently Widowed
15-19 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-24 1.0 2.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1
25-29 2.2 4.8 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.7
30-34 4.1 7.4 6.0 3.5 2.4 2.1
35-39 7.3 10.9 10.1 8.9 5.9 4.6
40-44 13.0 16.8 16.5 16.0 13.4 10.1
45-49 20.7 24.8 22.8 23.9 21.8 19.6
15-49 5.5 7.3 5.8 5.6 4.6 3.8
Note: Data for 1935 are for all Korea; data for subsequent years
are for South Korea only.
Sources: Kwon (1977. Appendix Table C); Korean Institute for
P-.i1y Planning (1978, Section F).
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War II and the Korean War, when fertility was somewhat
reduced. Since fertility is a function of both the
proportion married and marital fertility, the following
discussion examines the relationship between these two
components of overall fertility during the last few
decades.
Coale (1965) has developed three indices that
succinctly express the relationship between overall
fertility and its components: If, an index of overall
fertility, I g, an index of marital fertility, and 1m,
an index of the proportion currently married. These
indices are defined such that when the number of
illegitimate births is negligible (as in Korea), If •
(1 m) (I g). Each index is confined to the range from
zero (no childbearing, or no one married) to one (maximal
fertility rates, or all women aged 15-50 currently
married).
Table 16 presents values of the three indices for
various dates from 1925-75 and for the urban and rural
populations. The absence of a large difference between
overall fertility in 1930 and 1960 is the consequence of
opposing trends in the proportion married among women of
childbearing ages, on the one hand, and marital
fertility, on the other: the proportion married (Im)
showed an uninterrupted decline after 1930, marital
fertility (Ig) was substantially higher in 1960 than in
1930. The constant trend in overall fertility until 1960
was therefore the result of counterbalancing opposite
trends in 1m and Ig •
The trends in overall fertility and its two constitu-
ent components are shown graphically in Figure 7. Table
16 and Figure 7 demonstrate that I increased by almost
25 percent from 1930 to 1960, but lell by 23 percent over
the entire period fram 1930 to 1975, 1m, on the other
hand, fell by 33 percent during the same 45-year period.
Therefore, the decrease in proportions married contributed
substantially more to the decline in overall fertiiity
than did the decrease in marital fertility. The decline
in 1m from 1930 to 1975 accounts for 60 percent of the
decline in If. After 1960, however, Ig fell by 39
percent and 1m by 16 percent, hence 74 percent of the
decline in If is attributable to the decline in marital
fertility.3
Both the proportion married and marital fertility were
consistently lower in urban than in rural areas. The
extent of the decline in 1m was about the same in both
areas. Urban Ig increased slightly more from 1930 to
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TABLE 16 Indices of Overall Fertilty (If), Marital
Fertility (I~), and Proportion Married (1m), by Urban and
Rural Area, 925-75: Korea
Total Urban Rural
Year I. If Ig I. If I g I. If I g
19254 .879 .488 .556 .789 .390 .496 .883 .501 .568
19304 .893 .484 .538 .744 .387 .500 .900 .499 .554
19354 .883 .488 .540 .754 .381 .505 .893 .506 .567
19404 .856 .491 .544
1955b .715 .427 .598 .650 .371 .571 .738 .448 .606
1960 .704 .472 .670 .626 .362 .578 .740 .521 .705
1966 .658 .369 .561 .576 .258 .448 .710 .440 .620
1970 .632 .339 .536 .576 .286 .496 .686 .390 .569
1975c .594 .245 .412 .555 .215 .387 .645 .284 .440
aFigurea for 1925-55 enco.pass sll Korea; figures for subsequent years sre for
South Korea only. Trisl ca1culstions for that period show negligible differences
in the indexes for the whole country and for the srea currently within the
Republic of Korea.
bBaaed on average number of births. 1954-56.
cBirtha for 1975 sssume s correction factor for the population aged 0-1 in the 1975
cenaua equal to the average correction fsctor for the 0-1 age group in the 1966 and
1970 censuaes.
Source: Coale et al. (1979).
1955 than rural I g, but between 1955 and 1960, urban
I g remained almost constant, while rural Ig increased
by 16 percent. Prom 1960 to 1975, the proportionate
decline in rural I g was greater than that in urban
Ig l that is, the fertility decline among the rural
population was catching up with that among the urban
population. 'l'be proportionate reductions in If' 1m,
and I g were greater for the total population than for
either the rural or the urban population, this is partly
due to heavy rural-urban migration in the 1960s and 1970s
and resulting changes in the proportion of the population
living in urban and rural areas.
PROPORTIc.S DIVORCED AND WIDONBD
According to a series of censuses up to ~975, the
proportion of currently divorced women in Korea has
consistently been very low (less than 2 percent) and
aanifests no sign of significant change in any age
group. However, this cannot be interpreted as indicating
little recent change in divorce practices, since the
proportion currently divorced is a combined effect of the
FIGURE 7 Indices of Overall Fertility (If>, Marital Fertility (Ig >, and Proportion
Married (1m>, by Urban and Rural Area, 1925-75
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proportion ever divorced and the rate of remarriage among
the divorced.
In Korea, at least during the last two decades, the
idea has prevailed that the number of divorces is
increasing year by year. However, no supporting evidence
is available. On the contrary, a resurvey of a
middle-sized town discloses that the proportion of
ever-divorced women among the ever married declined
slightly during the period between 1965 and 19741 the
proportion for ages 20-44 is reported as 3.1 percent in
1965 and 2.6 percent in 1974 (B.-Y. Lee, 196512-3, PDSC,
197511-2). Though not convincing, this suggests that the
traditional stability of the Korean family still reaains
almost intact. However, it is interesting to note, as
discussed later in this chapter, that the pattern of
divorce has undergone a significant change since about
1960.
Little information is available for the nation as a
whole on the timing and age pattern of marriage
dissolution due to divorce. The 1974 KNFS is probably
the only source of such data. 4 According to these
data, the proportion of women who ended their first
marriage by divorce is highest in the age group 40-44
(about 5 percent), and divorce occurs most frequently in
a relatively early stage of reproduction, at an average
age of 25-27 in the case of women (see Tables 17 and 18).
In contrast to divorce trends, both the proportion of
widows and the probability of being widowed have been
reduced greatly since 1955 in response to the rapidly
declining risk of mortality regardless of age. As a
result, the stability of marriage has strengthened
substantiallyl the 1974 KNFS reveals that 95 percent of
the ever-married women in the age group 30-34 are in
their first marriage, the corresponding figure is 90
percent for the entire reproductive span, age 15-49, and
about 80 percent for women age 40-44.
UNIVERSALITY OF MARRIAGE
As noted earlier, in traditional Korea, every man or
woman was supposed to marry and set up a family. This
universality of marriage was supported by the early age
at marriage, and by the practice of completely arranged
marriage, the strongest support, however, came from
social custom and the family norm. Both legally and
conventionally, there was a marked discrimination between
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TABLE 17 Proportions of Ever-Married Women by Status of
First Marriage, 1974 : Republic of Korea
Dissolved by
Age Total Continuing Divorce Widowhood Separation
15-19 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-24 100.0 99.1 0.5 0.2 0.2
25-29 100.0 98.1 0.9 0.5 0.5
30-34 100.0 94.7 3.0 1.7 0.6
35-39 100.0 89.5 4.3 5.5 0.7
40-44 100.0 80.7 5.0 13.5 0.8
45-49 100.0 70.5 4.9 22.2 2.4
15-49 100.0 89.7 3.1 6.4 0.8
Source: 1974 KNFS data tape.
married and single personsl the status of ·adult· was
often assigned to married persons only, regardless of
their age; the style of hair was different according to
marital status; in ordinary conversation, -elderly single
men- were subject to severe ridicule; single girls beyond
marriageable age were frequently treated as -helpless·;
and the status of women was only determined by and within
marriage (H.-Y. Lee, 1978:758-759). Such constraints,
though weakened, still persist. Even today, peraanent
celibacy is rarely considered acceptable for ordinary
people; single persons past marriageable age are derided
by family members, friends, and colleagues.
The marital composition derived from a series of
censuses reflects the intensity of this pressure to
marry. In 1935, the proportion of single women was
reported as 0.1 percent at ages 35-39. It has increased
only slightly since then, reaching 0.2 percent at ages
45-49 in 1975 (see Table 15). The proportion of single
(never married) women is expected to increase somewhat
even in late reproductive ages in the years ahead beCause
of a marriage squeeze resulting from the Korean War during
1950-53;5 however, the ideas behind the universal
marriage system are very unlikely to attenuate. In
addition to this social atmosphere, institutional
supports for the unmarried are not likely to evolve in
the near future, given the apparent direction of the
newly emerging social welfare development policy. The
government has consistently emphasized the role of family
and community in helping the needy, including the
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TABLE 18 Mean Age of Women at Dissolution of
First Marriage by Reason. 1974: Republic of
Korea
Age Divorced Widowed
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
15-49
25.3*
25.1 27.4*
26.7 30.2
25.4 31.1
26.9 32.7
26.0 32.5
--. Fewer than 10 cases.
*: Between 10 and 19 cases.
Source: Calculated from the 1974 KNFS data
tape.
elderly, and government subsidies are directed mostly to
the family rather than to individuals. Thus, marriage
still provides lifetime security for Koreans, par-
ticularly for women whose opportunity for economic
activity is greatly limited by social custom.
Also supporting the universality of marriage is the
widespread concept of -adequate timing of marriage-
(hon-ki), a social norm applied particularly to girls.
Although this concept has changed considerably since the
1920s, it has consistently played an important role in
regulating the marriage behavior of Koreans. The range
of ideal timing is narrowly defined, and is much narrower
for girls than for boys. One begins to feel the pressure
for aarriage upon reaching this ideal age, although this
pressure may have eased slightly during recent years as a
result of the continuous postponement of the age at
marriage.
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TIMING OF MARRIAGE
Even though the traditional universal marriage system
persists, the timing of marriage has changed substan-
tially in Korea since the mid-1920s. According to a
census estimate, the singulate mean age at first marriage
was 21.1 for men and 16.6 for women in 1925, as is seen
from Table 19. It rose to 27.4 and 23.7 for men and
women respectively in 1975. The postponement of marriage
has been an ongoing process during the last half century.
The prevalence of early marriage in traditional Korea
is well documented. According to Kyung-kug tae-1un, a
fifteenth-century Korean law book, the lower limit of the
age at marriage was set at 15 for men and 14 for women,
in exceptional cases, marriage could be allowed at age
12. The limit was raised to 20 for men and 16 for women
in 1895. Interestingly enough, both laws state explicitly
that the prevailing early marriage is a bad custom, and
numerous historical documents condemn the early marriage
custom as frequently impairing the health of the couple
(D.-H. Kim, 1980:446-447, K.-K. Lee, 1977:229-231). In
fertility terms, infecundity appears to have been caused
often at early ages by early marriage, resulting in turn
in a relatively low level of marital fertility in
traditional Korea.
The initial rise in age at marriage in the mid-1920s
coincided with the growing migration of Koreans to Japan
and Manchuria, which was in turn a direct response to the
rapidly deteriorating agricultural economy resulting fro.
Japan's colonial policy of exploiting Korean agriculture
to the maximum (Kwon, 1977:163-166). Single, male
laborers were dominant in migration overseas during the
colonial period (1910-45). The contribution of such a
TABLE 19 Singu1ate Mean Age at First Marriage by Sex,
1925-75: Korea
Sex 1925 1935 1940 1955 1960 1966 1970 1975
Male 21.1 21.4 21.8 24.7 25.4 26.6 27.2 27.4
Female 16.6 17.1 17 .8 20.5 21.5 22.9 23.3 23.7
Notes: Calculation based on census data using Hajna1's ~thod. Data for
1925-40 are for all Korea; data for subsequent years are for South Korea only.
Sourcea: Kwon et al. (1975); Lee and Han (1978).
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population movement to marriage postponement for both men
and women can easily be postulated.
'!'he JM)st drastic change in the timing of marriage is
observed between 1940 and 1955, as is clear from Table
19. '!'his period was marked by a large volume of
migration in and out of Korea, and by social disturbance
resulting from a series of political upbeavals including
World War 11, the liberation of Korea from Japanese
colonialism, the partitioning of Korea into two separate
political entities, and the Korean War. '!'hese two
factors, migration and social unrest, are regarded as
largely responsible for the erosion in the custom of
early marriage.
During the first decade of the post-liberation era,
1945-55, Korea experienced an unprecedentedly large
influx of population into its territory. '!'he number of
persons who entered South Korea during 1945-49, con-
sisting JM)stly of repatriates from overseas and refugees
from North Korea, totaled 2.5 million, accounting for 69
percent of the total population growth during the period,
or 12 percent of the total population at the 1949 census.
During the Korean War years, 1950-53, about 650,000 North
Koreans are estimated to have taken refuge in the South
(Kwon, 1977). Most of the .igrants at that time
resettled where they did not have any solid base for
living, largely in urban areas. Such circumstances would
be incompatible with the practice of early marriage.
Traditional early marriage is only possible when a
minimum a.;)unt of economic support from the family of
orientation is secured. Otherwise, marriage is likely to
be postponed until the boy is old enough to participate
fully in the labor force. During the late colonial years
and the first decade of the post-liberation era, the
economy deteriorated severely, and a majority of the
population suffered from extreme povertYJ in a word,
economic conditions did not favor early marriage.
Undoubtedly the sudden, unexpected start of the Korean
War also caused a significant delay in marriage for
persons of marriageable age at that tiJle.
'!'he rise in age at marriage has continued since the
war, with the mean age at marriage reaching one of the
world's highest levels in the 1970s. However, the pace
of increase has slowed recently, and no further substan-
tial postponement in the timing of marriage is expected.
'!'he JM)st crucial determinants of change in age at
marriage during the post-Korean War period are thought to
be, as in the past, increasing economic constraints on
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individuals, massive population movements from villAges
to cities, and the resultant rapid urbanization.
Rapid educational growth and expansion and compulsory
military conscription of males for three years are also
known to have played an important role in the postpone-
ment of marriage. Increased educational opportunities
for feaales (Chang, 1980188) have had both direct and
indirect implications for age at marriage. In Korea,
high school education usually ends at age 18 and college
education at age 22. Marriage is rarely thought proper
for students, even in college. As such, the growing
proportion of women in higher education causes some
postponement of marriage. Perhaps more important,
however, is the indirect impact of education. As the
proportion of women in tertiary education increased,
marriage at a relatively late age became accepted as
proper, and the ideal age at marriage moved up to 22 to
25, not only for college graduates, but for other women
as well. High educational attainment is also observed to
have motivated women to work for a few years before
marriage.
The universal military conscription of men affects the
age at marriage for both men and women because of the
prevailing idea that the ideal age difference between
husband and wife is three to five years. The census
shows that the difference between men and women in
singulate mean age at first aarriage has been around four
years since 1925. With the process of urbanization and
modernization since the early 1960s, the patterns and
conditions of mate selection have also undergone a change.
Unlike in the past, a secure job or economic self-reliance
has become the necessary condition for a man to get
married in urban areas, and this is achieved in most
cases some time after discharge from the military service.
Until recently, the movement of young, single individ-
uals was the dominant pattern of rural-to-urban migration
in Korea, and migration was heavy during the two decades
1960-80. Since migrants usually have proble.. adjusting
to a new occupation, as well as to the urban environment
and life style--though these are not as acute as in other
countries (Green, 19771268-300)--the massive migration
since 1960 should have contributed greatly to the rising
age at marriage for men and consequently for wa.en.
The impact of age at marriage upon the level of
fertility can be examined on two levelsl the tiaing of
marriage itself is the primary determinant of an individ-
ual's total reproductive per iod, and the change in Age at
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marriage may influence the general level of fecundity.
In Korea, these twa levels appear to have opposite fer-
tility t.plications. The continuously rising age at
lIlarriage has contributed significantly to reducing the
general fertility level by shortening the average
reproductive span, as ..ntioned above. On the other
hand, aany studies have found that aarital fertility in
crucial reproductive ages increases with a rise in age at
aarriage. Based on the 1974 KNPS data, Moon (1980)
observed that late aarriage is associated with earlier
births or shorter birth intervals in parities 1 to 3.
Donaldson and Nichols's analysis (1978), based on a
series of national fertility and family planning surveys
of Korea, also shows that the tempo of family building
has recently been auch faster when the average age at
lIlarriage has been higher.
As noted above, historical documents suggest that
traditional early marriage, frequently occurring at age
13 to 14, often ..ant that the bride was too young to be
fecund. Therefore, the first child was not born for a
few years in lIlany cases. Evidently, the higher marital
fertility of ~n in late marriage is also partly
explained by the association between age at marriage and
premarital pregnancy rates (S.B. Lee et al., 1978a).
Even after allowing for such factors, the relationship
between age at marriage and marital fertility is
sustained to a significant degree. However, this iapact
on the level of births is felt far less than is the
length of exposure to reproductive behavior (or aarriage
duration) • In short, the postponement of marriage has
persistently contributed to a net lowering of the
societal fertility level. '!'he 1974 KNPS shows a marked
difference in the average number of children ever born
between different marriage groups of the same birth
cohort through all stages of reproduction. Also, multi-
variate analyses of fertility in Korea invariably
disclose that age at marriage is a strong predictor of
fertility (M.-I. Kim et al., 1974a, Shin et al., 1981).
The explanatory power is greater at younger ages and
largely vanishes in late reproductive ages (Kwan, 1982),
this effect can be partly attributed to the faster tempo
of family building among the later-married women, as·
discussed above.
Another important aSPeCt of age at marriage, particu-
larly in relation to fertility behavior, is its socio-
economic differentials. Late marriage is closely
usociated with high education, urban residence,
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nonfarm/nonmanual occupations, and a modern value
orientation (M.-I. Kim et al., 1974bJ Y.-B. Lee, 1977).
This pattern is almost identical to that of fertility,
suggesting that the former is an important deterainant of
the latter, particularly in the earlier reproductive
span, which is less affected by the deliberate attempt of
individuals to control family size (M.-I. Kim, et al.,
1974bJ Shin et al., 1981).
DIVOHCE NORMS AND PRACTICES
Traditional divorce norms manifest a marked distinction
between men and women in Korea. WOmen were not allowed
by law and social custom to divorce (or desert) their
husbands. However, men could divorce their wives by law
if one of the following seven prescribed conditions were
meta showing a lack of filial piety to parents-in-law,
failing to produce a son, being unfaithful, being jealous,
having a bad disease, being talkative, or having a thiev-
ing habit. At the same time, Yi dynasty law postulated
three exceptional conditionsa a woman should not be
divorced or deserted if she had completed two years of
mourning for the parents-in-law, if she had married in
poverty and achieved prosperity, or if she had no place
to go.
However, it is generally known that conditions for
divorce were associated with much stronger normative
social sanctions than the conditions for not being
divorced. In practice, women, especially if middle- and
lower-class, could be deserted at any time if the husband
or his parents felt it necessary. Nevertheless, divorce
or desertion was strongly suppressed by famili.., kin-
ship, and community organizations. The major mechanisas
for this were emphasis on family solidarity, concern with
the -face- (or -dignity-) of the family, and care for the
children's future reputation, particularly in arranging
their marriages. Consequently, despite frequent and some-
times very intense conflicts between a wife and her hus-
band or between a wife and her mother-in-law, these were
usually taken for granted and treated as within-family
affairs, and the dissolution of marriage was therefore
generally avoided. The acceptance of concubinage by
society is also seen as an important institutional nora
preventing marriage dissolution by divorce or desertion.
It may be more proper to consider traditional Korean
norms on desertion of the wife not as a force facili-
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tating aarital inBtability, but aB a Bocial mechanisa for
maintaining family peace. NumerouB hiBtorical Yi dynaBty
documents confira the conjecture that the practice of
divorce waB very reBtricted, and that the Btrong
Btability of the family waB therefore BUBtained
throughout the society (D.-B. Kim, 1980, K.-K. Lee, 1977).
SoBe conceptual clarification iB needed for an analYBiB
of divorce trendB. In the Yi dynaBty, the legal concept
of divorce exiBted, however, legal divorce waB very rare
and practiced only in the upper yangban (ruling) claBB.
Aaong c~erB, divorce took the form of deBertion, or
forced ejection of a wife from the hUBband'B reBidence.
Unlike the vital regiBtration Byst., cenBUBeB and BurveyB
in Korea have collected information on thiB cUBtomary
fora of divorce. In other wordB, trendB in legal divorce
are revealed by vital regiBtration, while those in
cUBtomary divorce (though alBo including legal divorce)
are revealed by the cenBUB and fertility BurveyB. Data
from vital regiBtration Bhow a growing rate of legal
divorce Bince 1960, though Btill a low level (Korea,
NBOS, 1980a), on the other hand, variouB Burvey data
reveal no increaBing trend in cUBtomary divorce. This
BuggeBtB that the CUBtom of deBerting a wife and Bocial
Bupport for thiB cUBtoa have waned Bignificantly with the
proceBB of modernization since 1960.
REMARRIAGE OF DIVOBCED AND WIDONED PERSONS
As iB the case for divorce, the traditional norms on
re.arriage differed for men and women. The law, which
incorporated the principles of neo-Confucianisa, did not
allow a WOIlal1 to marry IDOre than once in any circu~
stances, while divorced or widowed aen were socially
encouraged to remarry.
Though socially discouraged, r8llarriage of WOII8n was
not~n in the past. It was often arranged even by
the husband's family if a widow was very young. and had no
children at all. Various surveys around 1960 support
this observations a large majority of respondents (IDOre
than 90 percent) approved of the remarriage of women if
there were no child, while the opposite was true if there
were children (W.K. Koh et al., 1963sl49-l55, B.-J. Lee,
1959s59). Similar observations could be expected for more
recent tiJlles. Concerning the prevalence of r8llarriage
and its changing patterns over time, however, infonaation
is very limited. The 1974 KNPS, which may provide the
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only useful information for the nation as a whole, shows
the rate of remarriage for women aged 15-49 among wcaen
ever widowed or divorced to be 40 percent. However, as
is seen from Table 20, the prevalence of remarriage
differs greatly between women widowed and those divorced.
The rate for the former is less than 30 percent, while
the rate for the latter is nearly 75 percent in the
entire reproductive age span. No equivalent national
data on remarriage trends over time are available,
however, two consecutive surveys in the same middle-sized
town disclosed no increase in the rate of remarriage
between 1965 and 1974 (H.-J. Lee, 1965, PDSC, 1975). Tbe
rate of remarriage for divorced women increases greatly
with an increase in age, whereas for widowed wcaen, there
is a slightly declining tendency in the rate of remarriage
at age 35 and above. This pattern simply reflects
traditional remarriage norms. The customary law in
traditional Korea prescribes that if a woman leaves the
husband's family either for divorce or for remarriage,
she has to give up every right in the family, including
the claim for children. Accordingly, when a woman
divorces or remarries, all ties, formal or informal,
between the mother and children in the previous marriage
are ordinarily severed. If there is no one in the family
of the previous husband to take care of the children,
TABLE 20 Rate of Remarriage (in percent) by Reason, for
Women Whose First Marriage was Dissolved, 1974: Republic
of Korea
~e Divorced Widowed Separated Total
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
15-49
36.4* 21.7
68.8 27.8* 50.0
70.5 30.4 41.9
79.1 28.2 40.7
87.9 27.5 18.8* 36.9
73.5 27.7 16.3 40.5
Fewer than 10 cases in the denominator.
*: Between 10 and 19 cases in the denominator.
Source: 1974 KNFS data tape.
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they are often adopted by the stepfather if the ~ther
remarries, however, it is considered disgraceful for a
child to change the surname due to remarriage of the
mother.
Thus, divorce is discouraged when the couple has
children, and is frequently related to having no
offspring. Also, because divorce for women means a change
of residence and the severing of ties with her children,
remarriage is the only practical way to obtain social
security for JD08t divorced women. In contrast, a widowed
woman is supposed to live with the previous husband's
family, and if there are children, she is obliged to
raise them. ihis fact partly explains why the rate of
remarriage a.ong widowed women drops in the later repro-
ductive ages. In short, the existence of children has
been the major consideration in the remarriage of women
in Korea.
There is extensive social discrimination against
remarried women in the KOrean culture. As a result,
remarriage generally results in a lowering of social
status for women. Second husbands are almost invariably
of a auch lower social status and usually auch older than
first husbands. 1here is also discrimination against
offspring from second or third aarriages. For men, no
change in social status results froa remarriage. Even
young single women are often willing to aarry divorced
men. If there are children, particularly sons, from a
man's previous aarriage, no children or very few are
preferred in the second marriage.
It might be expected that these traditional remarriage
DOGIlS, which still prevail widely, would have a
fertility-lowering effect at the societal level. ihis
effect could be assumed furthe~re to have increased
with the growing availability of fertility regulation
since the early 1960s. However, the detailed implications
of these norms for fertility are not st-ple to deteraine.
~e following is a list of coarsely postulated relation-
ships between traditional remarriage patterns and
fertility a
Norll8 have discouraged the remarriage of divorcees
and widows, and thus contr ibuted to some reduction
in the cohort of women exposed to reproduction.
Social discrimination toward remarried women and
their children constitutes a force motivating
family-size liaitation in subsequent marriages.
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The strong discouragement of remarriage for wcaen
with children curtails reproductive behavior .-eng
women with high fertility for some time after the
first marriage is dissolved.
THE FAMILY AND FERTILITY
In Korea, human reproduction can only be properly under-
stood in the context of family building. Accordingly,
studies of fertility have rarely failed to mention the
importance of the family in accounting for the fertility
behavior of Koreans. However, little research has been
carried out primarily from such a perspective. Although
some studies examine the impact upon fertility levels of
a few selected family-structure variables, these are so
crudely organized, or so fragmentary, that no general
conclusions can be drawn. Furthermore, no single ad hoc
effort has been made in Korea to identify the linkage
between the family and fertility.
Most of these analyses are confined to the relation-
ship between cumulative fertility and the current family
composition of individual women, fertility differences
according to the order of a husband among his brothers,
and the association between the actual family size of the
couple's parents and the couple's own family size (e.g.,
Chung et al., 1972, H.-Y. Lee, 1971, Kwon, 1982). The
underlying hyPOtheses are self-evident. (a) the ideal of
a nuclear family promotes low fertility attitudes, (b)
because of pressure from relatives to continue the family
line, the only son and the first son would tend to have
higher fertility, and (c) the fertility behavior of
individuals is socialized in the family of orientation.
It is immediately apparent that the testing of these
hyPOtheses requires very refined and sophisticated
analyses, and that fertility differentials by the
couple's family background would have only marginal
significance for the overall relationship between
fertility and the family. Most studies have revealed
little association between the family background of
individuals and the level of fertility. This may be
interpreted as indicating that the family has little to
do with the fertility behavior of Koreans, alternatively,
it might be regarded as pointing to the inadequacy of the
research methods and assumptions. ~ understand the
relationship between fertility and the family, a holistic
approach seems to be essential. The overall family-
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building process, rather than cumulative fertility at a
certain point in time, .ust become the focal point of
attention. Moreover, instead of treating family-related
factors as independent of fertility behavior, the two
should be viewed as interconnected.
Bearing this in .ind, the discussion below will try to
hypothesize how Korean family structure was associated
with fertility behavior in the past, and how this
association has changed during the demographic transition
and JIOdernization. Because of the extre.e paucity of
e.pirical studies from such a persPective, this discus-
sion will rely largely on sPecUlation and will therefore
often be hypothetical.
'l'BB PAMILY SYSTBM
The family constitutes the most basic structure within
Korean society. In traditional settings, the family was
one of the major determinants of the social status of
individuals, governed human interactions and relation-
ships, provided a rationale for individual behavior, and
thus shaped the basic value orientation of Koreans, which
is termed -familism.-
During the later half of the Yi dynasty, or the
eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, the structure
and ideals of the Korean family were organized strictly
on the basis of male ~inance, in short, the traditional
Korean family was patriarchal, patrilineal, and patri-
local. This system naturally gave rise to male supremacy,
not only in family life, but also in every asPect of
social life, as well as to a preference for sons over
daughters. Sex discrimination was so strong and pervasive
that waDen were not allowed to .ix with men on any
occasion, private or PUblic, and a wife was obliged to
obey only the husband without any argUJlent. All family
property belonged absolutely to _no As noted above,
divorce and remarriage norms were completely different
for .en and waDen. The family had a hierarchical rather
than egalitarian structure 1 conjugal ties were neglected,
and parent-child relationships occupied the pivotal
position in the family and kinship network (J.-S. Choi,
19661364-419), even aaong sons, there was discrimination
according to birth order, as discussed below.
'1!le ideal traditional Korean family was large and
aulti-generational in cc.position. However, such an
extended family rarely dominated actual family life,
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mostly because of poor economic conditions and high
mortality (Lee and Kwon, 1968). Moreover, the principles
of family building in traditional Korea did not strongly
encourage the formation of, and living in, extended
families. The extended family in Korea was organized as
a -stem family-, which was cc.posed of parents and one of
the sons' families of procreation, usually the first
son IS. Other sons were supposed to live with their
parents for a couple of years after marriage, and then
leave to build a separate household, if a son other than
the first married after the death of the parents, par-
ticularly the father, he was compelled by custom to start
a separate family from the beginning. In other words,
the idea of a fraternal joint family was alien to Korean
society. As a result, the dominant type of family
actually implemented in traditional Korea was the nuclear
family (Lee and Kwon, 1968).
One interesting question is whether the large faaily
ideal is an inherent and indispensable cc.ponent of the
Korean family system. It is often argued that son
preference, which constitutes the crucial part of the
system, is responsible for the traditionally luge faaily
ideal, thus suggesting an essential connection between
the family system and family-size values. Bowever,
various surveys on fertility and family planning in Korea
disclose no congruence between shifts in son preference
and desired family size. During the last two decades, a
continuous rapid decline in desired family size has taken
place, while son preference has waned little (Kwon and
Lee, 1976, Kwon, 1976). This observation can be partly
interpreted as indicating that the large family ideal is
not primarily an outcome of the traditional family systea,
rather, that ideal seems to have been formed as a response
to conditions of high mortality at the time, a necessity
for the survival of both the family lineage and the
society itself. If so, a greatly reduced mortality risk
would result in a change in family size values without
much normative constraint.
On the other hand, by examining the functions of
children in the family, particularly those of sons, it
may be seen that a large family is not a necessity, even
in the traditional setting. The major obligations of
children in the Korean family are the succession of the
family name, ancestor worship, support of parents in old
age, and the provision of labor. Among these, the first
three are regarded as the responsibility of the first
son. In short, one son is enough to fulfill IIOBt of the
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functions of sons, and many are not required. In fact,
mainly because of extremely poor economic conditions,
many children were often thought to be a source of
trouble, not pleasure. Again, compensating for such
obligations, the eldest son was endowed with most of the
family rightsa he became head of the family in the
father's absence and inherited the largest share of the
family property, including residential quarters. In view
of such aeanings of children in the family, the
traditional Korean family system cannot necessarily be
thought to support a large family ideal and thus high
fertility.
In traditional Korea, the meaning of the first son was
almost absolute, and his status in the family was not
ca.parable with that of any of his brothers and sisters.
Accordingly, a preference scale .-eng children can be
hypothesized a the first son, other sons, and daughters.
Most studies on gender preference and its implications
for fertility in Korea have been based on the assumption
that son preference would lead to higher fertility than
is desired by the average family. However, as mentioned
above, since strong son preference has persisted, despite
the rapid tempo of fertility decline and the drastic
decline in desired family size, this assumption is not
supported. Kwon's research (1976) also demonstrates that
son preference may not be a barrier to the decline of
desired family size and thus to the reduction of actual
fertility, and may well be co~tible with a low-fertility
ideal. Son preference undoubtedly influences the
fertility behavior of individuals, but the direction of
that influence is not unitarya for women who reach their
desired family size without a son, it has a high-fertility
implicationJ those who have enough sons but have not
arrived at their desired family size may stop bearing
children before reaching that desired number, so that son
preference may have a low-fertility implication because
of the relative unimportance of daughters. On an
aggregate level, the counter forces may partially balance
off. Consequently, there may be little impact of son
preference on the level of fertility while the TPR is
above a level of about three children, however, below
this level it is likely that son preference will exert
sa.8 influence, in part because the proportion of
-no-son- outcoMs increases as the average number of live
births decreases, e.g., among couples with two live
births, about one fourth will have two daughters. (Por a
fuller discussion of gender preference, see Chapter S.)
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Thus, the rapid decline in desired family size in the
face of only a slight attenuation of son preference may
well be explained by the strong first-son preference
mentioned above. 6 This preference may be interpreted
as indicating the limit of the decline in desired family
size, that is, -at least one son.- Because of the
diminished importance of the second or third son, the
diffusion of the one-or-two son ideal has encountered
little resistance, in turn, given the preference of sons
to daughters, there has apparently been a concomitant
reduction in the desired number of daughters. Thus the
drastic decline in family-size values in Korea during the
last two decades (from 5 to 2.5 children on average) may
be related, to a considerable extent, to the preference
for first sons, as well as son preference in general. If
this argument is accepted, it cannot be assumed that the
traditional family system in Korea supports high fertility
in all circumstances. Rather, that system can be postu-
lated more properly as one factor--perhaps an important
one--fostering a low-fertility attitude under conditions
of low mortality, and inducing rapid fertility reductions
when mortality declines. (These hypotheses about
suggested fertility-trend relationships involving the
strength and level of son preference deserve more
research attention.)
FAMILISM
One of the most distinctive Korean value orientations
having profound implications for fertility is so-called
-familism,- often used in contrast to the -individualia--
prevailin~ in the Western world (B.-Y. Lee, 19781
778-779). Familism in traditional Korea defines the
meaning of individual behavior primarily within the broad
context of the family.8 For example, one's success in
the world gives one's family and relatives pride and, in
a sense, social respect. Accordingly, the entire faai1y
not infrequently sacrifices itself to promote the success
or education of a son. In return, he incurs substantial
obligations not only to his immediate family .embers but
to his relatives, at least emotionally. Therefore, faaily
involvement in important events in the life course such
as marriage, childbearing, and family formation beCa.es
inevitable.
During the last few decades, particularly since the
early 1960s, profound changes have taken place in every
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part of Korean society, these are often characterized as
-modernization- or -Westernization.- Mounting concern
has been expressed over the apparent rise of individualism
in connection with Westernization. More recently, an
attempt to vitalize some important ca.ponents of
traditional familism was launched with strong support
from the goverruDent. It is questionable, however, to
what extent individualism has penetrated into Korean
society. Various social surveys have indicated that
familis. is still cherished by most Koreans, even in
urban areas and regardless of age (Oh and Lee, 1980).
~ere have been some arguments that individualism,
together with conjugal family ideals, is favorable to
(very) low fertility in a society (Goode, 1963, Davis,
1957). It has also been observed in Korea that an
individualistic value orientation is stronger among those
with more modern, or less traditional, attitudes, and
that .adern ideals are associated with lower fertility
(e.g., Chung et al., 19721141-164). ~e inference is
that individualism should lead to low fertility, even in
Korea. ~e oonnection between the two is generally
explained by the differing values attached to children,
and by different value orientations in regard to
individual happiness. It is nevertheless doubtful that
familis., or collectivism in a sense, always supports
high fertility. In fact, in Korea, familism has been
found to be the major force in reducing fertility in
recent times. ~e main rationale for fertility control
lies not in increasing career or self-realization
opportunities for women, but in providing children with
better care or education, this strong concern about the
future of children is regarded as a characteristic
feature of traditional familis. in Korea.
Another important aspect of familia as a factor in
the societal level of fertility is its strong emphasis
upon blood ties a-ong family members. Unlike other
societies, such as Japan, with similar family systems,
Korea has very little adoption, adoption only takes
place, according to traditional norms, when there is no
(legitiJlate9) son in the family of the eldest son,
which bears all the prescribed responsibilities for the
ancestors. In such a case, the eldest boy from one of
his brothers' families that has two or more (legitimate)
boys is usually chosen. Prequently, the question of
adoption is raised after the death of the first son in
the .ain familylO who has married but produced no son.
~e necessity of having a legitimate son was a severe
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constraint mostly in the upper, or yangban, class (D.-B.
Kim, 19801228-291). For the majority of the population,
however, illegitimate sons could inherit the family
lineage if there were no legitimate son. As a result,
concubinage was widely recognized as a way to secure at
least one son in traditional Korea. In the traditional
setting, the strong emphasis upon blood tie (or purity of
blood) was a major mechanism for ensuring family
stability even after the dissolution of marriage due to
the death of the husband. Since concubines had, on the
average, a smaller number of children than married women,
this mechanism is thought to have significantly reduced
the overall fertility level.
HUSBAND-WIFE RELATIONS
In the traditional Korean family, the suppression and
regulation of sex were regarded as virtuous conduct for
women, and frequent union of a couple was often con-
sidered obscene. As a regulation mechanism, strict
segregation between men and women was imposed. FOr
example, husbands and wives were not to face each other
in private or in pUblic, except in bed. unfaithfulness
of a wife to her husband was very severely punished. On
the other hand, men's sexual impulses were channeledl
their extramarital affairs with -women in the bar- (a
kind of prostitute) were often encouraged as being
-manly.- Segregation between husbands and wives was so
extensive that their spheres of interest were ea-pletely
separate, the external world belonged to the husband and
the -kitchen- to the wife, and each was supposed to be
disinterested in the other's world. Though it was not
expected that such norms would be observed strictly, they
must have governed every aspect of Korean social life.
If a woman lived in an extended family, her behavior was
usually continuously surveyed by other members of the
family, partiCUlarly the mother-in-law, who sometimes
even regulated the couple's frequency of union.
According to in-depth interviews on fertility behavior
conducted in a middle-sized town,ll many women could
not feel love or affection for their husband until their
mother-in-law died because of such intensive inter-
ference. These traditional marriage and family norms
remain largely intact and are still taken for granted by
most Korean families.
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KINSHIP
In Yi dynasty Korea, kinship was organized by hierarchical
principles and had the function of conferring social
status on its members (M.-G. Lee, 197314-5). '!'hus, kin-
ship background was sometimes a crucial determinant in
the arrang...nt of marriage. '!'he importance of kinship
in traditional Korea can easily be demonstrated by the
fact that most farming villages were, and are still,
ao.inated by one or two kin groups bearing the same
faaily name (M.-G. Lee, 1973). Strong emotional
solidarity .-ong kin members is noticed increasingly in
rural areas (M.-G. Lee, 19731345-350), reinforced by the
extended family ideal discussed above. '!'he major kinship
obligations of individual members include observation of
worship rituals for common ancestors, economic support to
kin families in the case of such important family affairs
as weddings and funerals, and aid to kin meabers in
ordinary circumstances, as well as in emergencies. In
other words, kinship ideology was the basis for social
interaction and the major support for strong -familism-
in traditional Korea, although, as noted above, familia.
is not necessarily related to large family-size desires,
and thus probably did not significantly affect fertility
levels even in the past.
Kinship ideals have become greatly attenuated in urban
areas since the beginning of modernization and urban-
ization in the early 1960S1 thus their influence on
behavior generally, and on fertility levels in par-
ticular, is probably negligible. Even in rural Korea,
kinship has been found to explain few of the community
differences in fertility. Por instance, two rural
villages having similar socioeconomic characteristics
except for their kinship systems (differing in the degree
of kinship dominance, the closeness of the kinship
network, and the degree of kinship involvement in
everyday village life) show no meaningful differences in
their fertility patterns. 12 '!'he same study reveals
larger family-size desires in a fishing village having
little kinship solidarity than in the two rural (farming)
villages. Bong's analysis based on data from 53 villages
yields the same results (S. Bong, 1976).
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NOTES
1 In this chapter, the term -illegitiaacy- is used to
refer to births occurring outside marriage in the
customary sense. Traditionally, tbe concept was
applied in Korea to denote children born to
concubines.
2 Pbr a more detailed discussion of the relationship
between nuptiality and fertility, see Coale et ale
(1979) •
3 This finding was corroborated in Chapter 2 using a
different approach.
4 The marital status of ever-married WOllen from the
1974 KNPS closely matches that reported in the 1975
census, indicating the high reliability of the KHPS
data.
5 According to the prevailing ideal age difference
between husband and wife in Korea (3 to 5 years),
women in the postwar baby boom generation are aatcbed
with men born during the war years. The sex ratio
for these groups is less than 80.
6 According to J.-S. Choi (19661642-644), .-oog three
societies in Asia, China, Japan, and Korea, which
share much of a common cultural heritage, Japan shows
the strongest first-son preference and China the
least in power relations and property distribution
among brothers. However, the first son is _t
important in Korea in the succession of the fuily
lineage.
7 Pamilism in Korea has features in common with
f.-ilism in China, as outlined in Levy (1955).
8 The concept of family was shared by close relatives
in traditional Korea. The Korean term -jib,- which
stands for family, represents such a concept (J.-S.
Choi,1966163l-638).
9 Pbllowing the usage in traditional Korea, legitt.acy
is used here to denote the status obtained through
legal marriage. The principle of monogamy was
applied to define the legitimate couple.
10 The main family, called -bon-ga- in Korean, refers to
the family succeeded by the eldest son consecutively.
11 The record, unpublished, contains details of in-depth
interviews of about 100 selected WOllen, conducted as
part of the 1965 Ichon survey on fertility and the
family.
12 This survey, conducted by Ban and others, was
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 5
THE DEMAND FOR CHILDREN
The motivation to control fertility in a society depends
on both the deJlUUld for children and the supply of
children. Over the last quarter of a century, Korea has
~xperienced both a rapid decline in fertility and a
substantial transformation in the demand for children.
This chapter exaaines in detail the components of the
demand for children in Korea and how changes in that
demand have influenced the course of Korean fertility.
The first section reviews changes in ideal family size
over time and differentials in family-size norms among
different groups. The second section explores the values
and disvalues that parents attach to children and the
extent to which these have changed with modernization.
The final section focuses on the continuing strength of
son preference as an integral part of the Korean culture,
the historical background of this preference is outlined,
a number of independent measures are used to examine its
current levels, and the continuing debate about how it
will inhibit further fertility declines is discussed.
PAMXLY-SIZE DESIRES
Since the late 1950s, the number of children Korean
couples consider ideal has changed considerably.
Although there are questions about the quality of the
available data and about the meaning of this concept
generally, there are strong indications that the ideal
f.-ily size in Korea has been cut almost in half over a
period of slightly more than two decades. The evidence
for this rapid decline is shown in Table 21. The pattern
indicated is a slight decline in ideal family size prior
to 1965, a possible brief plateau in the late 1960s, and
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TABLE 21 Average Number of Children Considered Ideal:
Republic of Korea
Ideal Number
Year of Children Survey Source
Before 1960 Approx. 5 Several early aurveya Kwon and Lee (1976)
1958 4.4 Urban aurvey Chung et al. (1974)
1965 3.9 KAP Survey Hoon et al. (1973)
1966 4.3 Special Demographic
Survey Choe and Park (1969)
1967 3.9 KAP Survey Hoon et a!. (1973)
1968 3.9 1968 Fertility Survey Moon et al. (1973)
1971 3.7 1971 Fertility Survey Hoon et a!. (1973)
1971 3.6 KIRBS Survey Chung et al. (1972)
1973 3.1 1973 Survey S. Hong (1978)
1974 3.2 Korean National
Fertility Survey/ Korea, NBOS and
World Fertility Survey KIFP (1977)
1974 3.0 National Survey of Family
Planning Information,
Education and Communi-
cation Cheong eta!. (1979)
1976 2.8 National Fertility and
Family Planning
Evaluation Survey Cheong eta!. (1979)
1976 2.7 Survey of Economic
Factora in Fertility N. H. Cho et al. (1977)
1976 2.6 Value of Children Survey Bulatao et al. (1978)
1978 2.7 Study of Family Planning
Information, Education,
and Communication Cheong et al. (1979)
an accelerated decline during the 1970s. Although these
temporal changes should be interpreted cautiously because
of differences in survey coverage and question wording,l
the trend is obvious. It is interesting to note that
changes in family-size norms roughly parallel declines in
actual fertility during this period. It is difficult to
disentangle the direction of causality between these two
measures, however, declines in ideal and actual fertility
seem to have reinforced one another.
The overall averages in the ideal number of children
mask some interesting differences in the distributions.
Up through 1971, available data show that virtually
nobody considered less than two children an ideal
family. More recent surveys are consistent with this
pattern, although a few percent of respondents in some
studies consider one child ideal. The two-child family,
which the family planning program would like to establish
as the norm, was similarly unpopular through 1971, with
only 4 to 6 percent of respondents expressing this as
their ideal (Korean Institute for Family planning, 1973).
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However, since that time, the two-child family has rapidly
become a more acceptable ideal: in recent surveys,
between one third and one half of Koreans say that their
ideal number of children is two (Moon et al., 1973J S.
Hong, 1978J Bulatao et al., 1978). The three-child
faaily has similarly gained in popularity, with cor-
responding losses in the acceptability of large families
(five or more children).
This development of two to three children as the most
desirable faaily size is confirmed by data on the
proportion of women at various parities who do not want
any more children (Table 22). With each successive
survey, more and more women at each parity say they
prefer not to have any more children. Although the
proportion of first-parity women who are content to stop
bearing children has increased sharply from 7 percent in
1967 to 26 percent in 1979, the vast majority of women
would still not be satisfied with one child. However,
the trend at the second parity has been more dramatic:
in 1967, only 15 percent of women with two children
wanted to stop childbearingJ just twelve years later,
more than three fourths professed to be satisfied with
two children. Once the level of three children has been
reached, only a small percentage of women (7 percent) say
they wish to have one or more additional children.
On the other hand, women will not necessarily be able
to attain their ideal family size. A few will be unable
to have faailies as large as they would like, for example
because of fecundity impairments. Many more will exceed
their ideal faaily size or have already done sOJ in fact,
in the World Fertility Survey, 34 percent of currently
married women already had a larger family than they
desired, and 37 percent said they did not want their last
live birth.
In addition to the evidence that the ideal number of
children is dropping, there are some indications of a
corresponding decrease in the ideal spacing of children.
The ideal first birth interval dropPed by one sixth (from
21.1 months to 17.6 months) between 1976 and 1978. The
ideal spacing for subsequent births declined from 3.6
years in 1974 to 3.4 years in 1976, and further to 3.2
years in 1978 (Cheong et al., 1979:82). Moreover, in all
three years, ideal birth intervals drop steadily as one
moves from rural areas to large cities (Cheong et al.,
1979:82J B.T. Park et al., 1979:54J C.H. Choi et al.,
1975:24). Thus, it appears that the ideal life cycle for
.ost people in Korea now includes a fairly small number
TABLE 22 Proportion of Women Who Want No More Children: Republic of Korea
National National
National Korean Family Fertility Korea
Survey Fertility Planning Korean and Family Contra-
on and Family and National Planning ceptive
Number of Family Planning Fertility Fertility Evaluation Prevalence
Living Planning Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey
Children 1967 1968 1973 1974 1976 1979
1 7 8 11 13 19 26
2 15 24 46 66 69 78
3 55 54 73 86 88 93 ~0
4 74 73 85 92 93 97 ..
Note: The characteristics of women included in the calculation of the above figures
may differ from one survey to the next. For example, the Korean National Fertility
Survey figures for 1974 are based on currently married fecund women, whereas other
surveys may be based on all currently married women. Using a similar definition
across all surveys would apparently further heighten the increase over time in the
proportion who want no more children.
Sources: B.T. Park et a1. (1979:98); Korea, NBOS and KIFP (1977); K.S. Koh et ale
(1980b).
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of children, born within a relatively short space of
time, leaving women with a smaller proportion of their
adult lives devoted to childbearing and childrearing.
Although the shifts in ideal spacing parallel actual
declines in birth intervals at the lower parities, it is
once again difficult to tell whether these shifts are
leading or following actual changes (Rindfuss et al.,
1982).
The ideal age for a woman to complete childbearing
remained constant at 31 years over the 1974-78 period
(Cheong et al., 1979:82). KNFS data on the proportion of
currently married fecund women who want no more children
support this observation. At age 25-29, 46 percent of
women say they want to have additional childrenJ by age
30-34, this figure is only 16 percent (Korea, NBOS and
KIFP,1977). Even though most women in the younger
cohorts want to have more children, their ideal family
size is relatively low (about one child lower than for
those at the end of their childbearing years). In fact,
women age 15-24 have a slightly lower ideal number of
children than those in the same age group in Japan (B.T.
Park et al., 1979:91). However, there is no way to know
whether this ideal number will increase as they pass
through their childbearing years.
The Korean National Fertility Survey has also revealed
that better education and urban residence (in addition to
younger ages) are associated with smaller family-size
norms (Korea, NBOS and KIFP, 1977). Family-size norms
have consistently been 17-19 percent higher in rural than
in urban areas in nearly every survey over the last 15
years. In the most recent nationwide survey (Cheong et
al., 1979), ideal family size rose from 2.5 in Seoul, to
2.6 in other cities, to 2.8 in eups (townships), to 3.0
in myuns (rural administrative units). Even within
Seoul, there is evidence of different family-size norms
in different sections of the city. For example, in a
1971 survey, Chung et ale (1972) found that women in the
central or -lighted- areas of Seoul had an ideal family
size of 2.88 children, while those in the marginal or
-blighted- areas thought 3.33 children ideal.
These differences in family-size norms by urban-rural
residence, education, and age are undoubtedly related to
the varying roles that children can be eXPected to play
in the lives of People in different circumstances. The
next section examines the values that Korean parents
attach to children, and how these values change for
parents at different stages of the life cycle and in
different circumstances.
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THE VALUE OF CHILDREN
Attitudes toward the values and disvalues of children
appear to be one of the key factors determining faaily-
size attitudes and fertility behavior in Korea. Some
values are almost universally attached to children,
others are salient to only certain groups, while others
have essentially lost their importance or were never very
prominent. As noted above, children are seen as per-
forming different roles or functions for different people,
moreover, attitudes toward children change throughout the
life cycle of individuals and as modernization proceeds.
The value of children changes from one parity to the next
as parents add to their childbearing experience, it also
depends, in large measure, on the sex of the child. 2
Although very little was known about the value of
children in Korea before the early 1970s, a considerable
body of literature addressing this question has recently
emerged. In 1957, Leibenstein developed a useful general
framework that grouped the benefits of children into three
broad categoriesz (a) their utility as productive agents,
helping with the family farm or business, or earning
family income, (b) their utility in providing security
for parents in old age and in times of emergency, and (c)
their psychic or ·consumption· utility, i.e., the utility
of children as a source of personal pleasure to the
parents. The costs of children were divided into direct,
out-of-pocket costs of raising children and opportunity
costs. This framework is employed below to exaaine the
values and disvalues of children in Korea.
The Productive Utility of Children
Although there is a good deal of evidence showing that
children provide help in family enterprises, it is not at
all clear that this productive utility is a strong
motivation for having children. The Survey of Economic
Factors in Fertility found that over 60 percent of
married women expected help from their children on the
family farm and about 20 percent in the faaily business. 3
However, in the same study, this benefit was almost never
mentioned as the most important reason for having chil-
dren. This pattern is even more evident in the case of
practical help around the housez the Value of Children
(VOC) study found that over 80 percent of parents
expected both daughters and sons to help around the
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house, yet only a handful of respondents spontaneously
mentioned this type of help as an advantage of having
children (Bulatao, 1979). Moreover, the productive
utility of children noraally declines with the relative
i~rtance of agriculture and the need for family
workers. It may be noted that large-scale migration from
rural to urban areas in Korea aay be producing a somewhat
different pattern. migration to the cities has caused
considerable rural labor shortages that aay te.porarily
increase the value of children's work, eSPecially for
poorer rural families. However, in the long run, the
productive utility of children will inevitably decline.
The Security Utility of Children
Security has been cited as one of the IDOst cOlllpelling
factors in family-size decisions in countries in which
social security programs are nonexistent, do not have
widespread coverage, provide inadequate support, or are
unreliable. In Korea, where there is no gover~nt old
age security program, children are still viewed as an
i~rtant source of old age support and a cushion in
times of need. However, the security utility of children
is declining substantially as family nucleation proceeds,
as parents find they can rely more on their own income or
savings, and as children are perceived as less willing to
help their parents financially (Lee and Kim, 1979).
Although children often figure prominently in plans for
old age sUpPOrt, the degree of sUpPOrt aay be relatively
saall. In the vee study, over 80 percent of wives and
husbands said they eXPeCted old age support from their
sons and about 45 percent from their daughters. However,
only about one respondent in five spontaneously mentioned
help in old age as an advantage of having children
(Bulatao, 1979), about the same proportion cited this as
a very i~rtant reason for wanting another child (Lee
and Kia, 1979). The cc..only supplemental nature of
children's security contributions is further seen in
Table 23, which shows that a substantial proportion of
wa.en eXPect to be basically independent of their
children after retirement. This emerging independence is
further evident from data on household structure and
living arrangements. Por example, the Survey of Boone-ic
Pactors in Pertility found that 48 percent of wa.en in
their childbearing years do not eXPect to live with their
children at all, 22 percent eXPeCt to live with them for
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TABLE 23 Expected Economic Support After
Parents' Retirement: Republic of Korea
Total Support
Moderate Support
Little Support
No Support
Total
Sons
(percent)
39.3
18.4
25.6
16.7
100.0
Daughters
(percent)
1.0
2.8
22.5
73.7
100.0
Source: N.H. Cho et al. (1977:76).
as long as possible, while 25 percent expect to live with
them only when they are old.
Nevertheless, for substantial segments of Korean
society, children are still seen as the primary source of
security in old age. This is particularly true for older
couples, those who live in rural areas, and individuals
with low income and little education. The differentials
by type of place of residence are quite striking. In the
first phase of the VOC study, only 3 percent of urban,
middle-class respondents rated help in old age as a very
important reason for wanting another child, compared to
26 percent of urban, lower class respondents, and 43
percent of rural farmers (Lee and Kim, 1979). These
differentials suggest that the security utility of
children will continue to decline with increasing
urbanization and development.
The security utility of children might also decrease
if an old age security system were introduced. The
Survey of Economic Factors in Fertility found that 68
percent of parents would stop at two children, even if
they had no sons, if there were an old age security
system in Korea. Although such hypothetical survey
questions are always somewhat suspect, it is obvious that
a large number of women do make the connection between
old age security and family size in their minds. 4
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The Consumption Utility of Children
In addition to the economic factors considered above,
parents may derive a wide range of social-psychological
benefits from children. Some of those values mentioned
prominently in Korea are happiness, love, companionship,
the personal development of the parents, and a whole host
of childrearing satisfactions (Lee and Kim, 1979). There
is also some evidence that this ·consumption· utility is
greater aJIOng young, better-educated women in urban areas
(N.H. Cho et al., 1977). As will be seen below, these
benefits of children are particularly associated with the
first child. This does not mean that rural, less-educated
couples and high-parity women do not derive personal
pleasure from their children, rather, it indicates that
economic factors and other considerations may take
precedence for those individuals.
other Values of Children
The above categorization omits some additional values or
considerations which relate more narrowly on the children
themselves. Some of these are benefits that accrue to
other children in the family rather than directly to the
parents I children can provide companionship for each
other, and older children can help their younger siblings
with school expenses. The Survey of Economic Factors in
Fertility reported that when asked about the disadvantages
of a small fuily, 62 percent of women mentioned that the
children may feel lonely, and this was by far the most
Ca.BOn answer, companionship for children was found to be
a particularly important value for couples with two to
three children (Bulatao, 1979).
The number of siblings also has i~lications for the
quality of children, their relationship to their parents,
and even their personalities. Korean children from large
families are seen as having an open and loving lU1Uler
toward other people, being self-confident, and being
popular with other children. Children from s..l1 families
are thought to have high intellectual ability and a close
relationship with their parents, they are also seen as
being very happy, but rather spoiled (Lee and Kim,
1979163). Although children from large and small fuilies
..y not objectively possess these characteristics, the
perception that they do ..y be a factor in fertility
decision ..king.
lW
Direct Costs of Children
The benefits of having children must be counter-balanced
against the costs entailed in rearing them. In Korea,
several studies have shown that parents are acutely aware
of the high costs of childrenJ the costs of raising
children have consistently emerged as the most important
perceived disadvantage of having children, of having a
large family, and of having another child (Lee and Kim,
1979). Some would argue that survey respondents may
simply mention costs as a convenient rationalization of
what is in reality a very complex decision--not to have
more children. This argument is partially supported by
the results of hypothetical questions on what people
would do if their income doubled. In one study, only 7
to 14 percent of respondents said they would have more
children if their income doubled (Arnold et al., 1975196).
In the Survey of Economic Factors in Fertility, only 0.4
percent said they would use the extra money to have
another child, while 43.6 percent would use it for the
education of their other children. Thus, the money, if
spent on children at all, would be used to increase the
quality rather than the quantity of children. Lee and
Kim (1979) found that 57 percent of men and women said
the number of children they desired would be a heavy
economic burden to them. Thus other factors must compel
the majority of couples to have more children than they
feel they can comfortably afford. Nevertheless, the
prominence of cost considerations in every study to date
cannot be ignored. Only a minority (about one in five)
of Koreans feel that two children would be a heavy
economic burden, this figure rises sharply to nearly two
thirds for three children, and around 90 percent for four
children (Lee and Kim, 1979). Since this is the range
within which childbearing decisions will be most crucial
over the next decade, perceptions of the costs of
children should be carefully considered.
Measuring the actual costs of children, rather than
perceptions of them, has proven a difficult task, thus
there are virtually no reliable data to cite. A survey
conducted late in 1972 (Lee and Kim, 1979:58) reported
that urban middle-class couples estimated the average
expenditure on their children during the previous 12
months at about $473 (or 21 percent of their total
income). Urban lower-class couples figured they spent
only about half that much ($243), but this level of
expenditure ate up 29 percent of their total income.
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Couples in the rural, agricultural sample estimated that
they spent only 15 percent of their income ($133) on
their children. This economic crunch seems to fall most
heavily on lower-class couples in urban areas. This is
in fact a Ca.BOn phenomenon resulting from a combination
of the high cost of living in urban areas, low incomes,
and relatively large nuabers of children (Arnold et al.,
1975).
A study by the Korean Educational Development
Institute conducted somewhat later than the one just
aentioned atteapted to estiaate the cost of rearing a
child from birth to age 25 (Kim et al., 1976.65). The
authors estimated the cost for a middle-class couple at
about 15 million won (about o.s. $31,000) according to
prices at the end of 1975. If these figures are even
approximately correct, then costs must be a substantial
factor in faaily-size decisions, at least for middle-
class couples.
One of the principal components of the cost of
children, and one of major concern, is the cost of
education. Although the governaent covers most of these
costs through junior high school, they can still be
considerable for parents, who often pay for private
schools, books, tuition, school clothes, and special
lessons such as those in music or sports. One of the
greatest expenses incurred in educating children has been
that of private tutors. The governaent has recently made
private tutoring illegal in an atteapt to reduce this
economic burden. However, while this law will undoubtedly
aake educational expenses easier to bear, it will by no
means make children's education inexpensive. Educational
aspirations in general are very high in Korea, and
parents are willing to make considerable sacrifices to
provide education for their children. Education is now
compulsory through the sixth grade, and there are plans
to extend compulsory education through junior high school
soon, however, most parents want their children (or at
least their sons) to finish college, while a large
majority would like them to graduate from high school
(Moon et al., 1973). The Survey of Economic Factors in
Fertility found that education was the single MOst
expensive aspect of raising children, followed by food
and clothing. In the same study, three fourths of the
parents interviewed said that the cost of educating their
children would be a very heavy burden considering their
incaae level and status. A substantial proportion of
lorean couples state explicitly that the high cost of
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education is a reason for not wanting another child (Lee
and Kim, 1919), although the influence of this factor on
actual childbearing decisions is still open to question.
The Opportunity Costs of Children
The indirect or opportunity costs of children encompass a
variety of restrictions on parents' alternate activities,
but among these, perhaps the most important is the
restriction on one's job. These costs are thought to
affect women more than men since women usually bear the
brunt of childrearing responsibilities. Bowever,
opportunity costs are often thought to be minimal in
less-developed countries (particularly in rural areas) ,
where many jobs for women are compatible with child-
rearing (or where job opportunities for women are
limited) and where easy alternatives exist for child care
through the extended family or friends. In Korea,
opportunity costs are not highly salient, but neither are
they negligible, and they are gaining in importance.
Restrictions on alternative activities are felt most
strongly in urban areas, particularly among more educated
women (Arnold et al., 1915, Lee and Kim, 1919). Although
women do manage to combine working and childbearing
successfully, the Survey of Economic Factors in Fertility
found that 40 percent of working women felt childrearing
interfered greatly with their work, while 30 percent said
it interfered somewhat. As educational opportunities for
women continue to improve in Korea, opportunity costs
will undoubtedly increase as they have in more developed
countries.
Other Costs of Children
Other costs of children include both emotional and
physical costs and costs to society. Two of the strongest
reasons given for not wanting another child are emotional
strain and potential problems between husbands and wives
(Arnold et al., 1915). Although these emotional costs
were not rated as highly as the financial costs, they
were still quite important, the physical burden of caring
for another child was among the least important reasons,
except in rural areas. There was also a very strong
concern that having another child would prevent the
parents from giving sufficient attention to their other
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children. It appears that these nonfinancial costs are
not entirely anticipated prior to childbearing: R.-Y.
Park (1980) found that the financial burden was of the
greatest importance to couples before they had children,
but the emotional and physical burdens were given most
importance by couples who already had children.
As ..ntioned earlier, lOrea has one of the highest
population densities in the world, and IOrean couples
profess a good deal of concern about overpopulation. For
exaaple, in the VOC study, over 70 percent of wives and
husbands said they felt that overpopulation was a reason
for their having fewer children (Bulatao, 1979). Although
these answers must be interpreted cautiously (particularly
in light of the fact that answers about overpopulation
rarely surface spontaneously), it is interesting to note
that the figures for Korea were higher than those for any
of the other countr ies included in the study. IOrean
couples seem to be acutely aware of crowded conditions
and their attendant problems, particularly in the cities.
Parity-Specific Values
The above discussion of values and disvalues generally
treats all children as equal. Yet children of different
birth orders, different sexes, different ages, and so on,
are perceived differently by parents. A recent article
by Bulatao (1981) focuses on differences in the value of
children in successive childbearing decisions both in
Korea and elsewhere. The relevant data for Korea, repro-
duced in Table 24, show quite pronounced differences by
birth order in both the values and disvalues. On the
positive side, the first child provides a number of
social-psychological benefits, many of which are derived
from interaction with the child, it is seen as bringing
the spouses closer together, although it can also inter-
fere with the marital relationship by restricting the
a.ount of tiJle that spouses can spend together. The
first child is unique in that only one of the five values
mentioned (incentive in work) is prominent for any other
child. The importance of providing ca.panionship for
other siblings e..rges for the second and third child and
then disappears. Considerations of gender preference
COIle to the fore with the third and fourth child, but do
not seem important for subsequent births. Finally, it is
not until the fifth child and beyond that economic
benefits~ a prominent concern.
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TABLE 24 Values Attached to the Next Child: Republic of
Korea
1st Child
2nd Child
3rd Child
4th Child
5th Child
6th and
Subsequent
Children
Values
Love and care for
Incentive in work
Fun around house
Bring spouse closer
Pleasure to watch grow
Companion for siblings
Incentive in work
Wants a girl
Companion for siblings
Wants a boy
Incentive in work
Wants a girl
Help around house
Economic help
Economic help
Help in old age
Help around house
Disvalues
Child I s sickness
We are too old
Hard to discipline
Less time with spouse
Harder to have job
Less free
Less time with spouse
Overpopulation
Financial burden
Financial burden
Financial burden
Child I s sickness
We are too old
Source: Bulatao (1981:12, 18).
On the cost side, the differences are also striking.
Opportunity costs become important in the case of the
second child, and then fade. Overpopulation is an
important consideration for the third child, as might be
expected in light of the family planning slogan ·Stop at
two without sex distinction.· After the third child,
financial costs are paramount at every level. S The
particular values that are important for each child have
important policy implications. For example, if one
wanted to encourage couples to stop at two or three
children, policies designed to increase sexual equality
and decrease gender preference would seem appropriate,
although, as the next section will demonstrate, the
influence of gender preference on fertility in Korea is
not as clearcut as many believe.
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SON PREFERENCE
One of the most deeply ingrained values in Korea, both
historically and at the present time, is a preference for
male over female offspring, in fact, Korea exhibits one
of the highest levels of son preference in the world, a
topic that has received considerable attention in the
literature (see, for example, Chung et al., 1974, Kwon
and Lee, 1976, Kong and Cha, 1974). Although there are
aa.e signs that son preference is beginning to relinquish
its strong hold in Korea, its continuing importance
cannot be questioned. Korean society has indeed gone
through a drastic transforaation, however, satisfactory
institutions have not yet e_rged to take over the aajor
functions of sons in the traditional Korean f..ily (Kwon
and Lee, 1976).
Historical Supports for Son Preference
Son preference has a long history in Korea, but -it was
not until after the establishMnt of the Yi dynasty (near
the end of the fourteenth century) when boy preference
received institutional support in the form of Confucianism
that it took on aspects of a culture- (Chung et al.,
1974177). Under the Confucian system of the traditional
patriarchal family, a male child was seen as crucial for
carrying on the f..ily name, for the rituals of ancestor
worship, and for inheritance purposes. Having as many
sons as possible was regarded as one of the five blessings
(obok) • In the Yi dynasty, the right to preside over the
rituals of f..ily ancestor worship (chesa) would pass down
to -the eldest son, other sons, sons of concubines of
decent origin, and sons of concubines of lowly origin in
that order- (Chung et al., 1974156).
Inheritance laws have often favored sons, particularly
the eldest, however, even when the law entitled all
children regardless of sex to equal shares in the family
property (as was the case during the Yi dynasty), in
practice, inheritances a1.Dlost always excluded woaen (Chung
et al., 1974). Current Korean law states that women in a
family aaY inherit on an equal footing with men (United
Nations Fund for Population Activities, n.d.), and a law
is being considered that would make this undatory. H0w-
ever, until 1978, Korean law entitled unmarried daughters
to receive only half as much inherited property as sons
and aarried daughters to receive only one fourth as much
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(Chung et al., 1974). The Survey of Economic Factors in
Fertility found that 76 percent of Koreans expected to
bequeath the family farm to their first son, 19 percent
would share the land among their sons, and only 3 percent
would share the land among both their daughters and their
sons. In a rural area of Korea, Yoon (1974) reported
that in practice, the first son receives all of the
family's land and goods because of poverty and a lack of
land to be divided.
The low status of Korean wa.en also contributed to the
strong desire for male offspring. During the Yi dynasty,
all formal educational institutions were open only to
men. Young girls were told that women who know letters
are short-lived and short on fortune (Chung et al.,
1974:62). Women were also taught the womanly virtue of
the three obediences: a woman was expected to obey her
father when she was young, her husband after aarriage,
and her sons (particularly the eldest) after she bee...
widowed.
The traditional importance of sons in Korean society
is demonstrated by the lengths to which people have gone
in order to have a son. Chung et ale (1974) outline a
whole range of common practices such as son praying
(including rock worship and wood worship), geoaancy
(selecting auspicious grave sites), studying the
physiognomy of son-bearing wa.en, navel cautery, and
name-giving practices. Although some of these cuataas
are no longer widespread, others are still often
practiced. Son preference has also been supported by a
whole host of Korean folk sayings, some of which still
enjoy considerable currency, the following are exa-ples
(Kong and Cha, 1974, Chung et al., 1974, H.H. Cho et al.,
1977) :
-Children are valuable, but especially sons,
regardless of the number.-
- A daughter lets you down twice: when she is bOrn
and when she gets married.-
-If a man should die sonless, no one would ever
offer him even a bowl of water.-
-If you have to aarry someone you dislike, give
him many daughters.-
-A new-born son should be laid on a bed, clad in
fine clothes, and given precious stones to play
with, while a girl at birth should be left on the
floor with only a diaper on and given only pieces
of roof-tile to play with.-
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·Women not flogged for three days turn into faxes
and climb mountains.·
Although a number of current laws in Korea
discrt.inate against women, much of the male bias that
previously per~ated Korean law has been eliminated (B.H.
Park, 1973). These legal changes have been accompanied
by increasing opportunities for women's economic and
social participation and by changes in women's roles
(H.-S. Park, 1979). Nevertheless, strong boy preference
attitudes persist in Korea, as the next section will show.
Measures of Son Preference
The existence of a strong preference for sons in Korea is
one of the best documented facts in Korean population
studies, it is supported by every measure of son prefer-
ence that has been used (including the ideal number of
sons and daughters, parity progression ratios, reported
sex ratios of children, the Coombs sex preference scale,
and the ideal sex of next births). An overriding desire
to have at least one son (and often at least two) is
nearly universal.
The evidence on changes in the level of son preference
over time must be carefully analyzed. Some studies show
that there has been little if any change, while others
indicate a gradual downward shift. A review of ten
surveys between 1958 and 1978 conducted for the present
study showed virtually no change over time in the
proportions of boys and girls in the ideal faaily, in
fact, the average proportion of sons in the ideal faaily
was precisely the same in the earlier five studies as it
was in the five most recent studies. All but one of the
studies indicated that the ideal ratio of boys to girls
fell within the fairly narrow range of 1.42 to 1.59
despite the fact that the total number of ideal children
wanted varied between 2.7 and 4.4. Moreover, there were
no large or consistent differences between rural areas,
small cities, and large cities. However, this lack of
differentials should not be taken as proof that son
preference has remained the same over ti~. Although few
of the studies reviewed provide detailed information at
the couple level, it may be speculated that the lack of
change is due to two opposing forcest a decrease in
total ideal faaily size and an increase in the proportion
of couples who want an equal number of sons and daughters.
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This statistical quirk occurs because most Korean couples
want an equal number of sons and daughters or one more
son. Mathematically, the ratio of boys to girls in an
ideal family rises from 1.5 for couples who want three
boys and two girls to 2.0 for couples who want two boYs
and one girl. Thus, it may be argued that the natural
tendency for this proportion to rise as ideal family size
decreases has undoubtedly been offset by a fall in the
proportion of couples who want more boys than girls. In
the 1976 VOC study, for example, 43 percent of all men
and women said the number of boys in their ideal family
would exceed the number of girls by one, however, half of
all respondents wanted an equal number of boys and girls,
and hence did not exhibit any sex preference according to
this measure.
Because of the problems inherent in comparing sex
preference at different levels of ideal family size,
COombs developed a sex preference measure, based on
unfolding theory, that is independent of number prefer-
ence (COombs et al., 1975). The COombs IS-scale ranges
from 1, which indicates extreme girl preference, to 7,
which indicates extreme boy preference, with the neutral
value of 4 indicating the absence of any sex preference.
In the VOC study, the mean IS-scale score was 5.31 for
married men and 5.30 for married women, almost identical
with the average score of 5.37 reported in the KNPS (Kia
and Choi, 1981). Over 90 percent of both men and woaen
had scores of 5 or more, indicating the presence of son
preference. In contrast, only 2 percent of men and 4
percent of women exhibited any amount of daughter prefer-
ence (Bulatao et al., 1978).
As in most countries, sex preference is particUlarly
prominent in reference to the first birth. According to
the KNFS, 60.3 percent of currently married, fecund,
nonpregnant Korean women want a boy for their first
child, compared to only 4.1 percent who want a girl. At
all parities, 66 percent of woaen want a boy for their
next child, while only 16 percent want a girl (Korea,
NBOS and KIFP, 19771112). Table 25 shows that virtually
no one with an equal number of boys and girls (or .ore
girls than boys) expressed a desire to have a daughter
for their next child. Families with more sons than
daughters show a preference for an additional daughter,
however, this preference is only moderate, except for
families with two sons and no daughters.
When faced with the dilemma of what they would do if
they did not have a son, some couples would go to rather
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TABLE 25 Desired Sex of Next Child Among Currently
Married. Fecund. Nonpregnant Women Who Want a Future
Birth. 1974: Republic of Korea
Number of Living Sons
Number of
Living
Daughters 0 1 2
0 S- 60.3 S- 25.9 S- 1.8
D- 4.1 D- 38.6 D- 91.1
1 S- 93.5 S- 80.0 S- 23.1
D- O D- 1.0 D- 30.8
2 S-loo.0 S-100.0 S- 71.4
D- O D- O D- O
S - percent who want a son.
D - percent who want a daughter.
Source: Korea. NBOS and KIFP (1977:T353-T355).
extreme measures. In the 1971 study by the Korean
Institute for Research in the Behavioral SCiences (Chung
et al., 1972), 53 percent of respondents said they would
just keep on having children no matter how many they had
until they got a son (and this figure rose to 73 percent
in rural areas). In more recent surveys, this percent
has decreased considerably as ideal family size has
declined, but a substantial proportion still say they
would keep trying for a son. Another alternative would
be to adopt a son into the family, this solution was
preferred by the majority of household heads interviewed
by Yoon (1974) in 1971. A more drastic solution would be
for the husband to take a concubine to try to have a
son. COncubinage was outlawed under Japanese rule in
1923 and is now rare, nevertheless, in three early
studies, a substantial proportion of women (25 to 50
percent) said that if sonless, they would allow their
husbands to take a concubine to have a son (Chung et al.,
1972, B.-J. Lee, 1959, W.K. Koh et al., 1963). Although
it is not likely that many women would actually do this,
the large nUilber who said they would underscores the
i~rtanee of son preference at that time.
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The majority of women still maintain that they must
have a son (this figure has stayed constant at juat over
60 percent for the last 10 years), however, the proportion
of women who say they do not care whether they have a son
or not increased from 16 percent in 1971 to about 30
percent in 1976 (Moon et al., 1973, B.T. Park et al.,
1979). These data indicate that -the traditional
preference for sons is still very much alive,- although
-that the traditional attitude has also undergone sa.e
erosion- (Cho et al., 1977:117).
Another indicator of son preference ia the reported
sex ratio of births and of children. Both the registra-
tion system and several surveys and censuses in Korea
have found the reported sex ratio to be exceptionally
high: the sex ratio of registered births was reported to
be in the range of 106 to 116 in the colonial period and
105 to 125 since that time (Kwon, 1977), the censuses of
1955, 1960, and 1970 found the sex ratio of the enu.erated
population to be 105.5 to 107.2 at ages 0-4 and 107.6 to
109.1 at ages 5-9 (United Nations, ESCAP, 1975:39).
However, there is evidence that the true sex ratio at
birth does fall within the normal range, thus the above
figures suggest an underenumeration of female children
relative to male children and provide one more indication
of the relative i~rtance of males and femalea.
Even more revealing than the overall sex ratio of
children is the breakdown of sex ratios by parity and
birth order. For the KNFS, C.B. Park (1981) reported a
sex ratio of 106.5 for all children, but the sex ratio in
small families was considerably higher than that in large
families. For eXUlple, it was reported to be 126 in
two-child fUlilies and 130 in three-child faailiea, but
only 102 in five-child families and 94 in larger faailie••
In addition, the sex ratio of the last child in faailies
of any size (133) was markedly higher than that of
previous children (101).
Because of Korea's high degree of son preference, the
family planning progrUl has spearheaded a caapaign to
modify sex preference attitudes by adopting the alogan
-Stop at two, without sex distinction.- Thia alogan ha.
met with sa.e resiatance, however, as evidenced by the
resulta of the most recent national faaily planning (IBC)
(information, education, and c~unication) .urvey (Cheong
et al., 1979). While three fourths of the _n and ...n
interviewed approved of the slogan -stop at two, - only
just over half approved of adding -without .ex di.tine-
tion.- Moreover, there was about an equal difference in
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acceptance of the two .logans in large cities, small
cities, and rural areas, indicating that resistance is
widespread rather than localized.
Whether .on preference has begun to lose it. firm hold
on Korean society (as suggested by Cha, 1979, and Korea,
HBOS and KIFP, 1977) or has waned very little during the
last two decades (a. suggested by Kwon and Lee, 1976, and
Kwon, 1982), there is no doubt that the majority of
Koreans maintain their traditional values on this subject.
This is true in both urban and rural areas, among both
young and old couples, and among both _n and woaen,
although .everal studies have found differentials by type
of place of re.idence, degree of economic development,
and age. It is .till not clear whether the .are lKXIern
sex preference attitude. adopted by &ODe Koreans will
diffuse rapidly through the population, as have lKXIern
f_ily planning attitudes, or whether they will remain
stUbbornly resistant to change.
The Value of Son. and Daughters
The earlier di.cussion of the value of children dealt
primarily with children in general. However, Korean
parents do attach different value. to sons and daughters
and have different expectations for thea. Sons are seen
as entailing IIOre benefits and fewer co.ts. They are
e••ential for carrying on the family name, as well as for
providing old age and other .upport, and ancestor worship
(Cheong et al., 1979, Lee and Kim, 1979, Kong and Cha,
197f, Chung et al., 1974, Yoon, 197f, Bulatao, 1979).
Although the financial concerns are i~rtant, continuing
the f_ily name or the family lineage is always the
par..,unt reason given for wanting son••
Daughters, on the other hand, are valued pri_rily for
ca.panionship and other psychological satisfaction. while
they remain in the family (Lee and Kim, 1979). Once they
get married, they invariabily leave their parents I hou.e-
hold, and many of the.e advantages are lo.t, although
they might .till provide help in old age or .-ergencie••
Not only are daughter. seen as providing fewer benefits
to their parent., but they are also seen as being more of
a financial burden. TWo recent studies have found that
about twice as many parents think daughters cost more
than .ons as vice ver.a (N.B. Cho et al., 1977, Bulatao
et al., 1978). Tho.e who feel that daughters cost more
say they need IIOre expensive clothes, while those who
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feel that sons cost more mention educational costs most
often. Given these perceptions of costs and benefits, it
is no wonder that son preference attitudes are slow to
change.
The Effect of Son Preference on Fertility
and Family Planning
The prevalence of son preference has been said to
constitute ·a major obstacle to reducing fertility· and
·one of the most important obstacles to the current
efforts of reducing fertility to near replacement level
in Korea· (S. Hong, 1978:85, Kwon and Lee, 1976:2).
However, the evidence does not uniformly support this
contention, and the general consensus on the impact of
son preference on fertility has recently begun to lose
ground.
Kong and Cha (1974), in their review of 20 empirical
studies conducted before 1975, found several studies
showing that the sex composition of children affects the
rate of contraceptive practice. More recently, Rindfuss
et ale (1982) and Nemeth (1981) have presented some
preliminary evidence that Korean women without any .ons
intentionally curtail breastfeeding to speed up the birth
of the next child. Some of the strongest evidence for
the influence of son preference on fertility ee-e. fro.
parity progression ratios and other measures ba.ed on
family composition. This effect often manifests itself
most strongly at the second and third parity. Chung et
ale (1974) found many more families with three boy. and
with two boys and one girl than would be expected from
probability theory, and many fewer three-child familie.
with more girls than boys. The vee study reported that
there were nearly twice as many two-child couples with
two boys as with two girls (Bulatao et al., 1978),
indicating that couples whose first two children are
girls are at least twice as likely to have more children
as those whose first two children are boys. Additional
evidence comes from the stated intentions of those with
various family compositions. Table 26 shows the percent
of women who want no more children, broken down according
to their current number of living daughter. and son••
The most striking differences appear at the .econd and
third parities, where more than twice as .any woaen with
all boys than with all girls want to stop childbearing.
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TABLE 26 Percent of Currently Harried, Fecund,
Nonpregnant WOllen Who Want 110 More Chi ldren, by Nu~r of
Living Daughters and Sons, 1974: Republic of Korea
"her of LiYiD« Sons
Nuaber of
LiYins
Daughters 0 1 2 3 4 S+- All
0 13 16 77 94 (100) (96) 51
1 12 71 97 99 100 (100) 74
2 36 82 98 99 (100)
*
86
3 47 81 99 100 (100)
*
87
4 (55) 81 99 (100)
* *
86
S+-
*
93 (100)
* * *
88
All 23 64 94 98 100 99 74
(): Less than 50 csses.
*: Less than 20 cases.
Source: Korea, IOOS snd ItIFP (1977:112).
lIbile these differences are indeed dr_tic, the
overall effect of gender preference is attenuated by the
fact that by biological necessity, fewer wa.en fall in
the exu_s of having all boys or all girls than fall in
the ~ddle where the differences are considerably saaller.
!here are also large nuabers of wa.en at parities 0, 1,
and 4 or higher, where sex preference is less t.portant.
To calculate the overall effect of gender preference,
a new _asure can be used which attell()ts to esti_te fer-
tility attitudes in the absence of any gender preference.
!his _asure asSUlieS that witbout any sex preference, all
wa.en at any given parity will be as satisfied with their
fsaily size as are tboBe of the sa-e parity who currently
have the _t favored cc.bination of BOIUI and daughters.
In other words, it _y be hypothesized that 16 percent of
all ~n with one child will want no more children, 77
percent at parity two, 97 percent at parity three, and so
on (see Table 26). !his _asure also allows for the
presence of daughter preference or a preference for
balance. Using this _tbod and the DIPS data in Table
26, it lllay be estimated that 80.4 percent of Korean wa.en
would want no more children in the absence of any gender
preference, COIIPBred to 74.3 percent who actually said
they wanted no more children. !he same _tbod leads to a
aa-ewbat larger differential in the case of contraceptive
use. 54.6 percent of ~n would use contraception in
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the absence of any gender preference, compared to 45.7
percent who said they were actually using contraception
at the time of the survey. These rough mea.ures indicate
that gender preference may play a considerable role in
explaining fertility behavior in Korea. However, it is
equally obvious that strong sex preference attitudes have
not kept large numbers of women with an ·undesirable·
balance of daughters and sons from using family planning
to curtail further childbearing.
Multiple regression analyses of the influence of sex
preference on fertility and family planning yield mixed
results. The Survey of Economic Factors in Fertility
found that son preference exerted a strong influence on
the number of children desired, but no significant
influence on contraceptive use. Koo (1979) found that
son preference was statistically significant in explain-
ing fertility for older urban respondents only. Chung et
ale (1974) concluded that boy preference was an i~rtant
factor in family planning practice up to parity four
(particularly at the intermediate parities, thereby
paralleling the results based on family composition),
however, the authors did not find any net effect of boy
preference on the desire for more children among
low-parity women. Overall, the multivariate analyses
indicate that although son preference has an impact on
fertility for women in some groups, its effect is
decidedly less consequential than the purely descriptive
data on son preference might lead one to believe.
Kwon (1982) attributes the relatively weak effect of
son preference to countervailing forces. Be speculate.
that son preference will cause some couples to have .ore
children than they would otherwise desire, but other. to
have fewer children because girls are not considered an
absolute necessity for Korean families, therefore, the
net effect of son preference on the aggregate level i.
negligible. 6 Kwon et ale (1975) have also put forth
the intriguing thesis that historically, son preference
may have lowered the rate of population growth in Korea
by generating relatively high mortality for adult wo.en
and female children through inadequate care and diet.
The argument that gender preference does not nece••arily
retard fertility decline has also been developed in two
recent studies outside of Korea. In a small empirical
study in the United States, Widmer et ale (1981) .bowed
that sex preference can lead to lower fertility for aoae
couples and that the overall effect of sex preference 1.
not necessarily an increase in fertility. Bulatao and
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Fawcett (1981) .uggest tbat fertility may be reduced by
tbe exi.tence of gender preference because of tbe risk
that the next cbild may be of the ·wrong· sex. In Korea,
tbi. pos.ibility cannot be discounted.
An alternative hypothe.i. would suggest that son
preference may become a more illPOrtant el..nt in the
future coune of Korean fertility. According to this
argument, son preference has a negligible effect on
fertility wben the TPR is at a level of five or six
cbildren, but will gain in illPOrtance as the TPR
approacbes a level of two or three children. In this
case, further substantial reduction. in fertility would
be unlikely without major changes in the social and
cultural value. that support son preference attitudes.
There are thu. a number of opposing arguments and very
little e~irical re.earcb on the pre.ent and future
effect. of son preference on fertility. 'ftli8 topic IlUst
tberefore remain a matter for .peculation.
1 In.a.e surveys, re.pondents were asked the ideal
number of cbildren for ~n in Korea, in other., they
were asked for their per.onal ideal or desires, and in
others, the precise nature of the question was not
clear.
2 A detailed di.cu.sion of gender preference for
children is presented in the next .ection.
3 'ftle results of the Survey of Bcona.ic Factor. in
Fertility cited bere and in the remainder of this
chapter are found in N.B. Cbo et ale (1977).
4 It .bould be noted that wa.en are particularly
concerned with the i ••ue of old age .ecurity (Lee and
Kim, 1979) .ince they are generally younger than their
busbands, and their life expectancy is considerably
bigber, therefore, they can expect to live for many
year. after their spou.e's death.
S Coat. may be felt more acutely at bigber parities
because per.onal tax exemptions are ltaited to the
fint two cbildren, however, thi. factor would only be
illPOrtant for couples who pay an inca.e tax.
6 See Cbapter 4 for a more detailed explanation of this
tbesis.
CHAPTER 6
FAMILY PLANNING AND ABORTION
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM
The major social changes in Korea that have been linked
to the modernization process and industrialization
brought about a transformation in the value of children.
Individual couples began to appreciate the benefits of
having small families and the government began to realize
the need for a reduction in the rate of population
growth. These perceptions prompted the developlent of a
major national family planning program and led to it.
early success. This chapter begins with a review of the
historical development of the national family planning
program and past and present trends in contraceptive
use. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the use
of induced abortion and its impact on fertility rates.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the late 1950s were year.
of very high fertility. This period was preceded by a
series of important political eventsl in April 1960,
there were massive student protests that eventually led
to the overthrow of the Rhee government and the e.tabliab-
ment of an interim government. A new governMnt, fo~d
a few months later, undertook a major national deve10~nt
program. The so-called National Reconstruction Movellent
peaked in 1962-63, when over half of the road. to rural
villages were improved and clubs were organized for vo.Bn
aged 19-45 in each of the 45,000 village. in the country.
The new government also began to evince an intere.t in
family planning. '!bis interest was .trengthened in early
This chapter is based on a number of reports describing
the family planning program in Korea, eSPecially the
history by Kim et ale (1972).
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1961 when it was announced that the gross national product
had increased by only 2.6 percent the previous year,
while the population growth rate (based on 1960 census
results) was a whopping 2.9 percent, more than enough to
cancel the small economic gain. Private-sector family
planning efforts also helped stimulate the interest of
both the government and civic leaders.
The Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (PPPK) was
founded in the spring of 1961 following contacts with the
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) at
international meetings, through IPPF's publications, and
through visits of IPPF personnel. The head of the
National Reconstruction Movement became president of
PPPK. Since its formation, PPFK has worked closely with
and has been subsidized by the Korean government, coping
with politically sensitive family planning issues and
occasionally shielding the government from criticism. It
has also played an i~rtant international role in
population and faaily planning.
PPPK was also instrumental in the establishment of
Korea's national family planning program in 1962. When
this program began, the local health infrastructure was
quite weak, and there was no established health network
below the gun (county) level. The government did not
complete its goal of establishing one health center in
every shi (city) and gun until 1963. When myun (township)
family planning workers were finally hired in 1964, they
were put under the myun chief in the regular government
office rather than under the health administration. This
system had the unexPected advantage of making the myun
chief responsible for the success of the family planning
program, but it had the disadvantage that the family
planning worker's role was usually diluted with other
work in the myun office. Nevertheless, efforts were made
to minimize the size of the central organization, and
most of the money for the program was distributed at the
local level.
When the family planning program was first established,
it offered only traditional contraceptive methods and
vasectomy. A major expansion was facilitated by the
inclusion of family planning expenditures in the invest-
ment section of the national budget in 1963. At the end
of the saae year, the program was extended to provide a
faaily planning worker for each of the country's 1,473
lIYun, and a mass IUD program was announced. On this
basis, the government set a target of reducing the
population growth rate from 2.8 to 2.0 percent annually
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by 1970. In a single year, the number of family planning
field workers increased from 366 to 2,970, and the annual
number of loop insertions increased from 2,000 to 107,000,
by 1967 the program had inserted its millionth loop (Cho
and Perry, 19791103). The number of physicians who
completed the basic training course in family planning
each year rose from 45 in 1962 to 1,154 in 1964, then
gradually tapered off (Korean Institute for Family
Planning, 19781367).
By 1964, 18 percent of the government's total health
budget was allocated for family planning. This rose to
30 percent in 1966 before it began to decline, reaching a
level of only 13 percent by 1970. In the first six years
of the program, foreign assistance accounted for 18
percent of total family planning expenditures by the
government and by PPFK. Most of the local funds were
spent for organizational activities and contraceptive
supplies, most of the foreign funds were spent on
demonstration projects, equipment, research, evaluation,
training, and information and education.
The largest foreign donors during the 1960s were IPPF
and the Population Council. After 1967, the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) began to
provide large-scale support to Korea's family-planning
programs. In addition, the Swedish International Develop-
ment Agency (SIDA) contributed substantial fund. to build
the Korean Institute for Family Planning's .adern training
and research facilities. As a consequence, mainly of
USAID and SIDA funding, the foreign share of total family
planning rose to about 40 percent around 1970.
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MORSA),
which administers the family planning program, gave PPFK
responsibility for the national information and education
campaign during the 1960s, it gave KIFP the taak of train-
ing family planning personnel, and conducting reaearch
and experiments. In 1963, 125,000 posters and 2.3
million calendars were distributed in rural areas. The
following year, posters and calendars were supple..nted
by about 1.5 million leaflets on contraceptive ..thoda
and 400,000 counter cards for restaurants. Flip charts
and pelvic models were also distributed for use as
educational aids. In 1965, even more innovative items
such as fans for family planning acceptors and mirrors
wi th loop messages for beauty shops were introduced. 'l'he
thrust of the program began to change in 1966 with the
introduction of mobile teams consisting of a health
educator and a family planning worker. 'l'bese teams
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conducted group ~ting. and sbowed informational films
in village., in addition to providing clinical services.
Both group ~tings and .edia messages bave been invalu-
able for .preading family planning information and
.ativating acceptors. In 1968, the monthly magazine
~~ was .tarted for tbe meabers of 17,000 Mothers
Club. that were set up that year (.ee the next section
for a fuller discussion of these clubs). Since the
beginning of the faJllily planning prograJII, both governJDent
and private radio stations have carried a substantial
amount of faJllily planning material. Discussion sessions
have been broadcast, and the availability of contraceptive
Mthods bas been publicized througb spot announcements.
At the pre.ent ti.e, there continue to be spot announce-
Mnt. every other day, plus special programs from time to
time.
Although PPFK and M<»ISA have been most active in the
f.-ily planning program over the years, other agencies
have also played important roles. DIe Ministry of Home
Affairs, througb the local government organizations and
later tbe New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong), .obilized
support for f.-ily planning, the Ministry of Culture and
Public Information contributed to the success of media
campaigns, and the Ministry of Education was instrumental
in the introduction and expansion of popUlation education
activities. Finally, the army bas provided faJllily
planning education to large numbers of military personnel.
J«>'1'BERS CLUBS
In 1968, the Planned Parentbood Federation decided to
e.tablish ·Mothers Clubs· in rural areas, basically to
overcome traditional resistance to both smaller-size
families and modern contraceptive practice. FrOlR the
beginning, these clubs were planned only for rural areas,
principally because of (1) the socially cohesive informal
networks tbat have traditionally bound f.-ilies and
individuals in the villages, and (2) social institutions,
based on traditional values, that have resisted radical
social change in these areas. '!'he idea was to promote
family planning in the conservative rural sector by
aaking use of the existing informal networks of married
wa.en. Urban areas generally had much greater access to
contraceptives through both commercial channels and city
bealth centers, moreover, urban women, having lower
fertility levels and better education, were already more
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highly motivated to accept family planning. Furthermore,
the informal networkB exiBting in the villageB did not
exiBt in urban areaB.
The Btated objectiveB of the MotherB ClubB were to
motivate village women to accept and practice family
planning, to facilitate family planning communication,
and to mobilize Bupport for the government'B population
policy. For tactical reaBonB, they alBo engaged in Buch
related activitieB aB health education for better Banita-
tion, Bmall-Bcale banking functionB, and neighborhood
aBBiBtance projectB.
At the time the clubB were formed, there were roughly
16,800 legal villageB in Korea, with one legal village
uBually conBiBting of Beveral natural villageB. In 1973,
there were Bome 22,500 clubB, during the peak of Mothers
ClubB activity, they were operated by about half of the
natural villageB. The clubB ranged in Bize from 12 to
over 40 members, aB they became more active, they
gradually grew larger, with the average club Bize
increaBing from 23 in 1968 to 31 in 1972. The clubs ..t
about once a month, and according to a 1974 survey, had
an overall attendance of about 76 percent (B.J. Park et
al., 19741177-182). The Burvey alBo Bhowed that 10
percent of the clubB were very active, 38 percent active,
37 percent were moderately active, and 15 percent
inactive, in other wordB, about one half were functioning
productively.
It iB extremely difficult to evaluate quantitatively
the contribution of theBe clubs to the BucceBS of the
family planning program and to actual fertility reduction
in Korea, although Buch attemptB have been made. For
example, Park and Chung eBtimated that roughly 33 percent
of coupleB practicing family planning in 1974 did .0 on
the advice of the MotherB ClubB (B.J. Park et al.
19741191). Where they were actively functioning, the
clubB effectively recruited new acceptorB, provided
valuable aBsiBtance in introducing and winning acceptance
of new contraceptive methods, and contributed to continued
UBe by Berving frequently as convenient, additional
distributors of such contraceptives as pill. and condoaB.
They alBO provided important channels for information and
education about family planning. At the caaBunity level,
club leaders encouraged village leader. to participate in
family planning activities.
In the initial BtageB of the family planning program,
field workerB in the rural communities played a fairly
effective role, in BUbsequent years, however, they tended
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to be younger and unmarried and to show high turnover.
The Mothers Clubs, composed of older, married women, pro-
vided social and psychological support to these workers
and to family planning acceptors. The clubs also helped
eliminate taboos against discussing sex and family
planning, and contributed indirectly to improving women's
status giving them more active community roles and
leadership.
The Mothers Clubs existed and operated for 10 years
beginning in 1968, after which they were integrated into
the nationwide ·Saemaul,· or new Village Movement. This
movement, still actively operating, is a comprehensive
effort toward developing and modernizing the rural sector
of the country (for further discussion, see M.-G. Lee,
1980). By 1978, a major decline in fertility had been
achieved, as discussed in Chapter 2. Whether or not the
Korean family planning program would have achieved the
high level of contraceptive practice without the Mothers
Clubs is a moot question. certainly, the clubs were an
iaportant factor in the success of the Korean f_ily
planning program, and consequently in the reduction of
marital fertility.
TRENDS IN CONTRACEPTIVE PRACTICE
The expansion of the government's family planning program
was followed by a major increase in contraceptive
practice. Table 27 shows contraceptive practice rates by
women's age and residence for 1966, 1971, 1976, and
1979. The last column of the table indicates that the
practice rate increased 2.7 times in 13 years, from 20 to
Sf percent of currently married women age 15-44. The
urban practice rate was four to eight percentage points
higher than the rural practice rate between 1966 and
1976, but only one percentage point higher in 1979,
indicating a rapid urban-rural convergence between 1976
and 1979. Table 27 and Pigure 8 also show that practice
rates increased substantially at all ages, but especially
at ages 30 and above. Por the country as a whole in
1979, the practice rate ranged from 18 percent at ages
20-24 to 72 percent at ages 35-39. The practice rate at
ages 40-f4 was lower than that at ages 35-39, perhaps
partly because some women feel they are not able to have
BOre children at this age and hence do not use
contraception.
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TABLE 27 Contraceptive Practice Rates by Woman's Age and
Residence. 1966-79 (percent of currently married women):
Republic of Korea
Age
Reaidence
and Date 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 Total
Whole Country
1966 3 13 29 32 14 20
1971 7 15 28 38 27 25
1976 15 32 56 62 45 44
1979 18 41 68 72 53 54
Urban
1966 5 19 36 33 13 26
1971 7 17 32 45 29 27
1976 18 37 60 66 48 48
1979 19 43 69 72 55 55
Run1
1966 3 10 25 30 15 18
1971 5 14 24 34 25 23
1976 12 25 50 57 44 40
1979 16 36 67 72 51 54
Note: The 1aat column refers to currently ..rried wa-en aged 15-44. For
1971, 1976, and 1979, the 20-24 age group includes currently aarried wa-en
aged 15-19.
Sources: Korean Institute for Family Planning (1978:313); K.S. Koh et a1.
(1980b:l06).
Table 28 presents contraceptive practice rates by
women's education and residence. It 18 noteworthy that
by 1966, college-educated WOllen were already .adern in
their contraceptive behavior. Indeed, their practice
rate of 46 percent in 1976 was .lightly lower than it wa.
in 1966. This decline occurred because of the increa.e
in the proportion of college-educated WOllen who lived in
rural areas and had lower practice rates than their urban
counterparts, practice rate. for urban college-educated
wo_n increased slightly over the decade. In 1966,
practice rate. increased steeply and ~notonically with
education, but from 1971, a contraction of educational
differentials began to take place. In 1976, practice
rates were very .imilar from one educational group to the
next, although those with a high .chool or college
education still tended to have higher rate. than tho.e
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with less education. The patterns of urban-rural
differences in practice rates within educational cate-
gories did not change much over the 13-year period, the
gradual disappearance over time of educational differ-
entials was taking place both in urban and rural areas.
The almost complete disappearance of rural-urban
differentials in contraceptive practice by 1980 can be
credited to the wisdom of the early program leaders and
adainistrators in focusing their efforts on the
traditionally high-fertility rural areas. Program
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TABLE 28 Contraceptive Practice Rates by Women's
Education and Residence (percent of currently married
women aged 15-44) 1966-79 : Republic of Korea
Education
Residence
and Date None Primary Junior High High School College
Whole Country
1966 16 20 32 40 49
1971 21 25 25 32 38
1976 38 41 41 46 46
1979 51 54 53 58 61
Urban
1966 14 23 36 40 51
1971 19 27 24 35 36
1976 41 46 47 54 53
1979 52 54 53 59 61
Rural
1966 16 18 26 43
1971 21 23 25 21 44
1976 39 41 38 40 44
1979 51 55 53 52 62
Sources: Korean Institute for Family Planning (1978:315). The values of
16, 14, and 16 for 1966 in the first column are approximate values obtained
by averaging practice rates for "illiterate" and "read Korean" in Korea,
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (1966:163) (the figures in the KIFP
source are erroneous).
administrators argued that contraceptive needs in urban
areas would be met by the private sector. Changing
patterns in contraceptive sources in rural and urban
areas support this argument. The proportion of users
obtaining contraception from the government program has
gradually declined: in 1966, 80 percent of current users
obtained contraceptives from the government program,
while in 1976, this figure was only SO percent (Korean
Institute for Family Planning, 1978:313). The expansion
of nongovernment services has occurred principally in
urban areas, largely because drug store contraceptive
purchases involve no filling out of forms or lengthy
waits and usually no prescription, rising incomes, making
contraceptive costs less burdensome, together with the
rather small price differences between governaent and
nongovernment contraceptives, have also contributed to
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the increased use of the latter. Since 1976, the propor-
tion obtaining contraceptives from the government may
have risen somewhat because of the increased sUbsidy of
sterilization, which will be discussed later.
USE OP DIPPERENT CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS
Table 29 shows contraceptive practice rates by method.
In 1966, the most popular method was the IUD, followed by
the condom, however, virtually all of the increases in
practice between 1966 and 1976 are accounted for by other
methods--the pill, sterilization, and ·other· (e.g.,
diaphragm, spermacides, douche, rhythm, withdrawal). '!'he
TABLE 29 Contraceptive Practice Rates by Method of
Contraception and Residence (percent of currently married
women aged 15-44). 1966-79: Republic of Korea
Method
Residence
and Date
Whole Country
IUD Pill Condom
Steril-
ization Other
1966
1971
1976
1979
Urban
1966
1971
1976
1979
Rural
1966
1971
1976
1979
9 1 6 2 2
7 7 3 4 4
11 8 6 8 11
10 7 5 20 12
9 1 9 3 4
5 7 4 4 7
8 8 8 11 13
6 6 6 24 13
9 0 5 2 1
8 7 2 3 3
13 8 4 6 9
15 8 4 16 11
Note: Sterilization figures include male as well as female
sterilizations. Method-specific rates in this table add, to within
small rounding errors, to overall practice rates in the last column of
Table 6.1.
Source: Korean Institute for Family Planning (1978:316).
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IUD practice rate actually declined in urban areas,
although it increased in rural areas and remained
approximately constant in the country as a whole.
As noted above, the IUD was greatly emphasized from
the beginning of the national family planning program, it
was the only effective method known to the program
administrators and leaders. The major push for IUD
acceptance was in rural areas, as is reflected in Table
29. The argument behind this emphasis on IUD acceptance
was that the level of education among eligible women in
rural areas was low, and the method was rather simple to
administer: it did not require the services of medical
doctors, and individual acceptance and practice were
easily achieved without much educational effort.
In the early stages of the family planning program in
1963-64, IUDs were introduced on a large scale and were
rather favorably accepted. Nevertheless, there was some
cultural resistance. In his study of fertility in a
rural community in 1964, Cho (1966) found that not all
the villages in the area accepted IUDs. Villages with
effective leaders who were younger and had a modern
outlook were more accepting, but villages under conserva-
tive leadership resisted. Eventually, of course, all
rural areas came to adopt IUDs as a principal contracep-
tive method. Acceptance of the IUD also meant a serious
decision by the individual to control births. The IUD
drop-out rate was very high during the 1970s, reaching 51
percent by the end of the first year (Moon and Ban, 1973).
However, IUDs played the important role of initiating
contraceptive behavior in addition to preventing births,
IUD drop-out was usually followed by either abortion or
adoption of other contraceptive methods.
The government program did not introduce birth control
pills on a large scale until 1968, by then, IUD drop-outs
were increasing, and couples were searching for an alter-
native method other than abortion. As shown in Table 29,
use of the pill increased at approximately the same rate
in both rural and urban areas. Another noticeable change
in the trend of contraceptive practice since 1976 is the
rapid increase in the use of other methods, such as
withdrawal and rhythm, in both rural and urban areas.
It is not apparent in the table, but the upsurge in
sterilization, which was particularly marked in urban
areas, occurred only after 1972. Before that date,
sterilizations were limited mainly to vasectomies, and
the number of female sterilizations was negligible. A
dramatic surge in the latter occurred in the two-year
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period 1975-77, with the rate rising from 11 to 53 tubal
ligations per 1,000 ever~rried va.en age 20-39. This
increase has been attributed to the introduction of
laparoscopy (a siJlplified outpatient procedure) into the
gover.-ent prograa in 1976 and the tripling of goverruaent
pa~nts in 1977 from 5,000 to 15,000 won (O.S. $10 to
o.s. $30) to physicians perforaing the procedure. Prior
to 1977, the goverruaent subsidy covered only one third of
the fee, leaving the patient to pay the other two thirds.
In 1976, the proportion of couples sterilized in the
private sector exceeded the proportion sterilized in the
goverruaent sector, by 1978, this differential had been
reversed (Westoff et al., 19801130-137).
~e f..-le sterilization rate increased substantially
in both rural and urban areas at every age and _ritel
duration and at every parity and educational level.
Perbaps because of the increases in the goverruaent
subsidy, however, the greatest surge in feaale sterilisa-
tion occurred at lower educational (and, presuaably,
inca.e) levels, the sterilisation rate did not increase
.x:b for co11ege-educated va.en (Westoff et al.,
19801137). ~e surge was also notable aaong those who
bad never previously used contraception I in 1977, feaale
sterilization accounted for 22 percent of all new
acceptors in the goverruaent prograa (Korean Institute for
Paaily Planning, 19781291). Since 1977, tvo-child
families with a wife under 40 who bas undergone contra-
ceptive sterilization are given preference for new
goverDllent housing (Nortaan and Hofstetter, 1980123),
although the illport of this policy has yet to be
evaluated.
AIIong currently _rried fecund va.en who want no acre
births (the group that is aost likely to elect sterili-
zation), 26 percent were sterilized as of 1978. Another
29 percent were using other efficient methods (pill, IUD,
condoa, diaphraga, spermicides). The reaaining 45 percent
were either using inefficient methods (rhythm, withdrawal,
douche, and folk ..thods) or were not using contraception
at all (Westoff et al., 19801137). Many of these wo.en
used abortion, which will be discussed later in this
chapter. Because of the widespread use of abortion, the
substantial increase in sterilization after 1976 averted
only a .aderate nuaber of births. In 1977-78, sterili-
zation averted 0.84 pregnancies per va.an, of which 0.30
would bave resulted in births and 0.54 in induced
abortions. The sterilisation program has thus had a
_jor iapact in reducing the nuaber of abortions (Westoff
et al., 1980).
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Direct computation of births averted indicates that
the national family planning program accounted for about
37 percent of the decline in the birth rate for wo.en
aged 15-44 between 1963 and 1973. The effect of the
program was largest (in the neighborhood of 54 to 60
percent) at ages 25-44, at ages below 25, rising age at
marriage accounted for most of the fertility change (!hoo
and Park, 1978:70). This estimate of impact is approxi-
mate, since it depends somewhat on educated guesses about
potential fertility and substitution rates. Regarding
the latter, it was assumed that 20 percent of acceptors
in the government program would have obtained contracep-
tion in the private sector had the government program not
been available.
Multivariate areal analyses also indicate that the
national family planning program contributed to fertility
decline. Standardized regression coefficients indicate
that both the program and socioeconomic changes have
contributed, however, results from such studies depend a
great deal on which variables are included in the
analysis. Cho and Perry (19791110) found that the
availability of pharmacies strongly influenced total
marital fertility in 1970, more so than did the IUD
acceptance rate. K.S. Koh et ale (1980aI21) found that
availability of doctors and family planning workers
(variables not included in Cho and Perry's analysis)
substantially influenced the TPR in 1975.
In spite of Korea's lowered fertility rates, the
absolute number of births could increase as women born
during the -baby boom- of the late 1950s enter the high-
fertility age group. To forestall this, the governaent
established a Population Policy Deliberation Comaittee in
1976, chaired by the Deputy Premier and Bcona.ic Planning
Minister. Beginning in 1977, a revision of the i~
tax law limited tax exemptions to two rather than three
children per family. Operationally, the family planning
program has increased field workers' salaries, and plana
are underway to increase services to special grouP8 .ucb
as industrial workers and the very poor (Nort.an and
Hofstatter, 1980123).
The new government under President Chun decided to
continue to push the family planning program, and
recently legislated an incentive scheme to di.oourage
large families. According to this new .che.e, to be
implemented from 1982, familie. with three or .are
children will have to pay a higher re.idence tax and
higher fees for medical in.urance. Other benefits for
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small families include priority in public housing,
maternal leave for pUblic-sector employees, and maternal
medical service benefits. Also, as noted above, to
counter the persistent preference for sons, new legisla-
tion has been proposed to attempt to correct those aspects
of the inheritance system that are unfavorable to women.
The target in the Fourth Five-Year Plan was to reach
an annual growth rate of 1.6 percent by the end of 1981.
Bowever, results from the 1980 census show that the
average annual growth rate between 1975 and 1980 was 1.5
percent (see Table 1), and the target was,thus already
achieved by 1980. So far, moreover, the resurgence of
births has failed to materialize.
The Fifth Five-Year Plan calls for continued family
planning efforts and further reduction in the population
growth rate. Because the proportion of women of child-
bearing age will substantially increase in the years to
come, the Plan sets a fairly realistic target of a 1.5
percent growth rate for 1986. If this is to be achieved,
the family planning practice rate must increase to 56
percent by 1982 and 67 percent by 1986.
INDUCED ABORTION
In recent years, populations with a so-called Chinese
cultural background have been successful in reducing
their fertility levels, usually at a more rapid rate than
European populations. These frequently cited -family
planning success stories- occurred first in Japan and
then in other East Asian nations, and in the Chinese
populations of Singapore and Malaysia. All these popula-
tions have historically been under the influence of the
Chinese culture, for which induced abortion and infanti-
cide were traditional practices. In the absence of
modern contraceptives, it is considered quite natural for
a woman to resort to abortion to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy. This happened on a massive scale in Japan
after WOrld War II. As modern contraceptive methods are
introduced, the use of abortion as a method of birth
control becomes less prevalent, but it never completely
disappears. Abortion in these populations still serves
as the ultimate means of birth control when other, more
convenient methods fail, and this is particularly true in
Korea. Asian cultures which sanction induced abortion or
infanticide will probably complete the fertility transi-
tion more quickly than those which do not, consequently,
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among the former, abortion tends to playa major role in
the initial stage of the fertility transition (Cho, 1977).
THE PREVALENCE OP INDUCED ABORTION
Although detailed statistical information on abortion is
scarce and tends to be incomplete, it can be said that
induced abortion has been an important means of family-
size control and thus a major intermediate determinant of
Korean fertility levels, at least since 1960. Before the
initiation of the national family planning program in
1962, it was the only effective method of fertility
control. However, induced abortion is known to have been
very rare during the period of Japanese colonialism. A
small black market in abortions arose immediately follow-
ing the liberation of Korea in 1945, and an increasing
number of -backyard- abortions were performed during and
after the Korean War (1950-53). Abortions occurred
mainly in the cities, especially the large ones, on a
very limited but growing scale (caldwell, 1969). The
major motivation for abortion at that time was to ter-
minate illegitimate pregnancies resulting from forced or
unavoidable situations during the period of war and
extreme social unrest, because of such incidents,
abortion became socially acceptable, though it remained
illegal.
Various studies clearly indicate that induced abortion
for family limitation started in the late 1950s and was
rapidly diffused to a significant proportion of the urban
population beginning around 1960. An early abortion
survey in Seoul discloses that one abortion took place
for every two births in 1963, and that more than 90
percent of abortions in the early 1960s were induced for
the purpose of family limitation (S.B. Bong, 1971120 and
47). According to an estimate by Ban (1973171-78), baaed
on the 1971 National Pertility-Abortion Survey, the ratio
of the total abortion rate to the TPR (approxi-ately
equivalent to the ratio of the total nwBber of abortions
to the total number of births) was 22 percent in seoul,
18 percent in other urban areas, and 3 percent in rural
areas.
Although self-reported data on abortions are known to
be unreliable, there is considerable evidence that
induced abortion has become more prevalent since 1960,
except in the years around 1970. The proportion of
ever-married women who had experienced an abortion was
Ul
TABLE 30 Percent of Ever-Married Women Who Have
Experienced an Induced Abortion: Republic of Korea
Region 1966
Whole Country 13
Seoul 25
Other Urban 23
Rural 10
1971
26
40
34
19
1976
39
50
41
29
Sources: Han (1973:73); B.T. Park et a1. (1979:147).
reported to be 13 percent for the whole country in 1966
and 39 percent in 1976, while the total abortion rate has
been estimated at 550 per 1,000 ever-married women for
1960, 1,347 for 1966, and 2,310 for 1976 (see Tables 30
and 31). Such a drastic change in the prevalence of
abortion has been accompanied by a concomitant change in
attitudes: according to a survey in a middle-sized town,
the proportion of women who disapproved of abortion was
54 percent in 1965 (Lee, 1965:20), national surveys of
fertility and family planning show the rate of disapproval
to be 45 percent for 1971 and only 8.5 percent for 1976
(B.T. Park et al., 1979:254).
Although abortion was illegal in Korea except for
medical or maternal health reasons until 1973, legal
action against abortion has rarely been taken, and a
majority of the population has treated abortion, along
with contraception, as a proper means of family limita-
tion. One important factor contributing to this
situation and thus to the high prevalence of abortion is
a lack of opposition to illegal abortion among medical
personnel and lawyers (Ham and Jon, 1965). More than 90
percent of abortions were reported to have been performed
in authorized medical clinics even before legalization in
1973, at a cost so small that it did not constitute an
economic strain even for the poor (Bong and Watson,
1976:95-96). In fact, the average cost for an abortion
in 1971 was reported as U.S••7.50, which was equivalent
to three days' wages for unskilled laborers, the 1968
abortion survey in Seoul reported similar costs (S.-B.
Bong, 1971:45-46).
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TABLE 31 Total Induced Abortion Rates (per 1,000) by Type
of Area, 1960-76: Republic of Korea
Year Whole Country Seoul Other Urban Rural
1960 550 1,184 1,001 249
1961 610 1,658 848 264
1962 748 1,562 906 468
1963 935 2,146 1,223 522
1964 992 1,878 1,342 632
1965 1,326 2,964 1,623 753
1966 1,347 2,764 1,653 830
1967 1,413 2,452 2,086 85S
1968 1,430 2,430 2,087 899
1969 1,755 2,424 2,794 1,142
1970 1,652 2,004 2,446 1,200
1971 1,590 2,114 2,100 1,170
1976 2,310 2,720 2,430 1,890
Sources: Han (1973:73); B.T. Park et al. (1979:147).
In addition to a growing desire for family limitation
and a low level of economic and social constraints, the
rapid dissemination of abortion in the 1960s seems to
have been partly due to the frequent failure of contra-
ceptive methods and a widely prevailing distrust of both
contraceptives and sterilization. Many studies on abor-
tion reveal a close association between family planning
practices and abortion (Bong and Watson, 19761120-23,
8.-U. Kim, 1980). Por example, the proportion of
contraceptive users among women with abortion experience
was 76 percent in 1971, while that among wa.n with no
abortion experience was 33 percent. In a pregnancy-
interval analysis based on the 1974 KNPS data, Choe
(1980) demonstrates that women with abortion experience
were generally -bad- contraceptive users as coapared to
women who relied on contraceptives only. It was found
from various in-depth interviews (in the 1965 and 1974
Ichon surveys and in an anthropological survey of
population processes in Korea by S.B. Ban and others)
that a considerable nwBber of wa.n preferred induced
abortion to contraceptives or steri1i.ation for family
planning and had had multiple abortions, even though 95
percent of women still consider abortion to be ha.arous
to one's health (B.T. Park, et al., 19791161). ~e
proportion of ever-married wa.n who had experienced
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abortion more than once is reported to bave been 7
percent for the entire nation in 1966, 13 percent in
1971, and 22 percent in 1976 (B.T. Park et al., 1979,147,
Korean Institute for Family Planning, 1978,330). Accord-
ing to the 1976 National Fertility and Family Planning
Evaluation Survey, the majority of women would abort a
birtb if it resulted from the failure of contraceptives
or if it were unwanted (B.T. Park et al., 1979,159-60).
Table 31 sbows that the abortion rate reacbed a
plateau around 1970 and resurged in tbe mid-1970s. The
plateau aay be explained by the increasing availability
of effective family planning methods after 1965, wbile
the resurgence may be explained by the legalization of
abortion for family limitation in May 1973, since wbicb
time the government has vigorously promoted abortion as
an important component of the national family planning
prograa.
PATTERNS AND DIPPERBNTIALS OF ABORTION
As stated above, abortion became popular first in big
cities, then in small cities, and finally in rural
areas. The rate of abortion peaked in 1965-66 in Seoul
and in 1969-70 in other cities, tbereafter fluctuating
with a tendency to decline, in the early 1970s (see Table
31). The rate for urban areas, including Seoul, rose
again in the mid-1970s, although it had not quite reached
its former peak levels by 1976.
A nearly incessant increase in the rate of abortion
has been observed in rural areas since the early 1960s.
As a result, the urban-rural gap in the prevalence of
abortion was reduced gradually during the first half of
the 1960s and rapidly after 1965. The rate of abortion
in rural areas was estimated at about 20 percent of the
urban rate in 1960 and 70 percent in 1976. The marked
regional gap in the early years is largely accounted for
by a scarcity of doctors and a relatively small abortion
market, moreover, although various surveys found rural
women more favorable to abortion than urban residents,
the former apparently felt more anti-abortion pressure
within the more intimate rural community. Witb the
growing abortion market and increasing population
pressure, rural women became increasingly exposed to
abortion. The legalization of abortion in 1973 was
particularly important in expanding rural abortion
practices since the national family planning program was
concentrated in these areas.
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With the growing prevalence of abortion and the rapid
decline of fertility, the first incidence of abortion for
an individual woman started to take place at an increas-
ingly early age and parity. Por instance, the proportion
of pregnancies that terminated in induced abortion in the
third parity was 1 percent in 1960, 9 percent in 1965,
and 11 percent in 1970 (Han, 197318). Overall, abortion
is concentrated among women aged 30-39, with the degree
of prevalence dropping toward both ends of the repro-
ductive span, according to either the age-specific
abortion rate or the ratio of abortions to live births
(Korean Institute for Pamily Planning, 19781334, Park,
Choi & Kwon, 1979:152). ~e rising incidence of abortion
in the early reproductive ages is usually interpreted as
indicating the recent increased use of abortion for
spacing between children.
According to a series of abortion surveys in Seoul,
the relationship of an individual's socioeconomic
background to abortion use changed significantly during
the 1960s. In 1964, abortion was much more commonly
practiced among women of higher socioeconomic status,
there was a strong positive association between abortion
and women's educational, occupational, and economic
status. This pattern shifted partially in 1970: abortion
became most extensive among middle-status women and
decreased slightly in the upper-status group (S.-B. Bong,
1971:26-42), similar observations can be made based on
national abortion data from a variety of sources compared
in sequence (see Ban, 1973:13-26, 8.-U. Kim, 1980, B.T.
Park et al., 1979:145-50).
Religious background has little association with
abortion use, even CAtholics have about the same level of
use as women in other religious groups or those with no
religion. Based on the 1974 KNPS data, S.-U. Kim observed
that an extended family composition tends to be a.sociated
with somewhat less frequent abortion use, indicating the
parental anti-abortion pressure due mainly to a differ-
ence between parents and children in desired family .ize.
Lack of privacy may also act to discourage abortion.
Prom various surveys, very consistent differentials in
attitudes toward abortion are observed by women'. age,
current residence, and other major socioecona.ic back-
ground characteristics. However, these pattern. are
generally opposite to those observed for actual abortion
behavior, and there is no significant statistical
relationship evident between abortion behavior and
attitudes (S.-U. Kim, 1980, Han, 1973:58). ~i.
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suggest. that actual u.e largely depend. on the couple's
.ativation to control family si.e and .atisfaction with
available family planning methods, rather than on their
attitudes.
ABORTION AND THE PRACTICE OF FAMILY PLANNING
As mentioned above, abortion has been considered an
iaportant ..ans of fertility control in Korean .ociety
.ince the late 1950s1 it is also clear from the above
di.cussion that abortion trends have been very po.itively
correlated with family planning practices, indicating
that abortion is not .imply an alternative to contracep-
tives. Bong and Watson (19761120-139) observed the
following relationships between abortion and contra-
ceptive use ba.ed on the 1971 National Fertility-Abortion
SurveYI
The proportion of contraceptive users i. much
greater a.ang va.en with abortion experience than
among those without.
Contraceptive use after abortion is .are frequent
than that prior to abortion, and abortion i • .are
common a.ang previou. contraceptive u.er. than
aDIOng non-users. In general, the use of
contraception and abortion .timulate each other.
Sterilization and abortion are largely mutually
exclu.ive. The proportion of women sterilized
after abortion i. very minor (12'), ~red to
the ~n who previou.ly adopted contraceptive.
(2") •
A considerable portion (42') of women r...in
unprotected from another pregnancy after abortion.
U.ing the same data, S.-B. Ban made the following
additional observations (1973131-47)1
The distribution of women with abortion experience
i. much wider compared to contraceptive u.ers. In
other words, the proportion of abortion u.ers i.
relatively high both in young and late
reproductive ages.
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Contraception is usually started after the second
birth, but induced abortion frequently occurs at
the first or second parity of pregnancy.
Selectivity in abortion utilization in terms of
the socioeconomic background, particularly the
level of educational attainment of women,
occupation of the husband, and number of modern
Objects owned, is far greater than that in
contraceptive use.
Although there has been no systematic effort to examine
the relationship between abortion and contraceptive use
based on more recent data, it is apparent from various
survey reports that the above observations are largely
applicable to later years.
EFFECTS OF ABORTION ON FERTILITY
Since the 1960s, postponement of marriage, induced
abortion, and family planning have been the major
components of fertility change in Korea. Several
attempts at decomposing the fertility decline by these
three components have shown that they are more or less
equally important in explaining the fertility change
during the 1960s (Kwon, 1980, Repetto et al., 1981:
Chapter 2, Koh and Smith, 1970:37, 56-57). It has also
been observed that, in the early 1960s, the decline of
fertility due to abortion was much more salient than that
due to adoption of family planning methods, though this
pattern was reversed in the 1970s. According to an
estimate by Han (1973:69-71), the proportion of fertility
curbed by induced abortion was equivalent to 3 percent of
actual total fertility in 1960, 14 percent in 1965, and
18 percent in 1970, the most pronounced effect of abortion
according to Han's estimates was almost 50 percent of
actual total fertility in Seoul in 1965.
Estimation of the effect of abortion depends primarily
on the method used to calculate the number of births
averted per induced abortion. The above estimation,
using the renewal process model of Keyfitz (1971),
discloses that one induced abortion has the effect of
averting 0.52 births. However, other studies show a
considerably smaller effect: based on the same 1971
survey data, Hong and Watson (1972) roughly estimated
that one abortion is equivalent to averting approximately
Digitized by CoogIe
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0.35 bir1:bs, while a.oe (l98O) caJc:nlated the
ccxrdpWwJjng figure at 0.40 using 1974 IDWS data OIl
PE~ int:.eEYals and a life table llethad. It is also
highly PE'Obable that the i.JII*:t of abortiaD OIl the
fertility lnels (as ....ured by the Dmlber of births
a1rHted per hdeed abortiaD) .... c+anged significantly
during the last bIo dec... with pcofOUDd cbaDges in
repcoductbe bebBYioc, lActatiaD pnlCtices, and fecuDdity
l.ewelaJ lJu;w:e;er, there is apparently no ~tiaD
aYailable that tIOUl.d perait aD &BUB It of sucb cba....
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